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Abstract 
 
In the late 1990s and 2000s, a new kind of social policy spread through Latin American 
countries. Nearly all of them currently invest in Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs, i.e. 
programs that pay cash to poor families and impose health and education conditionalities on their 
children. Political scientists investigating the phenomenon commonly argue that these programs 
have a strong pro-incumbent effect among the poor, but these claims have been sustained by only 
a handful of country studies. In this dissertation, I pursue two objectives. First, I analyze an 
original dataset with information for all Latin American presidential elections carried out 
between 1990 and 2010 and show that investments in CCT programs have not had any 
significant effect on the electoral performance of incumbent candidates. Second, I explore 
multiple sub-national and survey data to demonstrate that CCT programs are associated with 
both electoral gains among the poor and electoral losses among the rich. I claim that the 
occurrence of these counterbalancing effects explain why CCT programs have not helped 
incumbents to win elections. Their most important electoral consequence was to trigger 
rearrangements in the composition of incumbents’ electoral bases, increasing the participation of 
the poor and decreasing the participation of the rich. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
A few years ago, a group of World Bank analysts and academic scholars published a 
comprehensive research report called Inequality in Latin America (Ferranti et al. 2004), which 
proposed a gloomy diagnostic of the region’s unfair distribution of wealth and ways of turning it 
more egalitarian. Analyzing a multitude of datasets, the authors show that Latin America has 
been the most inegalitarian region of the world for as long as statistical data are available and 
that chronic inequities persisted through the centuries, despite social, economic, and political 
changes all countries have gone through. Authoritarian institutions imposed by metropolises in 
colonial times and the capture of the state apparatus by economic elites in the post-independence 
era are claimed to be the main culprits for the phenomenon. Despite the authors’ mild optimism 
with the democratization wave of the 1980s, they did not find signs that higher political equity 
had been translated into a better distribution of income in the following decade. Evidence from a 
sample of household surveys for twenty countries at three time points in the 1990s led them to 
conclude that “on average, inequality has increased in South America and remained stable in 
Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica” (Ferranti et al. 2004, 72). 
More recent estimates published in the United Nation’s Human Development Report 
2009 confirm that Latin America is still highly inegalitarian. Table 1.1 shows that the best 
ranked country, Venezuela, has the 48
th
 highest Gini coefficient in a sample of 142 countries for 
which data are available. Income inequality of Latin American nations are usually much higher 
than in countries with similar human development indexes (HDI). For example, out of forty-four 
countries with HDI between 0.8 and 0.9, in only ten the income of the richest 10% citizens is 
more than twenty times higher than the income of the poorest 10%, and all of these ten countries 
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are located in Latin America.
1
 The only exception is Venezuela, whose ratio is 18.8. In terms of 
people living below the poverty line, there is great variation across countries with similar HDIs. 
Note in the table that national governments tend to define their official poverty lines through 
much more rigorous criteria than the United Nations, for which only people living with less than 
$1.25 PPP a day are classified as poor.  
 
Table 1.1 - Latin American Social Indicators: Countries Ranked by Income Inequality 
Country 
Global 
Rank Gini Rich/Poor 
Below UN 
Poverty Line 
Below National 
Poverty Line 
Colombia 6 58.5 60.4 16 45.1 
Bolivia 7 58.2 93.9 11.7 37.7 
Honduras 9 55.3 59.4 18.2 50.7 
Brazil 10 55.0 40.6 5.2 21.5 
Panama 11 54.9 49.9 9.5 36.8 
Ecuador 12 54.4 35.2 4.7 38.3 
Guatemala 13 53.7 33.9 11.7 51 
Paraguay 14 53.2 38.8 6.5 N/A 
Nicaragua 18 52.3 31.0 15.8 45.8 
Chile 19 52.0 26.2 < 2 N/A 
Argentina 24 50.0 31.6 3.4 N/A 
Dominican Republic 25 50.0 25.3 4.4 48.5 
El Salvador 26 49.7 38.6 6.4 30.7 
Peru 27 49.6 26.1 7.7 51.6 
Mexico 29 48.1 21.0 4 47 
Costa Rica 34 47.2 23.4 < 2 23.9 
Uruguay 39 46.2 20.1 < 2 N/A 
Venezuela 48 43.4 18.8 3.5 N/A 
Notes. Countries are ordered according to their level of inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient. 
Data for the first three columns were extracted from the 2009 report, and data for the last two columns 
are averages for 2000-2008, extracted from the 2010 report. "Global Rank" indicates the position of the 
country in the 2009 report, from most to least inegalitarian (data were available for 142 countries). 
"Rich/Poor" is the percentage of income possessed by the 10% richest citizens divided by the 
percentage of income possessed by the 10% poorest. "Below UN Poverty Line" is the proportion of the 
population living with less than $1.25 PPP. The criteria for defining national poverty lines vary from 
country to country. 
 
The Latin American reality has been an enduring puzzle among political economists, who 
generally agree that popular demands for income redistribution are stronger in inegalitarian 
                                                          
1
 Data were not available for fifteen out of these forty-four countries. 
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countries. The classic model proposed by Richard and Meltzer (1981), for example, predicts that 
the farther the median voter’s income is from the average, the more the population will be taxed 
and the more the government will redistribute income. The authors’ rationale is intuitive and 
based on an assumption with which political scientists would hardly disagree: politicians want to 
stay in power and will implement policies that are suitable for achieving this objective. In 
inegalitarian countries, low-income citizens comprise the majority of the electorate, and 
incumbents should seek to address their demands in order to be reelected. It is intriguing that 
Latin American leaders were able to remain in power without implementing policies favored by 
most citizens. 
A quick glance at books of Latin American history reveals that, occasionally, presidents 
strongly committed to income redistribution were forced out of power. This was the fate of Juan 
Perón in Argentina, João Goulart in Brazil, Salvador Allende in Chile, Juan Bosch in the 
Dominican Republic, Carlos Monroy in Ecuador, Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala, and Ramón 
Villeda Morales in Honduras. Dictatorships were justified as a way to protect Latin American 
countries from the communist threat and were commonly supported by landowners, business 
elites, and the United States. It is not hard to understand why domestic stakeholders have 
traditionally backed authoritarian regimes in the most inegalitarian region of the world, as they 
have much to lose from policies supported by the majority of the population. 
Dictatorships are not the only instrument capable of preventing leaders committed to 
income redistribution from holding power. The literature has plentiful accounts of clientelism in 
Latin American democracies, through which politicians are able to gather support from the lower 
classes without implementing policies that effectively improve their living conditions (see Fox 
1994; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Stokes 2005; Penfold-Becerra 2007; Nichter 2008; Hilgers 
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2008). Clientelist politicians provide private goods to voters in exchange for their political 
loyalty. A patron-client relationship is developed between them, where the former are, in some 
way, capable of monitoring the electoral behavior of the latter, and the latter fear the interruption 
of benefits in case they do not vote as expected. Most politicians may consider clientelism an 
appealing electoral strategy in places where democratic institutions are not sufficiently 
consolidated, the media are not independent, and the civil society is not well organized. 
It is noteworthy, however, that a few years after Pinochet stepped down from power in 
Chile, ending the last military dictatorship in the continent, analysts started to observe 
improvements in Latin American social indicators. In the 2000s, the long-standing trend 
documented in the cited 2004 World Bank report seems to have reversed, and income in the 
region is now better distributed than it was ten years ago. Figure 1.1 shows the recent fluctuation 
of the Gini coefficient in the five most populous Latin American countries, which comprise 
together almost three fourths of the region’s population.2 Note that their levels of inequality 
declined in the 2000s, except for Colombia. Only four out of eighteen democracies (Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Honduras, and Uruguay) had a higher Gini coefficient in the last year of the 2000s 
for which data are available than in 2000. 
                                                          
2
 Values displayed in Figure 1.1 do not match values in Table 1.1, because they were extracted from 
different sources. In Table 1.1, the source is the Human Development Report 2009, and Gini coefficients were 
calculated by World Bank researchers through household surveys obtained from governmental statistical agencies 
and World Bank country departments. Neither the United Nations nor the World Bank publishes these data yearly, 
making it impossible to grasp temporal trends. In Figure 1.1, the source is the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID). This database uses information from the WIID, Luxembourg Income Studies, and 
other sources to expand coverage of countries and over time. Even though its estimates are entirely based on 
secondary sources, it allows us to have a better visualization of temporal trends. 
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Figure 1.1 - Recent Evolution of the Gini Coefficient in the Five Most Populous Latin 
American Countries 
 
Figure 1.1 reflects the emergence of a new generation of Latin American presidents 
strongly committed to income redistribution. The arrival of these leaders coincides with the 
consolidation of national democratic institutions, higher freedom of the press, better organized 
civil societies, and stronger international support for democracy. Arguably, such structural 
transformations have helped reduce the electoral effectiveness of clientelism, as risks of public 
exposure become higher. Moreover, the end of the Cold War obliterated the strongest 
justification for military dictatorships, and the reappearance of these regimes becomes less likely 
year after year. For example, the majority of Latin American leaders emphatically condemned 
the removal of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya by the military in June 2009, and new 
elections were quickly called by the acting president. Similar reactions followed attempted coups 
in Venezuela (2002), Ecuador (2010), and Paraguay (2012). The implausibility of new 
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dictatorships and the decreased effectiveness of clientelism as an electoral tactics have forced 
leaders to update their strategies to retain power. 
 
The emergence of a new kind of social policy 
Simply put, in order to survive in this new political environment, incumbents feel stronger 
pressures to genuinely address popular demands for income redistribution. Aggregate social 
spending (e.g., health, education, housing, social security, etc.) has increased in most countries, 
and more effective programs have been devised to reduce the income gap between social classes. 
One policy intervention in particular has caught the attention of analysts for their high efficiency 
and quick spread across the continent: Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs. The basic 
characteristic of this new kind of social policy is that the government provides cash to poor 
families regularly, but their permanence in the program depends on compliance with health and 
education conditionalities. In general, pregnant women are required to receive prenatal care, 
babies and young children must visit the doctor regularly for health check-ups, and teenagers 
must attend school.  
CCT programs have been scrutinized countless times by economists, governmental 
institutions, and international organizations, most often through country studies. The general 
consensus is that they have had numerous positive socio-economic effects, such as increasing 
school enrolment (Bourguignon et al. 2003; Rawlings and Rubio 2005; Schady and Araujo 2008; 
Lomelí 2008; Lalive and Cattaneo 2009; Attanasio et al. 2010; Behrman et al. 2011), decreasing 
child labor (Bourguignon et al. 2003; Gee 2010; Attanasio et al. 2010; Behrman et al. 2011), 
improving nutrition and health standards among poor children (Gertler 2004; Behrman and 
Hoddinott 2005; Rawlings 2005), reducing poverty (Skoufias and Di Maro 2008; Soares et al. 
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2010), among others. A few scholars have even associated these programs with the reduction of 
income inequality in some countries (Haddad 2008; Soares et al. 2009; Soares et al. 2010). The 
great potential of CCT programs to prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty is 
usually claimed to be their main virtue. The enthusiasm and optimism that characterize most 
studies and evaluation reports stem from the expectation that healthier and better educated 
children will have better opportunities to ascend in the social scale and improve their living 
conditions in the future. 
All CCT programs pay cash to poor families and impose conditionalities on their 
children, but there are many differences among them. They differ in terms of funding sources, 
eligibility criteria, schedule of payments, amount of cash paid, and coverage. National programs 
may be funded by the public budget, international loans, or a combination of both; the 
government may impose restrictions on the number and age of beneficiary children, and it may 
establish different criteria for measuring families’ level of poverty; payments may be made 
monthly, bimonthly, or yearly; the amount of money received by each family varies across 
countries and may depend on number, age, and location of children; and, finally, coverage has 
varied from 0.5% of the population (Paraguay in 2008) to 34.5% (Ecuador in 2009) and may be 
geographically restricted. Specific characteristics of current and past CCT programs can be 
found in a recent book coauthored by Fizsbein and Schady (2009) and will not be discussed here. 
The following pages and chapters will make it clear that none of these sources of variation are 
relevant for the political phenomenon studied in this dissertation, except for those affecting 
programs’ coverage.  
The reason for the current optimism about CCT programs goes beyond their positive 
effects in the social realm; analyst also praise their relative insulation from political opportunism. 
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In a region where the exchange of material handouts for votes has been portrayed as endemic by 
numerous authors, CCT programs’ objective and transparent eligibility criteria, as well as their 
management by an impersonal bureaucracy, assure both that benefits are not conditional on the 
electoral behavior of beneficiaries and that only families in real need are covered (Zucco 2008; 
De la O 2009). Moreover, these programs also have a clear potential to directly weaken patron-
client bounds. The direct transfer of cash from the national government to beneficiaries without 
the intermediation of local party brokers may lead voters to rethink their loyalties toward local 
patrons, as they now have an alternative source of valuable material resources (see Montero 2010 
for a different view). 
 
The origins of CCT programs 
The relatively recent history of CCT programs in Latin America started in Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras, in a typical Summer day of 1990, when President Rafael Callejas signed the Acuerdo 
del Poder Ejecutivo 1208-A and created the Programa de Asignaciones Familiares (PRAF). In 
one of the most influential studies of this program, Moore (2008) asserts that it started as a 
school voucher for children from first to third grade and evolved over the years to include 
children from different age ranges, pregnant women and the elderly poor. Clearly, PRAF is the 
oldest CCT program in Latin America, but most scholars working on the topic rather neglect it 
when depicting the origins of this new kind of social policy. This apparently unfair attitude is not 
completely unjustified. Over the years, the Honduran precocious program became embroiled in 
overt political manipulation, ineffective targeting, and lack of enforcement of conditionalities. Its 
problems were so overwhelming that, in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) authorities decided to create a parallel program, the PRAF-
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II, instead of investing in the original one. As is documented by Moore (2008), the smaller IDB 
program was more effective in targeting the needy and enforcing conditionalities, whereas the 
original PRAF remained subject to ambiguous procedures and opportunistic interference from 
different presidential administrations. Existing in one of the poorest countries in the region, the 
Honduran CCT programs have never been even close to covering all eligible families. Both the 
government’s and the IDB’s programs always relied on some sort of geographic targeting, and a 
non-negligible number of needy families had their access to benefits denied even in covered 
localities.  
In 1994, when lack of resources and political opportunism had already derailed Rafael 
Callejas’ initiative, the mayor of the Brazilian municipality of Campinas launched the Programa 
de Renda Mínima, the origin of the first universal CCT program in the world. The idea of 
providing financial support to extremely poor families on the condition that they kept their 
children in school enticed other mayors and governors to do the same, leading to the spread of 
similar municipal and state programs all across the country. It took seven years, however, for 
President Cardoso to implement the first Brazilian national CCT program, Bolsa Escola, which 
covered relatively older children and imposed only education conditionalities. A few months 
later, the government also implemented the Bolsa Alimentação, a similar program that targeted 
expecting women, babies, and young children. Each of these programs was administered by a 
different Ministry, and, when Cardoso left the presidency, they covered nearly all Brazilian 
municipalities, but only about half of the eligible population. In 2003, the newly elected 
President Lula merged the Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, and other social programs into the 
Bolsa Família, and expanded it to reach all the eligible families, or around 20% of the Brazilian 
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population. It became the flagship of his administration and has served as a model for other Latin 
American initiatives. 
In Mexico, the first CCT program was implemented by President Zedillo in 1997. It was 
called Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA) and covered only the 
country’s rural areas. Although the program never reached families living in the most populous 
municipalities, it followed a rigorous and transparent targeting mechanism, contradicting the 
traditional clientelist practices of the then hegemonic Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). 
In 2000, the party left the presidency for the first time in seventy years, and the newly elected 
President Fox, from the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), continued to invest in anti-poverty 
programs. In 2002, at the same time that other countries initiated their pilot CCT programs, Fox 
changed PROGRESA’s name to Oportunidades, expanded its coverage to urban areas, and 
turned the Mexican experience into a reference for other initiatives, in the same way the 
Brazilian Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Alimentação had become. 
The spread of CCT programs across Latin America and other continents in the 2000s was 
fast. Originally conceived by neoliberal presidents to help the poor deal with hardships brought 
about by macroeconomic adjustments, CCT programs thrived under left-leaning administrations 
that succeeded them. Given their strong redistributive potential, programs created by 
conservative and liberal leaders were embraced and expanded by their leftist successors not only 
in Brazil, but also in Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador, and El Salvador. In other countries, CCT 
programs were actually launched by socialist and left-leaning governments (e.g. Uruguay, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Panama, Guatemala, and Dominican Republic). Today, they are present in 
sixteen out of eighteen Spanish/Portuguese-speaking Latin American democracies and cover 
together more than 100 million poor citizens. It is ironic that the only two democracies in Iberian 
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America that do not have a CCT program are currently ruled by the most radically socialist 
leaders of the region: Venezuela and Nicaragua. Nonetheless, Hugo Chavez and Daniel Ortega 
have also been strongly committed to income redistribution, and the level of inequality in those 
two countries has decreased systematically during their administrations as a result of investments 
in different kinds of social programs. 
 
The political effects of CCT programs as a research topic 
It is easy to see that providing cash to poor families may have strong political consequences, 
even if it is not conditional on beneficiaries’ electoral behavior. From Argentina to Mexico, 
opposition leaders and the media commonly claim that investments in CCT programs have been 
made only to serve incumbents’ electoral interests. It is possible that many citizens are being 
driven to support the incumbent in the polls to “repay” the extra money they are receiving from 
the government. Those who have already voted for him or her in the previous election are likely 
to keep doing so, and those who have voted for the opposition or did not vote before might join 
the incumbent’s electoral base in the next election. This rationale was implied by the vast 
majority of scholars who studied the effects of CCT programs in Latin American elections 
(Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008; Díaz-Cayeros et al 2009; Nupia 2011; Queirolo 2011). 
The view that these programs bring about electoral dividends for incumbents has become almost 
universal. 
Most of what we know about how CCT programs affect electoral results is based upon 
studies of Bolsa Família and its impact on the Brazilian 2006 presidential election. As I pointed 
out earlier, a few months after taking office in 2003, President Lula merged two large CCT 
programs started by his predecessor – Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Alimentação – with other recently 
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created social programs to create the Bolsa Família program. Although the new program did not 
differ much from the previous ones, it covered twice as many families and became strongly 
associated with Lula. In October 2006, Lula ran for reelection and won. When the electoral 
results were made public, they quickly grabbed the attention of analysts. Lula had performed 
considerably better in the least developed municipalities of the country, an unprecedented pattern 
that suggested the emergence of a great divide across the population. Brazilian economists and 
political scientists quickly pointed out a strong association between the incumbent’s vote and 
Bolsa Família coverage. Taking the form of maps, tables, and graphs, the association displayed 
in Figure 1.2 was explored by many scholars. 
 
Figure 1.2 – Bolsa Família Coverage and Lula’s Vote Share in the First Round of the 2006 
Elections, by Municipality. Source: IPEA and TSE 
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What Figure 1.2 suggests seemed obvious to everybody. The higher the investment in 
Bolsa Família was in the municipality, the higher was Lula’s level of support there. Soon, the 
program reached the status of main explanatory variable for Lula’s electoral performance in 
articles published in international and domestic specialized journals (Hunter and Power 2007; 
Nicolau and Peixoto 2007; Zucco 2008; Soares and Terron 2008; Marques et al. 2009; Licio et 
al. 2009). A similar interpretation was proposed in unpublished academic papers presented in 
Brazilian professional conferences, and it did not take much time for the country’s mass media to 
buy it. Claims that the program explained X% of Lula’s vote, or that for each Z invested in the 
program Lula had obtained Y extra votes, became frequent in domestic newspapers of high 
circulation, most of the time authorized by experts in Brazilian politics. 
The potential for ecological fallacy in these interpretations was soon dealt with, as public 
opinion surveys confirmed that Bolsa Família beneficiaries were much more likely to have voted 
for Lula in 2006 than non-beneficiaries (Licio et al. 2009), and analyses based on complicated 
ecological inference techniques also pointed in the same direction (Pinheiro 2009). The 
consensus that took shape in the wake of the Brazilian 2006 presidential election is still the 
current one: the poor rewarded Lula at the polls, and the Bolsa Família helped him to get 
reelected. This explains why his municipal vote shares were so strongly associated with the 
program’s coverage. 
The same rationale has been applied to events elsewhere in Latin America. Consider the 
Mexican Oportunidades, whose evolution and institutionalization bear great resemblance to 
Bolsa Família’s. The presidential election that followed its implementation was carried out in 
2006, and the candidate from the incumbent party, Felipe Calderón, won, despite performing a 
few percentage points worse than his predecessor. His party (PAN) had been traditionally 
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stronger in the most developed areas of the country, and the same occurred in that election. Note 
in Figure 1.3 that the correlation between Oportunidades’ coverage and Calderón’s performance 
is negative: the lower the program’s municipal coverage was in 2006, the better the Mexican 
incumbent candidate performed. 
 
Figure 1.3 – Oportunidades’ Coverage and Calderón’s Vote Share in the 2006 Election, by 
Municipality. Source: SEDESOL and IFE. 
 
The evident contrast between the Mexican and the Brazilian cases did not prevent 
scholars from putting forth interpretations for Calderón’s performance in 2006 that were similar 
to the mainstream explanation for Lula’s performance in the same year. A few months after the 
election, Serdán (2006) published a study claiming that the incumbent gained votes in the least 
developed municipalities of the country, if compared to Fox’s performance in 2000. Díaz-
Cayeros et al. (2009) analyzed exit poll data and found that Oportunidades beneficiaries were 
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11% more likely to have voted for Calderón than non-beneficiaries. Based on these findings, the 
authors claimed that “the triumph of the National Action Party (PAN) would not have 
materialized without the support of ample sectors of the urban poor, who voted for the Right as a 
result of two highly effective programs aimed at them, Oportunidades and Seguro Popular” 
(Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2009, 229).  
More recently, similar stories have been told about presidential elections in Uruguay and 
Colombia. Manacorda et al. (2011) analyzed survey data and found that beneficiaries of the 
Uruguayan short-lived CCT program Plan de Asistencia Nacional a la Emergencia Social 
(PANES) were significantly more likely to declare support for the incumbent than non-
beneficiaries. Addressing more directly the Uruguayan 2009 election, Queirolo (2011) confirmed 
that former beneficiaries of PANES were more likely to have voted for the incumbent candidate 
Mujica than non-beneficiaries. The argument that the Uruguayan CCT program influenced the 
political attitudes and electoral choices of beneficiaries in favor of the incumbent is aligned with 
mainstream interpretations of the Brazilian and Mexican 2006 electoral results. 
Further north, analysts have also been quick to associate the performance of the candidate 
Juan Manuel Santos in the Colombian 2010 presidential election with investments made by his 
predecessor Álvaro Uribe in the large CCT program Familias en Acción. Replicating a research 
report published by the American NGO Global Exchange, Nupia (2011) confirmed that the 
incumbent had gained votes in municipalities with larger proportions of beneficiaries. It led the 
author to make a general statement that defines precisely the consensus that took shape among 
scholars currently studying the politics of CCT programs: “Our results suggest that anti-poverty 
programs in poor countries might be used for incumbents to increase their political support” 
(Nupia 2011, 20). 
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Plan of Dissertation 
The research question that has motivated the literature could be phrased this way: “Do 
investments in CCT programs improve incumbents’ electoral performances?” This question also 
motivates this dissertation and is directly addressed in the next chapter. Naturally, governments 
have a set of other alternatives when their intention is to reduce their countries’ levels of poverty 
and income inequality. The primary reason why I focus on CCT programs is that they happened 
to be the choice of Latin American presidents. It gives me an enormous analytical advantage, as I 
am able to assess the electoral effects of the same kind of social policy in different political 
contexts. I expect that other targeted redistributive programs some Latin American governments 
have invested in (e.g. unconditional cash transfers in Venezuela and provision of in-kind benefits 
in Nicaragua) would have similar effects as the ones reported in the following chapters, because 
they also benefit exclusively the poor. However, I do not want to make stronger claims than my 
empirical analyses permit, and I leave the assessment of this possibility for future research. 
The hypothesis proposed by the literature is that CCT programs do improve incumbents’ 
electoral performances. This is a hypothesis that, although explicitly stated in most studies, has 
never been adequately tested. It is rather an extrapolation of findings that the electoral support 
for incumbents who invested in large CCT programs increased among beneficiaries. However, 
we do not know anything about the counterfactual: would these incumbents have performed 
worse had they not invested in those programs? The closest we can get to an answer for this 
question, given the fact that we need to rely on observational data, is by comparing their 
performances with the performances of incumbents who did not invest in CCT programs. This is 
my first objective in this dissertation.  
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In the next chapter, I analyze an original dataset comprised of all eighty-four presidential 
elections carried out in the eighteen Latin American democracies between 1990 and 2010. In the 
models I estimate, the dependent variable is incumbents’ vote swings from one election to the 
other, and the main explanatory variable is the coverage of CCT programs at the end of the 
presidential administration. I control for several other factors commonly claimed to influence 
incumbents’ electoral performances, such as the economy, the status of the government, and the 
president’s ideology. My results contradict the hypothesis that CCT programs pay off electorally. 
In fact, presidents who invested in these programs did not fare better in the following election 
than presidents who did not. Only broader economic variables, such as growth of GDP, inflation, 
and unemployment, are associated with incumbents’ vote swings in the period covered by the 
analysis. 
This finding raises a puzzling question that I address in the rest of this dissertation: “Why 
does not the performance of incumbent candidates who invest in CCT programs improve in the 
following election?” This is puzzling, because the literature has provided compelling evidence 
that those incumbents were gaining votes among beneficiaries. Why have not these extra votes 
entailed a better overall performance at the national level? My hypothesis is that vote gains 
among beneficiaries were offset by vote losses among non-beneficiaries. The logic behind it is 
straightforward. Those who benefit from CCT programs are better off at the end of the 
presidential administration and will reward the incumbent at the polls. On the other hand, those 
who are ineligible for the program are worse off, because their tax money is not being spent in a 
way that directly benefit them. They would rather pay less taxes, or have their tax money 
employed in other policies, and, therefore, they punish the incumbents when the next election 
takes place. 
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I start by assessing this hypothesis at the aggregate level of analysis in chapter 3. If non-
beneficiaries really disapprove investments in CCT programs, the incumbent should endure vote 
losses in areas of the country where coverage is low and the proportion of non-beneficiaries is 
high. As coverage increases, vote swings should become less and less negative, until a threshold 
is reached where the incumbent neither gains nor loses votes in the aggregate. As coverage 
increases beyond that threshold, incumbents’ vote swings should become more and more 
positive, because the proportion of the population that approves of investments in the program 
(the beneficiaries) increases. I verify this on the basis of electoral results and coverage of CCT 
programs disaggregated at the level of administrative subdivisions for nine countries. I built 
twelve country-specific datasets, which correspond to 86% of all presidential administrations that 
invested in universal CCT programs between 1990 and 2010.
3
 These datasets reveal a pattern 
that has not been identified before and confirm the hypothesis that motivated my analyses in this 
chapter: support for incumbent candidates who invested in those programs indeed tends to grow 
in the countryside, where CCT coverage is higher; but it also tends to shrink in the capitals and 
metropolitan areas, where coverage is relatively small. This is confirmed by regression models 
using incumbents’ vote swings as the dependent variable and coverage of the program as the 
explanatory variable.  
In the same chapter, I also provide a more in-depth analysis of four cases, and illustrate 
the effects of CCT programs on the performance of incumbents with electoral maps. My original 
intention was to discuss all cases for which I collected data, but that would imply the 
presentation of an excessive amount of country-specific information that would not add much to 
                                                          
3
 In three countries (Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador), more than one presidential administration invested in 
universal CCT programs in the period, and I built one dataset for each of them. 
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our understanding of the phenomenon. Instead, I opted to focus my attention on two cases that 
are representative of the pattern revealed by the regression analyses (Panama and Uruguay), the 
one case that deviated from that pattern (Costa Rica), and the case in which the vote swings 
associated with CCT programs were most dramatic (Brazil). I do not have any good reason for 
choosing Panama and Uruguay; I could actually have chosen any other country, as all of them 
followed the same pattern. I chose two representative cases instead of one, because I wanted to 
emphasize the fact that similar vote swings occurred in countries where the president originally 
enjoyed stronger support in areas with a higher proportion of poor voters (e.g. Panama) and in 
countries where he or she originally enjoyed stronger support in more developed and urbanized 
areas (e.g. Uruguay). I could not avoid discussing in more detail the outlier case (Costa Rica), 
and speculating the reasons why the vote swings observed there occurred in the opposite 
direction. Finally, I dedicate a good portion of that chapter to the discussion of the case that has 
been most scrutinized by the literature. In Brazil, the vote swings endured by Lula between 2002 
and 2006 were so extreme and so strongly associated with coverage of Bolsa Família that this 
case clearly stands out. Such a dramatic realignment of the electorate is unprecedented in the 
Brazilian post democratization era. Although Lula’s national vote share in 2006 was similar to 
his vote share in 2002, he gained a massive amount of votes in the poorest areas of the country, 
and lost nearly the same amount in the most developed ones.  
In the third chapter, my objective was to verify if electoral patterns observed at the 
aggregate level of analysis supported my hypothesis about the electorally neutral effect of CCT 
programs. I hypothesized that vote gains among beneficiaries are offset by vote losses among 
non-beneficiaries. Findings presented in that chapter are revealing of the influence the program 
has on the geographic distribution of incumbents’ electoral bases, but they do not authorize me to 
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make any claim about individuals’ behavior. In order to be able to make such claims, I turn my 
attention to the individual level of analysis in the fourth chapter. The same hypothesis that 
motivated the third chapter also motivates the fourth, but now I test it directly on individual level 
data: do beneficiaries electorally reward, and non-beneficiaries punish, presidents who invest in 
CCT programs? 
I take advantage of the impressive amount of survey data made available by the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2010, when citizens from nearly all countries in 
the Americas and the Caribbean were interviewed. In many surveys, CCT beneficiaries were 
distinguished from non-beneficiaries, making it easy to compare their attitudes and voting 
decisions. For my purposes, an important virtue of these data is that respondents were asked to 
indicate their vote decisions in two time points: whom they voted for in the previous presidential 
election, and whom they would vote for if the following election were to be held next week. 
With these two pieces of information in hand, I was able to identify citizens who would change 
their vote and determine if those changes were associated with CCT benefits. The pattern 
revealed by my analyses is that the pro-incumbent effect of CCT programs depends on whether 
the president inherited or implemented the country’s current program. In countries where he or 
she inherited it, voters who did not vote in the previous election were significantly more likely to 
declare an intention to vote for the incumbent in a hypothetical upcoming election. In countries 
where he or she initiated or universalized the program, citizens who previously voted for the 
opposition were more likely to switch sides and vote for the incumbent in the next election. 
Non-beneficiaries have always been the majority in all countries, and they do not bear the 
same attitudes toward CCT programs. The only LAPOP survey that asked respondents to 
indicate their opinions about a national CCT program was the one carried out in Brazil. This 
21 
 
survey reveals that a very specific segment of the population tends to be critical of Bolsa 
Família. These “anti-CCT” citizens are generally richer, better-educated, and more conservative 
than the average. My analyses show that among all respondents who declared to have previously 
voted for Lula, anti-CCT citizens are considerably less likely to keep supporting him in an 
upcoming election. Other surveys do not have information on respondents’ attitudes toward CCT 
programs, but I found a similar negative effect among richer, better educated, and more 
conservative citizens in all countries where a CCT program currently exists, but not in those 
without it.  
Similarly to all of the other authors who investigated the electoral effects of CCT 
programs, a very small portion of this dissertation is dedicated to theorizing, but I am careful 
enough to not be completely negligent in this regard. My focus on empirical analyses is in part 
due to the simplicity of the mechanisms driving the hypotheses I test. Incumbents who invest in 
CCT programs were believed to perform better in the following elections as a result of the extra 
votes they gained among the poor. It did not happen, however, and the logical explanation for it 
seems to be that non-beneficiaries react negatively to the fact that their tax money is not being 
invested to their benefit. Whether this actually happens or not becomes an empirical question, 
which this dissertation seeks to answer using different analytical tools and assessing information 
at different levels of analysis. My results support an interpretation of the electoral consequences 
of investments in CCT programs that is much different from the one that has been championed 
so far. Proposing this alternative view and providing strong empirical support for it are the main 
contributions of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 
CCT Programs and Presidential Elections in Latin America 
 
The potential that CCT programs have to affect electoral results has not been studied by political 
scientists as much as the effects of other economic variables, such as GDP growth, inflation, and 
unemployment. Although social safety nets in Latin American countries have expanded in the 
2000s primarily as a result of massive investments in CCT programs, they remain a very specific 
kind of social policy that scholars unfamiliar with Latin American politics are unlikely to have 
heard of. However, if claims made by the most recent studies on the topic are correct, this highly 
effective form of income redistribution is providing incumbents with a way out of what 
McDonald and Budge (2005, 93) call a “consistent, stable, and generalizable finding that does 
emerge from studies of comparative voting - governments everywhere seem consistently to lose 
votes in the current as opposed to the previous election”. Are CCT programs really making 
incumbents electorally more successful, contradicting a systematic finding of a literature that has 
already become classic? 
In this chapter, I claim that they are not. CCT programs, like any other redistributive 
policy, do not lead to Pareto improvements in the allocation of societies’ resources. Non-
beneficiaries pay their costs in the form of higher taxes or lower investments in policy areas they 
may consider more essential. Added to that, government intervention in the economy for the sake 
of income redistribution is something citizens may reject on strictly ideological grounds. Here, 
my objective is to deconstruct the myth that these programs help incumbents to win elections and 
demonstrate that this hypothesis is not sustained by cross-national empirical evidence. Latin 
American presidents who invested in CCT programs are neither electorally more successful than 
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those who did not, nor electorally more successful than they had been in the past. Paldam’s 
(1991:19) assertion that “it does cost votes to rule” is not put in check by the recent spread of 
CCT programs in Latin America: incumbents tend to lose votes between elections and providing 
cash to the poor does not alleviate these losses. 
In order to demonstrate this, I collected electoral, political, and economic data for all 
eighteen Iberian American democracies, sixteen of which currently invest in CCT programs, 
from 1990 to 2010. Eighty-four presidential elections were carried out in the period, and these 
elections comprise the units of analysis in the dataset I use in this chapter. For each of them, I 
have information on the incumbent’s electoral performance, on the economic situation during the 
years preceding the election, on characteristics of the government that had been ruling the 
country until then, and on investments made in CCT programs.  
In the next section, I briefly discuss the two strands of the literature this chapter 
addresses. On the one hand, by demonstrating that CCT programs do not affect incumbents’ 
electoral performances, I am directly dialoguing with scholars studying the electoral effects of 
these programs. This literature has already been discussed in the last chapter, and I do not spend 
much time on it here. On the other hand, when I show that economic growth and inflation 
strongly affected electoral results in the Latin America of the 1990s and 2000s, I am also 
approaching the older and more mature economic vote literature. The analyses reported in this 
chapter owe in great measure to insights of studies assessing the association between 
macroeconomic variables and elections. In the second section, I introduce my criterion for 
distinguishing between universal and geographically-targeted CCT programs and describe the 
method I employ to estimate their coverage in election years. In the third section, I estimate the 
effect of CCT programs on incumbents’ vote swings through different statistical models and 
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using different sets of control variables. These models consistently demonstrate that CCT 
programs are not associated with incumbents’ electoral performances, whereas GDP growth and 
inflation are. They also confirm the customary argument of the economic vote literature that the 
influence of the economy on elections is mediated by political institutions: only presidents 
perceived as clearly responsible for the country’s economic performance are punished in the 
polls when the economy goes bad. In the fourth and last section, I restrict my analysis to 
programs that have reached universal coverage and demonstrate that my findings are robust to 
alternative specifications of the main explanatory variable. 
 
The current consensus 
In Chapter 1, I pointed out that research on the Brazilian 2006 presidential election produced the 
most influential studies about the effects of CCT programs on the electoral performance of 
incumbent candidates. A strong positive correlation between the municipal coverage of Bolsa 
Família and vote shares of the incumbent candidate Lula led several political scientists and 
economists to propose a causal association between the two. Soon, statements that the program 
was the most important determinant of the 2006 electoral results became mainstream, and most 
scholars investigating the phenomenon agree that Bolsa Família helped Lula to get reelected 
(Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008; Soares and Terron 2008). I also pointed out in Chapter 1 
that research has not been restricted to Brazil. Serdán (2006) found that, in 2006, the Mexican 
incumbent candidate Felipe Calderón performed better in municipalities with larger 
Oportunidades coverage than President Vicente Fox in 2000. A few years later, Díaz-Cayeros et 
al. (2009) analyzed exit poll data and found that Oportunidades beneficiaries were 11% more 
likely to have voted for Calderón than non-beneficiaries. Manacorda et al. (2011) found that 
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beneficiaries of the Uruguayan CCT program PANES were more likely to support President 
Tabaré Vázquez in opinion surveys, and Queirolo (2011) found that they were also more likely 
to have voted for the incumbent candidate José Mujica in the 2009 elections. Nupia (2011) found 
that in the Colombian 2010 presidential election, the incumbent candidate Juan Manuel Santos 
performed better in municipalities where the CCT program Familias en Acción covered a larger 
proportion of the population than President Álvaro Uribe did when he was reelected in 2006. 
Finally, Layton and Smith (2011) analyzed survey data of nine Latin American countries and 
found that beneficiaries of CCT programs are consistently more likely to declare intention to 
vote for incumbents than non-beneficiaries. 
What is important to underscore about this literature is that country studies of a handful 
of electoral contests are the main references we currently have for what we know about how 
CCT programs influence elections. These studies consistently claim that such programs pay off 
and help incumbents to win elections, as a result of the expansion of their bases of support 
among beneficiaries. If we take into consideration that twenty-nine Latin American presidential 
elections held between 1990 and 2010 followed administrations that invested in these programs, 
and that only five of them have been studied by the literature, it is evident that we do not know 
much. In order to help this research agenda to move forward, I collected cross-national data to 
assess if the common wisdom could resist a basic empirical test, i.e., if presidents who invested 
in CCT programs were really performing better in elections than presidents who did not. In the 
following sections, I demonstrate that these programs have not had any significant electoral 
effect at the cross-national level of analysis and that the economy is by far the strongest predictor 
of incumbents’ performances in Latin America. It confirms classic economic vote hypotheses 
that have been tested through the most varied methodologies for decades.  
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Claims of the economic vote literature have not been immune from contradictory 
empirical evidence and criticisms, however.
4
 So many scholars have found the influence of the 
economy on elections to be mediated by political institutions, for example, that an influential 
author has titled one of his most recent articles “The End of Economic Voting?” (Anderson 
2007). Without providing a “yes or no” answer for the question enunciated in his title, the 
author’s concerns reflect a consensus that took shape in the academic community after decades 
of knowledge accumulation: the economy does not affect the electoral performances of 
incumbent candidates in all countries similarly. Instead, voters only punish or reward those 
incumbents they clearly perceive as responsible for the country’s economic situation. Heads of 
government who can blame coalition partners or the opposition in the legislature for their failures 
in office are relatively immune from voters’ punishment (Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 
1995, 2000; Duch and Stevenson 2008), and the findings I present in the third section of this 
chapter confirm this argument. 
The economic vote literature had relied exclusively on country studies, especially of the 
U.S., in its beginnings, and serious efforts of cross-national analyses only started in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Although not without contradictions, 
which forced authors to review the theoretical grounds on which economic vote hypotheses were 
sustained, it is fair to say that this literature resisted this crucial test and still explains much of 
real world phenomena. Evidence presented in this chapter is proof of it. The young literature on 
CCT programs has also relied primarily on country studies up to this date, and my dissertation is 
                                                          
4
 For reviews of the economic vote literature, see Schneider and Frey 1998, Nannestad and Paldam 1994, 
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, and Anderson 2007.  
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the first academic work to test its claims on a comparative cross-national framework. Below, I 
show that such claims do not resist this test and need to be reviewed with urgency.  
 
Coverage and classification of CCT programs 
In the cross-national dataset I have built, each case corresponds to a presidential election and has 
information on the incumbent candidate’s vote share in it and in the one held immediately 
before. I make reference to presidential administrations quite often, and by that I mean the 
period of time that passed between those two presidential elections. Twelve out of the eighty-
four presidential administrations in the dataset were interrupted before the end of the president’s 
constitutional term for reasons of resignation or impeachment, and a non-elected temporary 
government ruled until a new presidential election was carried out. These cases also count as one 
presidential administration, despite the fact that more than one head of government ruled in the 
period. Table 2.1 shows that 34.5% of Latin American presidential administrations invested in 
CCT programs between 1990 and 2010. 
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Table 2.1 - Number of presidential administrations that invested in CCT programs by country (01/01/1990 - 
12/31/2010) 
Country 
Total 
Terms 
Invested in 
CCT Name of Current Program 
Classification of the 
Current Program  
Argentina 4 2 (50%) Asignación Universal por Hijo Universal 
Bolivia 5 1 (20%) Juancito Pinto / Juana Azurduy Universal 
Brazil 5 3 (60%) Bolsa Família Universal 
Chile 4 2 (50%) Chile Solidario Universal 
Colombia 6 3 (50%) Familias en Acción Universal 
Costa Rica 6 1 (17%) Avancemos Universal 
Dominican Republic 6 1 (17%) Solidaridad Universal 
Ecuador 6 2 (33%) Bono de Desarrollo Humano Universal 
El Salvador 4 1 (25%) Comunidades Solidarias Geographically-Targeted 
Guatemala (*) 5 0 (0%) Mi Familia Progresa Geographically-Targeted 
Honduras 5 5 (100%) PRAF Geographically-Targeted 
Mexico 3 2 (67%) Oportunidades Universal 
Nicaragua (**) 4 2 (50%) NA NA 
Panama 4 1 (25%) Red de Oportunidades Universal 
Paraguay 4 1 (25%) Tekoporã Geographically-Targeted 
Peru 5 1 (20%) Juntos Geographically-Targeted 
Uruguay 4 1 (25%) Asignaciones Familiares Universal 
Venezuela 4 0 (0%) NA NA 
Total 84 29 (34.5%)     
(*) The Mi Familia Progresa program was implemented in 2008, after the last Guatemalan presidential election of 
my sample. 
(**) The Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social operated from 2000 to 2006 and was discontinued by President 
Bolaños. 
Note. "Total Terms" indicates the number of presidential administrations subsumed in the dataset; "Invested in 
CCT" indicates the number and proportion of presidential administrations that invested in any kind of CCT 
program; "Name of Current Program" indicates the name of the national CCT program(s), as of 12/31/2010; and 
"Classification of the Current Program" indicates the way I classify current programs based on criteria described 
further in this section.  
 
Each of these programs went through a very specific process of institutionalization, and 
five countries had already had experience with other CCT programs before the implementation 
of the ones now in place. The Argentine Asignación Universal por Hijo evolved from Plan 
Familias and Jefes y Jefas de Hogares; the Brazilian Bolsa Família evolved from Bolsa Escola 
and Bolsa Alimentação; the Salvadoran Comunidades Solidarias evolved from Red Solidaria; 
the Mexican Oportunidades evolved from PROGRESA; and the Uruguayan Asignaciones 
Familiares evolved from PANES. In Brazil, El Salvador, and Mexico, new programs were 
implemented by presidents who inherited CCT programs from administrations led by other 
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parties. This was done, in part, to create a false impression of discontinuity with the initiatives of 
their predecessors. In Argentina and Uruguay, institutional adjustments that ended previous CCT 
programs and gave origin to the current ones were relatively deeper, despite the fact that power 
remained in the hands of the same party. When the second decade of the XXI century began, 
Venezuela was the only democracy in the Iberian America that lacked any experience with these 
programs, and Nicaragua was the only country to have terminated a CCT program without 
implementing a new one to replace it. 
Succinctly defined, CCT programs pay cash to poor families and impose health and/or 
education conditionalities on them. All of the programs listed in Table 2.1 share this basic 
characteristic, but in the first chapter I indicated that they differ in many aspects. Among other 
things, CCT programs vary in terms of amount of cash paid to beneficiaries, regularity of 
payments, specificities of conditionalities, age ranges of eligible children, methods for assessing 
the poverty level of individuals, and funding sources. Independently of these differences, 
however, beneficiaries are better off with a CCT program than without it, which leads them to 
reward the incumbent in the next election. The only characteristic of CCT programs that may 
have a major impact on electoral results is their coverage, because it determines the number of 
people who will migrate to the incumbent’s electoral base. If scholars of CCT programs are 
correct, the higher the number of people receiving cash from the government is, the more the 
incumbent’s electoral base will expand, and the better he or she will perform in the next election. 
Following the standard practice, I use the number of households covered by CCT 
programs divided by the total number of households as the indicator of coverage. Unfortunately, 
this indicator can never be completely accurate. Governmental agencies responsible for the 
management of CCT programs generally publish statistics on the number of beneficiary families 
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with some regularity, but censuses are carried out in most countries only every ten years. The 
implication is that coverage figures must rely on past or future counts of the population and are, 
therefore, slightly over or underestimated. I estimated the coverage of CCT programs at the end 
of all the twenty-nine presidential administrations that invested in them between 1990 and 2010, 
based on official CCT statistics and census data, and they are reported in Table 2.2. To reduce 
the magnitude of over and underestimation, I rounded values down to the next half integer if the 
census was carried out before the publication of the corresponding CCT statistics and rounded 
them up otherwise. For the three cases where a census was carried out in the same year as the 
publication of CCT statistics (Mexico 2000, Honduras 2001, and Brazil 2010), I rounded the 
estimate to the closest centesimal. Sources and dates for statistics on which these estimates are 
based are listed in Appendix A. 
 
Table 2.2 - Estimated Coverage (as % of population) in Election Years 
Geographically-Targeted Programs 
Country Year Name of the Program Coverage 
Argentina 2003 Ingreso de Desarrollo Humano 2% 
Argentina 2007 Plan Familias 4.5% 
Colombia 2002 Familias en Acción 3.5% 
Colombia 2006 Familias en Acción 4.5% 
El Salvador 2009 Red Solidaria 6.5% 
Honduras 1993 Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF) 6% 
Honduras 1997 PRAF 4% 
Honduras 2001 PRAF/PRAF-II 8.1% 
Honduras 2005 PRAF/PRAF-II 9.5% 
Honduras 2009 PRAF/PRAF-III 10% 
Mexico 2000 PROGRESA 11.15% 
Nicaragua 2001 Red de Protección Social 1% 
Nicaragua 2005 Red de Protección Social 2.5% 
Paraguay 2008 Tekoporã 0.5% 
Peru 2006 Juntos 1% 
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Table 2.2 (cont.) 
Universal Programs 
Country Year Name of the Program Coverage 
Bolivia 2009 Juancito Pinto/Juana Azurduy 22% (*) 
Brazil 2002 Bolsa Escola/Alimentação 11% 
Brazil 2006 Bolsa Família 19.5% 
Brazil 2010 Bolsa Família 22.25% 
Chile 2005 Chile Solidario 4% 
Chile 2009 Chile Solidario/Chile Crece Contigo 5% 
Colombia 2010 Familias en Acción 22.5% 
Costa Rica 2010 Avancemos 13% 
Dom. Republic 2008 Solidaridad 17% 
Ecuador 2006 Bono de Desarrollo Humano 31% 
Ecuador 2009 Bono de Desarrollo Humano 34.5% 
Mexico 2006 Oportunidades 19.5% 
Panama 2009 Red de Oportunidades 8.5% 
Uruguay 2009 Asignaciones Familiares 14% 
(*) Bolivia's estimate is total number of grantees divided by the population, 
because the government does not publish the number of beneficiary families 
as all other countries do. The coverage of its programs is, therefore, highly 
underestimated in the table.  
Notes. Geographically-targeted and universal programs are listed in the first 
and second half of the table, respectively. All estimates are based on official 
CCT statistics and census data, except for Honduras and Nicaragua. Official 
CCT statistics for these two countries are lacking, and their estimates are 
based on data collected from IADB and ECLAC documents. For dates and 
sources, refer to Appendix A.  
 
Once the eligibility criteria are established by the government, CCT programs tend to 
expand gradually until they reach full coverage. With nearly 100% of potential beneficiaries 
covered, the only way CCT programs can keep expanding is through changes in their eligibility 
criteria. In principle, governments cannot prevent eligible families from receiving benefits, and 
this is the reason why these programs have been praised as universalistic. However, the programs 
listed in the first half of Table 2.2 impose geographic restrictions on accession, which can be 
interpreted as a sign of unfairness against poor families living in uncovered areas. Although 
geographic targeting does not necessarily make a program clientelistic, it is an undeniable 
indicator that the program does not cover all the poor. Grievances may lead the uncovered poor 
to support the opposition, offsetting electoral gains the incumbent expects to obtain among 
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covered families. For this reason, geographically-targeted programs are distinguished from 
universal ones in the dataset. I classified as universal only those programs that covered at least 
95% of the country’s second-level administrative divisions at the time of the election. 
It is very likely that some of the programs classified as universal did not reach full 
coverage when the presidential election took place. However, determining how close each of 
them is from covering 100% of eligible families is always a challenging task for two reasons. 
First, all countries but Brazil rely on relatively complex proxy means tests to determine the 
poverty level of families and select beneficiaries.
5
 In general, public social workers apply 
personal in-home questionnaires to potential beneficiaries and, based on some kind of scoring 
system, decide if they fit the eligibility criteria or not. Questionnaires and scoring systems vary, 
but their relative complexity makes it hard for independent analysts to estimate the exact 
potential for CCT coverage in each country. Second, all programs are affected by leakage 
(coverage of beneficiaries who do not fit the eligibility criteria) and undercoverage (exclusion of 
families who fit the eligibility criteria), the degree of which can be estimated only roughly. Latin 
American governments, sometimes in cooperation with independent organizations, have been 
quite diligent in seeking to identify and eliminate these problems, and the general perception that 
CCT programs are well-targeted is in part the result of these efforts. However, monitoring tens of 
thousands, in some cases millions, of beneficiaries is difficult, and reliance on complex 
measurement instruments such as proxy means testing only adds to the difficulty. For these two 
reasons (i.e., complexity of selection mechanisms and pervasiveness of leakage/undercoverage), 
I decided to eschew the task of assessing how close each of the programs I classified as universal 
really is from being universal. The only criterion I employ to classify CCT programs is, as I 
                                                          
5
 In Brazil, the only criterion for selecting beneficiaries is their income. 
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already pointed out, reliance on geographic targeting, because this is an unquestionable sign that 
the government systematically denies social assistance to some poor families by reasons other 
than the families’ actual needs.  
Distinguishing universal from non-universal programs is important for one more reason. 
Once a program becomes universal, its potential for expansion and for affecting electoral results 
in the future decreases. No president is able to claim as much credit for investing in a CCT 
program, with all positive and negative implications it may have for his or her political fate, as 
the one who implemented and universalized it. This is the reason why several presidents sought 
to imprint their own signature on the CCT programs they inherited from their predecessors. They 
did so by changing the eligibility criteria and expanding coverage, raising the value of payments 
substantially, or simply changing the program’s name. These presidents tend to be motivated by 
the widespread belief, which this dissertation argues is not completely accurate, that increasing 
investments in CCT programs will pay off in the next elections. 
 
Explaining incumbents’ performance: CCT programs and the economy 
In order to assess whether CCT programs have affected electoral results in Latin America, I 
calculated vote shares of incumbent candidates
6
 in the first round of the eighty-four Latin 
American presidential elections held between 1990 and 2010, by dividing the number of votes 
                                                          
6
 I considered incumbent candidates the president, the candidate of the president’s party, or the candidate 
explicitly endorsed by the president. In only eight presidential elections, incumbent candidates did not compete: 
Colombia 2002, Ecuador 1996 and 1998, Guatemala 1996, Nicaragua 1996, Peru 2001 and 2006, and Venezuela 
1998. 
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they received by the total number of valid votes.
7
 I followed the same procedure to calculate the 
vote shares of presidents in the election held immediately before. Then, I subtracted the 
president’s vote share in the previous election from the incumbent’s vote share in the current one 
and labeled this difference the incumbent’s vote swing. All the information required to calculate 
vote shares and vote swings was extracted primarily from national electoral courts’ websites and 
complemented with data from Nohlen’s data handbooks (2005) - refer to Appendix A for the list 
of sources. 
Table 2.3 provides some descriptive statistics of Latin American elections and conveys 
important information. First of all, incumbent candidates tend to lose votes between elections, a 
pattern that has been frequently observed around the world (see Paldam 1991; Remmer 1991; 
Nannestad and Paldam 2002; McDonald and Budge 2005). They lost, on average, almost nine 
percentage points of valid votes in the period, and less than half of them got reelected. Only 
nineteen incumbent candidates (25% of the sample) improved their performances from one 
election to the other. Secondly, the table clearly shows that presidents who invested in CCT 
programs performed much better than other presidents, especially when the program was 
universal. If recent claims are correct, universal programs may have had a stronger impact on 
electoral results as a consequence of their larger coverage. The higher the number of families 
receiving cash from the government is, the more votes the incumbent is expected to gain in the 
next election.  
                                                          
 
7
 Colombia is the only Latin American country where blank votes are considered valid. I did not take those 
votes into account when calculating Colombian candidates’ vote shares, however. 
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Table 2.3 - Electoral Performance of Incumbent Candidates in Latin America 
Subsamples N 
Average Vote 
Swing 
Reelection 
Rate 
Did not invest in CCT Programs 49 -10.51 pp 42.86% 
Invested in any kind of CCT Programs 27 -5.32 pp 51.85% 
Invested in geographically-targeted CCT Programs 13 -7.69 pp 30.77% 
Invested in universal CCT Programs 14 -3.12 pp 71.43% 
First to invest in universal CCT Program 10 -5.69 pp 70.00% 
Whole Sample 76 -8.67 pp 46.05% 
Note: Eight elections were excluded, because incumbent candidates did not compete. 
 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 2.3 seem to confirm the prevailing argument 
that CCT programs pay off electorally. However, these programs are not the only potential 
determinants of electoral results. Table 2.4 reports results of three linear regression models in 
which incumbents’ vote swings is the dependent variable. Following the common practice, two 
control variables are included in these and in all other models reported throughout this chapter: 
the president’s vote share in the previous election and a dummy variable indicating that the 
incumbent candidate was the acting president. The reason for including the former is that it is 
much easier for an incumbent candidate to lose votes when he or she had performed 
exceptionally well in the previous election, and this variable should always have a negative sign. 
The inclusion of the latter is due to the general understanding that presidents have electoral 
advantages that no other candidate has (e.g., name recognition and control of state resources). 
Consequently, they tend to perform better than other candidates from incumbent parties when 
they run for reelection, and this variable should always have a positive sign.  
The models reported in Table 2.4 estimate the effect of CCT programs and three 
commonly used economic variables (GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment) on incumbents’ 
vote swings. The main explanatory variable is the estimate of coverage reported in Table 2.2, 
with administrations that did not invest in CCT programs coded zero. I also estimated the same 
models using two alternative explanatory variables: a dummy variable indicating that the 
36 
 
president was one of the twenty-nine to have invested in any kind of CCT program, and a 
dummy variable indicating that the president was one of the fourteen to have invested in 
universal CCT programs. These models lead to similar conclusions and are reported only in 
Appendix B (Tables B.1 and B.2). Information on GDP growth and inflation was extracted from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) website. Data on unemployment were collected from 
three sources, all of them incomplete: the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), the World Bank, and the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
Although there are some discrepancies in the estimates published by each of these sources, the 
correlation among them is always higher than 0.9 for non-missing cases. I decided to work with 
ECLAC’s database because it has fewer missing cases and implies the exclusion of only four 
elections in models using current values (election year) and five in models using lagged values 
(year preceding the election).
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
8
 Following Powell and Whitten’s (1993) argument, I also estimated models using world and Latin 
American aggregate rates as baselines for GDP growth and inflation. According to the authors, voters may be less 
critical of bad-performing governments when unfavorable international conditions already lead them to expect the 
government to fare poorly. Applying these baselines of comparison affects the results only marginally, however, and 
these models are reported only in Appendix B (Tables B.3 and B.4). There is no reliable information on international 
rates of unemployment, as many countries do not carry out labor force surveys yearly. 
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Table 2.4 - OLS Models: Dep. Variable = Vote Swing of Incumbent Candidate 
 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
Variable β p   β p   β p 
Coverage of CCT program 0.400 0.047 
 
0.155 0.449 
 
0.211 0.286 
GDP Growth 
   
-0.001 0.906 
   Log of Inflation 
   
-0.054 0.019 
   Unemployment 
   
-0.014 0.005 
   Lagged GDP Growth 
      
0.009 0.027 
Log of Lagged Inflation 
      
-0.038 0.130 
Lagged Unemployment 
      
-0.009 0.045 
Incumbent Candidate is the President 0.118 0.003 
 
0.181 0.000 
 
0.154 0.000 
President's vote share in previous election -0.380 0.004 
 
-0.424 0.001 
 
-0.355 0.006 
Constant 0.047 0.448   0.245 0.006   0.123 0.190 
N 76 
  
71 
  
71 
 Adj. R-squared 0.21 
  
0.31     0.36   
Notes. Inflation rates are logged to reduce the influence of hyperinflation in the early 1990s. Eight 
elections were excluded from all models, because incumbent candidates did not compete. Model 2 also 
excludes four elections for which data on unemployment are missing (Dominican Republic 1990, 
Guatemala 1990, 1999, and 2007), as well as the Argentine 1999 election, because it endured deflation 
and the log of negative numbers is undefined. Model 3 excludes five elections for which data on lagged 
unemployment are missing (Dominican Republic 1990, Guatemala 1990, 1999, and 2007, and Honduras 
2001). 
 
CCT programs’ coverage is significantly associated with incumbents’ vote swings only in 
the model that does not control for economic variables. Model 1 predicts that covering an 
additional one hundredth of the population will result in an extra 0.4 percentage point of valid 
votes for the incumbent in the following election. When economic variables are included into the 
regression equation, however, the explanatory power of CCT programs completely disappears. 
Model 2 controls for GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment in the election year, the rates of 
which only became publicly known after the election. It predicts that inflation and 
unemployment have a strong negative impact on incumbents’ performance, whereas GDP 
growth has no influence at all. Model 3 controls for the same variables in the previous year, most 
of which were already known at the time of the election. Now, GDP growth and unemployment 
are significantly associated with incumbents’ vote swings, whereas inflation barely misses 
statistical significance. Models 2 and 3 confirm classic hypotheses of the economic vote 
literature, at the same time that they contradict recent claims made by scholars of CCT programs.  
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Nevertheless, it is possible that the effect of CCT programs was mediated by the effect of 
political institutions in the same way many authors (Lewis-Beck 1988, Powell and Whitten 1993, 
Anderson 1995, Duch and Stevenson 2008) found the effect of economic variables to have been. 
In order to account for this possibility, I collected data on two political variables commonly 
employed by the literature: a dummy variable indicating coalition governments (more than one 
party holds cabinet portfolios)
9
 and a dummy variable indicating minority governments (all 
parties with cabinet portfolios control together less than 50% of seats in the lower/single 
chamber).
10
 Presidents who can blame coalition partners or the congress for their failures in 
office should not have their electoral performances affected by the economy. The electorally 
most vulnerable governments in this regard are the single party majority ones, because the 
president is perceived as clearly responsible for the country’s economic performance. I also 
collected data on the effective number of parties in the lower/single chamber, because it may 
affect the government’s capacity to build majority coalitions and pass its legislation. In the 
models reported below, I assess if the extra difficulties imposed by fragmented legislatures on 
presidents’ capacity to build coalitions have had any impact on their electoral performances. All 
the information required to code these three political variables were extracted from the Political 
                                                          
9
 Determining if the government is single party or coalition was not straightforward in only one case. Lucio 
Gutiérrez’s (2002-2005) administration in Ecuador started as a coalition of three parties, but ended with only one 
holding cabinet portfolios. Because two of the coalition members left the government less than a year after Gutiérrez 
took office, I coded his administration as single party. 
10
 In seventeen cases (20% of the sample), the composition of the coalition changed during the presidential 
administration, and all of these changes are recorded in the dataset spreadsheet by means of comment boxes. I 
considered the composition that lasted the longest to determine if the government status was minority or majority. 
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Handbook of the World (several years), Nohlen’s handbooks (2005), and Keesing’s World News 
Archive. 
Two of these variables hinge on electoral results of legislative elections, which creates an 
important challenge. In twelve countries (67% of the sample), presidential and legislative 
elections are held concurrently, and the term of legislators corresponds to the term of the 
president. In one country (Colombia) they are not held concurrently, but their dates are 
sufficiently close (around two months and a half apart) to be treated as so. These are the easy 
cases. In two countries (Chile until 2005 and El Salvador), legislative and presidential terms have 
different lengths, and concurrent elections are held in some, but not all, years. In one country 
(Dominican Republic after 1996), terms have the same length, but the legislature is renewed only 
in the middle of the president’s term. Another country (Argentina) renews half of its legislature 
at the time of the presidential election and the other half in the middle of the president’s term. 
Finally, Mexico and Ecuador (until 1996) have systems similar to the one employed by the 
United States: legislators’ terms have half of the length of the president’s, and the legislature is 
renewed both at the time of the presidential election and in the middle of the president’s term. 
The challenge imposed by the six countries that do not always have concurrent legislative 
and presidential elections stems from the fact that the composition of the legislature the president 
has to work with changes during his or her term.
11
 As a consequence, the proportion of 
                                                          
11
 The same situation arises in three cases in which a Constituent Assembly was elected during the 
presidential administration, replacing the previous legislature as the country’s representative body (Ecuador 2007, 
Peru 1992, and Venezuela 1999), and in two cases in which an unusual electoral schedule was extraordinarily 
adopted after the approval of a new Constitution (Brazil 1990 and Colombia 1991). These five cases were treated as 
changes of the legislature composition during the presidential administration in the same way as other cases. The 
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legislative seats controlled by the government and the effective number of parties in the 
legislature may also change. As a matter of fact, ten administrations (12% of the sample) 
changed their status from majority to minority or vice-versa as a consequence of non-concurrent 
legislative elections.
12
 There is no obvious solution for the problem posed by these cases, and I 
decided to simply consider the government’s status at the time of the election. Arguably, what 
the government does in the months preceding the election has a higher impact on citizens’ voting 
decisions. If the government can count on the majority of legislators during this crucial period, it 
will be able to do more and to be held accountable for its deeds. Regarding the effective number 
of parties, one of the solutions adopted was also to consider only its value at the time of the 
election. Alternatively, I calculated its weighted average during the presidential administration, 
where the weights are proportional to the rounded number of years that each legislature 
composition lasted within the period of the administration. Both solutions lead to similar results, 
and below I report only results with values at the time of the election (refer to Table B.5 of 
Appendix B for results with weighted averages). Keep in mind that these variables refer 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Bolivian 2006-07 Constituent Assembly does not pose the same problem, because the legislature kept functioning 
normally and retained its legislative prerogatives, despite the formation of the parallel representative body.  
12
 Presidential administrations that changed their status from minority to majority as a result of non-
concurrent legislative elections are: Leonel Fernández in the Dominican Republic (2004-2008), Rafael Correa in 
Ecuador (2006-2009), Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990-1995), and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1998-2000). The 
latter three attained majority following elections for their respective Constituent Assemblies. Administrations whose 
status changed from majority to minority after non-concurrent elections are: Carlos Menem and Nestor Kirchner in 
Argentina (respectively, 1995-1999 and 2003-2007), Hipólito Mejía in the Dominican Republic (2000-2004), 
Rodrigo Borjas in Ecuador (1988-1992), Alfredo Cristiani in El Salvador (1989-1994), and Ernesto Zedillo in 
Mexico (1994-2000). 
41 
 
exclusively to the composition of the legislature at the time immediately after the legislative 
election and do not account for legislators’ party switches during their terms. 
Another variable commonly used by the literature is the ideology of the president, 
because it affects voters’ expectations about government’s priorities. Powell and Whitten (1993) 
argue that left-wing governments tend to pursue full employment and income redistribution, 
whereas right-wing governments are more concerned with inflation and taxes. Although their 
study is restricted to developed nations, similar tendencies are certainly observed in Latin 
America, but not without the influence of attenuating contextual factors. On the one hand, most 
of the countries in the region have endured several years of hyperinflation, and the trauma was so 
devastating that leftist presidents have been extra-careful to not let the prices get out of control 
again. On the other hand, Latin American nations are characterized by extreme levels of income 
inequality, and right-wing governments have also started to increase investments in social 
policies, including CCT programs. Despite these attenuating contextual factors, differences in 
presidents’ priorities are still visible in the region, with leftists being relatively more concerned 
with the poor, and rightists prioritizing pro-business programs and economic prosperity.  
My indicator of ideology is innovative, easily coded, and has the advantage of being 
closely aligned with the Latin American reality. The president was classified as leftist when his 
or her party was a formal member of the Foro de São Paulo (FSP), the most important 
organization of leftist parties in Latin America.
13
 The FSP was founded by initiative of the 
Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party) and held its first meeting in the city of São 
                                                          
13
 Alternatively, I created a dummy variable indicating that a formal member of the government coalition 
was also a FSP member, even if the party of the president was not. Using this variable instead of the more restrict 
one does not alter significantly the results reported below and leads to exactly the same conclusions. 
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Paulo in 1990. Since then, it has been congregating leftist parties and organizations, both radical 
and moderate, from several countries to debate their role in the continent after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. The FSP has held meetings almost yearly in different Latin American major cities. 
Debates and members’ ideas kept evolving over time, especially after many of them left the 
opposition in their respective countries to become rulers. FSP documents commonly claim that 
the rise of its members to power started with the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998 
and was followed by the election of Lula in Brazil, Vázquez in Uruguay, and several other leftist 
leaders in other countries. Electoral victories of FSP members are the most important leading 
force of what is routinely called the continent’s “turn to the left”. I am confident that a dummy 
variable indicating that the president’s party is a FSP member is a good indicator of the 
government’s ideological proclivities (see Regalado 2007 for a thorough description of FSP 
meetings and history).
 14
 
                                                          
14
 Coding presidential administrations through this criterion is straightforward, as lists of FSP members 
have been published after most of its meetings since 1990. This simplicity is certainly one of the variable’s main 
advantages. Thirteen presidents (15.5% of the sample) were coded as leftist: Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006-2009), 
Lula in Brazil (2002-2006, 2006-2010), Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet in Chile (2000-2006 and 2006-2010, 
respectively), Leonel Fernández in the Dominican Republic (1996-2000, 2004-2008), Rafael Correa in Ecuador 
(2006-2009), Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (1984-1990), Ernesto Balladares in Panama (1994-1999), Tabaré Vazquez 
in Uruguay (2004-2009), and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1998-2000, 2000-2006). Some clarifications are 
necessary, however: Hipólito Mejía’s administration (2000-2004) in the Dominican Republic was not coded as 
leftist, because the first record of his party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano) in FSP documents occurred when 
Mejía had already left the presidency; Daniel Ortega’s administration (1984-1990) in Nicaragua is the only one 
coded as leftist before the foundation of the FSP, because his party (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) was 
the only Latin American governing party in the 1980s that became an active FSP member thereafter; and Martín 
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In the models reported in Table 2.5, interactions account for the possibility that the effect 
of CCT programs and the economy on elections is mediated by political circumstances. 
Combining the indicators of coalition and majority governments leads to four categories of 
political context: single-party majority (twenty cases), single-party minority (twenty-nine cases), 
coalition majority (twenty-three cases), and coalition minority (twelve cases). The first of these 
four categories is the one with highest clarity of responsibility, and the last is the one with the 
lowest. The economic models reported in Table 2.4 have shown that lagged GDP growth, 
inflation, and unemployment are strong and significant predictors of incumbents’ vote swings, in 
stark contrast to CCT programs. By accounting for the existence of different political contexts, 
my hope is that CCT programs will prove to be significant in at least single-party majority 
situations, whereas the effect of economic variables will disappear under circumstances of less 
clarity of responsibility. If my results confirm these expectations, they will be also confirming 
two strong scholarly consensuses, each one from a different research tradition: that the effect of 
the economy is mediated by political factors and that CCT programs do help incumbent 
candidates to win elections (if not generally, at least under favorable political circumstances). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Torrijo’s administration (2004-2009) in Panama was not coded as leftist, because he formally requested to cancel the 
membership of his party (Partido Revolucionario Democrático) during his term. 
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Table 2.5 - OLS Models: Dependent Variable is Incumbent's Vote Swing 
  
(1) Coverage (2) Any Kind (3) Coverage 
  Variable β p β p β p 
β1 Invested in CCT program 0.502 0.151 0.056 0.350 0.280 0.223 
β2 Lagged GDP growth 0.011 0.004 0.012 0.004 0.014 0.017 
β3 Coalition government -0.005 0.919 -0.001 0.978 0.002 0.971 
β4 Minority government 0.016 0.713 -0.020 0.681 0.055 0.414 
β13 CCT program × Coalition -0.277 0.629 -0.078 0.361 
  β14 CCT program × Minority -0.454 0.370 0.026 0.750 
  β34 Coalition × Minority -0.134 0.063 -0.095 0.208 -0.179 0.048 
β134 CCT program × Coalition × Minority 0.893 0.290 0.038 0.783 
  β23 Lagged GDP growth × Coalition 
    
-0.006 0.537 
β24 Lagged GDP growth × Minority 
    
-0.013 0.313 
β234 Lagged GDP growth × Coalition × Minority 
    
0.021 0.208 
β5 Effective number of parties 0.001 0.922 0.004 0.695 0.001 0.944 
β6 President is leftist 0.007 0.892 0.044 0.361 0.026 0.587 
β7 President is the incumbent candidate 0.100 0.014 0.103 0.011 0.093 0.020 
β8 President's vote share in the previous election -0.356 0.014 -0.342 0.013 -0.338 0.012 
β0 Constant 0.006 0.948 -0.012 0.887 -0.002 0.977 
 
N 76   76   76   
  Adjusted R-squared 0.33   0.33   0.33   
Recovered Effects of CCT Programs and Lagged GDP Growth 
Model Effect Coefficients Effect p N 
1 Coverage in Single Party Majority β1 0.502 0.146 20 
1 Coverage in Single Party Minority β1+β14 0.047 0.894 26 
1 Coverage in Coalition Majority β1+β13 0.224 0.650 21 
1 Coverage in Coalition Minority β1+β13+β14+β134 0.663 0.304 9 
2 CCT program in Single Party Majority β1 0.056 0.347 20 
2 CCT program in Single Party Minority β1+β14 0.082 0.104 26 
2 CCT program in Coalition Majority β1+β13 -0.021 0.740 21 
2 CCT program in Coalition Minority β1+β13+β14+β134 0.042 0.695 9 
3 Lagged GDP growth in Single Party Majority β2 0.014 0.014 20 
3 Lagged GDP growth in Single Party Minority β2+β24 0.001 0.906 26 
3 Lagged GDP growth in Coalition Majority β2+β23 0.008 0.295 21 
3 Lagged GDP growth in Coalition Minority β2+β23+β24+β234 0.016 0.051 9 
Notes. Eight elections were excluded from the sample, because incumbent candidates did not compete. The 
p-values of main models were calculated through t-tests, whereas p-values of recovered effects were 
calculated through z-tests. That is the default procedure of the software I used to make my analyses (Stata), 
which explains why the p-value of recovered effects for Single Party Minority governments is slightly 
different from the p-value of the correspondent coefficient in the model. Shaded rows indicate statistically 
significant recovered effects. 
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The table reports estimates of three linear models with interactions. The main explanatory 
variable in the first model is coverage of CCT programs, whereas in the second one it is an 
indicator that the president invested in any kind of CCT program. Both variables are interacted 
with the two indicators of political context. In the third model the main explanatory variable is 
coverage of CCT programs, and only lagged GDP growth is interacted with indicators of 
political context. The bottom part of the table reports recovered effects of interacted variables 
and their respective p-values. The crucial finding is that CCT programs are not significantly 
associated with incumbents’ vote swings in any type of political context. We are left with no 
empirical grounds to claim that CCT programs pay off electorally. On the other hand, model 3 
reveals something unexpected. To begin with, lagged GDP growth strongly affects incumbents’ 
performances in single-party majority governments, but not in single-party minority and 
coalition majority ones, which is a finding that agrees with customary hypotheses of the 
literature. The big surprise, however, is that lagged GDP growth was found to strongly affect 
incumbents’ electoral performances also in the political context with least clarity of 
responsibility: coalition minority ones. In such situations, presidents can blame other actors for 
their failures in office, and incumbent candidates should not be punished in the polls when 
economic conditions are unfavorable. 
Although my main objective in this chapter was to demonstrate that CCT programs have 
not helped Latin American incumbents to improve their electoral performances, which I believe 
was satisfactorily achieved with the analyses reported above, the unexpected finding of model 3 
asks for some clarification. The basic truth is that the significance level of the effect of lagged 
GDP growth among coalition minority governments is strongly influenced by one outlier with 
high leverage: Argentina’s 2003 election. To illustrate how it affected the results, the first panel 
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of Figure 2.1 displays the association between standardized residuals and leverages of model 3. 
Note that Argentina’s 2003 election is by far the observation with highest leverage, making it a 
clear outlier. Although its influence in the magnitude of the model’s coefficients is almost 
inexistent, it does have a huge impact on the statistical significance of joint coefficients 
corresponding to coalition minority governments, as can be guessed from the second panel of 
Figure 2.1. If we drop that observation from the sample and reestimate model 3, the magnitude 
of all of its coefficients remain virtually the same (i.e., that observation is not influential), but the 
p-value of the effect of lagged GDP growth among coalition minority governments skyrockets to 
0.575. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Impact of outliers on estimates of Model 3 
 
To be fair, I repeated the same procedure with single party majority cases. Although the 
Peruvian 1990 election does not have as much leverage as the one held in Argentina in 2003, the 
deep recession endured by Peru in the late 1980s places it close to the position of an outlier 
among single party majority governments, as can be seen in the third panel of Figure 2.1. 
Dropping this observation from the model actually increases the magnitude of the effect of 
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lagged GDP growth to 0.019 among single party majority governments, and its statistical 
significance remains below 0.05. The effect of economic growth in that political context is, 
therefore, robust to the exclusion of outliers, whereas its effect among coalition minority 
governments is not. 
I estimated numerous models with different combinations of variables and none of them 
contradicted the findings reported above. Some of these models are worth discussing here. To 
prevent a reduction of the sample size, note that I did not include the variables inflation and 
unemployment in the models reported in Table 2.5. Accounting for them in the first two models 
reduces the number of non-missing cases (N) to seventy and does not turn CCT programs 
significant in any political context. Accounting for them in the third model has the same effect 
on the sample size, and the effect of lagged GDP growth becomes insignificant among coalition 
minority governments, as expected, but not among single party majority ones. I also reestimated 
model 3, substituting the variable lagged GDP growth by inflation and unemployment, and these 
models are reported in Appendix B (Table B.6). As expected, inflation has a negative and 
significant effect only among single party majority governments, but unemployment turned out 
to be insignificant in all political contexts. 
 
Restricting the analysis to universal CCT programs 
Claims that CCT programs help incumbents to win elections have been based on empirical 
evidence of countries that invested in large universal programs, such as Brazil, Mexico, 
Colombia, and Uruguay. It is possible that universal programs are the only ones to have had a 
significant pro-incumbent electoral effect in Latin America. If this is true, their effect may have 
been masked in the models reported in Table 2.5, because the main explanatory variable takes 
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smaller geographically-targeted programs into consideration. Although universal programs are 
observed in all of the four political contexts defined in the last section, they do not amount to a 
large enough number of cases to produce meaningful estimates in regressions with four 
interactions. Therefore, in order to assess their electoral impact, I divided countries in only two 
categories: single party majority (twenty cases) and all the others (sixty-four cases). If these 
programs really matter for incumbents’ electoral performances, presidents who invested in them 
should have performed electorally better than presidents who did not, at least under 
circumstances of high clarity of responsibility. Table 2.6 reports estimates of two models using 
this alternative binary classification of political contexts. The main explanatory variable is a 
dummy variable indicating universal programs in Model 1, and coverage of universal programs 
(geographically-targeted programs and all other cases are coded zero) in Model 2.
15
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 If we restrict even more the main explanatory variable and take only the first presidents to implement 
universal programs in each country into consideration, the coefficients reported in Table 2.6 change slightly, but 
lead to the same conclusions. 
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Table 2.6 - OLS Models: Dependent Variable is Incumbent's Vote Swing 
  
(1) Universal   (2) Coverage 
  Variable β p   β p 
β1 CCT program -0.006 0.917 
 
0.240 0.406 
β2 Single Party Majority Government 0.015 0.710 
 
0.013 0.752 
β12 CCT Program × Single Party Majority 0.108 0.251 
 
0.237 0.602 
β3 Lagged GDP growth 0.013 0.001 
 
0.013 0.001 
β4 Effective number of parties 0.004 0.686 
 
-0.001 0.956 
β5 President is leftist 0.035 0.472 
 
0.025 0.585 
β6 President is the incumbent candidate 0.083 0.045 
 
0.090 0.027 
β7 President's vote share in the previous election -0.296 0.031 
 
-0.304 0.028 
β0 Constant -0.049 0.554 
 
-0.034 0.680 
 
N 76     76   
  Adjusted R-squared 0.29     0.30   
Recovering the Effect of CCT Programs and Lagged GDP Growth 
Model Effect Coefficients   Effect p 
1 CCT Program in Single Party Majority β1+β12 
 
0.102 0.197 
1 CCT Program in Less Clear Contexts β1 
 
-0.006 0.917 
2 Coverage in Single Party Majority β1+β12 
 
0.477 0.169 
2 Coverage in Less Clear Contexts β1 
 
0.240 0.403 
Notes. Eight elections were excluded from the sample, because incumbent candidates did not compete. 
In Model 1, the variable "CCT Program" is an indicator of universal CCT programs, whereas in Model 
2 it is the coverage of universal CCT programs (geographically-targeted programs and all other cases 
are coded zero). The p-values of main models were calculated through t-tests, whereas p-values of 
recovered effects were calculated through z-tests. This is the default procedure of the software I used to 
make my analyses (Stata), and it explains why the p-value of recovered effects in Less Clear Contexts 
is slightly different from the p-value of the correspondent coefficient in the model. 
 
The models reported in the table show that universal CCT programs have not helped 
incumbents to win elections in any kind of political context. One could object that, although 
statistically insignificant, the p-values of recovered effects in single party majority contexts are 
sufficiently low to discourage final conclusions. While I agree that, in the future, the occurrence 
of new cases of universal CCT programs in single party majority contexts may force us to 
recognize their potential to affect electoral results, we currently have no empirical grounds for 
making such claims. Moreover, none of the four cases of single party majority contexts that are 
driving the results reported in the table (Bolivia 2009, Costa Rica 2010, Dominican Republic 
2008, and Ecuador 2009) have been subjected to scholarly research, as of today. Claims that 
CCT programs pay off electorally have been based altogether on studies of countries that rather 
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fit the category “Less Clear Contexts”. For this reason, my results represent a strong warning 
against the common wisdom, at the same time that they impel scholars to redirect their attention 
to general macroeconomic variables when proposing explanations and making predictions of 
incumbents’ electoral performances in Latin America. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, my objective was to address a major shortcoming of the literature on CCT 
programs, that is, the lack of comparative research, and verify if mainstream claims could resist a 
basic empirical test. Most scholars agree that presidents who invest in CCT programs improve 
their performances in the following election as a result of higher support among beneficiaries. If 
this was true, these presidents should perform better when they run for reelection, if compared to 
presidents who have not invested in these programs. I collected data for all eighty-four 
presidential elections that were carried out in Iberian America between 1990 and 2010, twenty-
nine of which followed administrations that invested in CCT programs. My results demonstrate 
that investments in these programs are not significantly associated with incumbents’ vote swings 
once we control for economic variables. Hoping to find a CCT effect at least in situations in 
which the president is perceived as clearly responsible for governmental policies, I accounted for 
differences in countries’ political contexts and still did not find any significant effect. 
A secondary finding of this chapter is that economic growth and low inflation positively 
affect the electoral performances of incumbent candidates, although only in single party majority 
contexts. Unemployment was also found to affect their performances, but this effect disappears 
once we control for political contexts. These results confirm that the pattern found by the 
economic vote literature among developed and mostly parliamentary democracies also applies to 
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Latin American presidential regimes. Only governments perceived as clearly responsible for the 
country’s economic performance are held accountable when the next election is carried out 
(Powell and Whitten 1993, Anderson 1995, Bengtsson 2004, Duch and Stevenson 2008). In 
countries where the responsibility for economic performance is less clear, presidents neither 
profit electorally from economic growth nor are punished during recessions. 
The results presented in this chapter may sound frustrating for students of CCT programs, 
but I rather see them as a great opportunity for this research agenda to move forward. The fact 
that CCT programs do not help incumbents to win elections does not mean that they do not have 
electoral effects. In the next chapters, I show that presidents who invested in these programs 
consistently increased their electoral support among beneficiaries, which confirms findings of the 
literature. These electoral gains, however, did not entail an improvement in incumbents’ overall 
electoral performances, because they were offset by vote losses among other segments of the 
population. These electoral losses have been at least as large as electoral gains among 
beneficiaries, and the occurrence of these counteracting effects is a systematic pattern observed 
all across the continent. 
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Chapter 3 
CCT Programs and Electoral Geography 
 
In the previous chapter, I showed that presidents who invest in CCT programs are not electorally 
more successful than other presidents. Economic variables are, by far, the strongest determinants 
of incumbents’ electoral performances, especially in political contexts where clarity of 
responsibility is high. However, the lack of effects at the cross-national level of analysis does not 
mean that these programs have no electoral effects at all. Studies analyzing aggregate sub-
national data, for example, consistently show that CCT programs boost incumbents’ electoral 
performances in areas with larger proportions of beneficiaries (Serdán 2006; Nicolau and Peixoto 
2007; Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008; Soares and Terron 2008; Nupia 2011). At that level 
of analysis, the electoral effect of CCT programs is quite obvious. This chapter aims at assessing 
this effect not only in cases that have already received considerable attention from the literature, 
but also in some of those that have not received any attention at all up to this date. 
Most Latin American countries are characterized by high levels of regional inequality, 
and, consequently, indicators of socio-economic development vary considerably across their 
administrative subdivisions. Since CCT programs are universalistic and well-targeted, their 
coverage also varies across sub-national units in accord to the proportion of the population living 
in poverty. Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and several other countries have sub-national units where 
almost all families receive benefits from the program, and these units tend to be located in the 
impoverished countryside. The same countries also have units where only a negligible fraction of 
the population is composed of beneficiaries, and these units are typically located in metropolitan 
agglomerations. If CCT programs influence citizens’ vote decisions in favor of incumbents, the 
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implication is that incumbents should perform better in the impoverished countryside than in 
capitals and big cities when the next election takes place. The literature has presented evidence 
confirming this hypothesis in three electoral contests: Mexico 2006 (Serdán 2006); Brazil 2006 
(Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008; Soares and Terron 2008); and Colombia 2010 (Nupia 
2011).  
Some of these studies use incumbent’s vote shares as the dependent variable, while others 
use incumbent’s vote swings. The latter is simply the change in incumbent’s vote shares from 
one election to the other, calculated in the same way I did in the previous chapter. This variable 
is more appropriate to test hypotheses proposed by the literature, because it accounts for changes 
in voting patterns. It can assume positive and negative values, indicating areas of the country 
where the incumbent gained and lost electoral support between elections. Coverage of CCT 
programs are not necessarily associated with incumbents’ vote shares in a single election, but in 
the following pages I demonstrate that it is positively associated with vote swings between two 
elections in almost all cases. Even in cases where support for the incumbent remained relatively 
stronger in urban areas with low CCT coverage, not only electoral gains and losses did occur all 
across the country, but these losses and gains are closely associated with investments in the 
program. 
The possibility that incumbents lose electoral support for investing in CCT programs is 
something that has been completely ignored by the literature. Scholars have been avoiding 
dealing with the fact that vote swings can be negative and that, therefore, vote losses are 
implicated in the association between that variable and CCT coverage. Instead of sweeping it 
under the rug, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that vote losses in regions with low coverage has 
been a systematic occurrence in all Latin American countries that invested in universal CCT 
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programs. The importance of this phenomenon for this dissertation is that it provides us with an 
important clue for solving the puzzle implied by the findings of the previous chapter: “Why have 
not incumbents improved their electoral performances, if CCT programs supposedly raise their 
support among beneficiaries?” The answer proposed by this chapter and explored further in the 
next one is that these programs also have electoral costs. Citizens who are ineligible for the 
benefits may have strong reasons to oppose targeted redistribution, even though some of them 
may still praise the positive externalities of reduced poverty. 
The remaining of this chapter is divided in two sections. In the next one, I analyze sub-
national data from eight countries where the president invested in universal CCT programs. 
These programs have affected the performance of different incumbent candidates in similar 
ways, and, to better illustrate this pattern, I provide a more in-depth discussion of two 
representative cases (Panama 2009 and Uruguay 2009) and one outlier (Costa Rica 2010). The 
incumbent party in the Panamanian 2009 election has been traditionally stronger in less 
developed areas of the countryside, whereas in Uruguay it has been traditionally stronger in the 
capital. Despite the difference in the geographic distribution of their electoral bases, both parties 
incurred losses in the capital and gains in the countryside, a pattern that is observed in nearly all 
other cases. I do not have any particular reason for having chosen these two countries; I could 
actually have chosen any of the others, as all of them followed the same pattern. The exception is 
the Costa Rican 2010 election, where the incumbent party lost support in the impoverished 
countryside and gained support in the metropolitan area of San Jose, despite the fact that the 
president also invested in a large universal CCT program. Further in this chapter, I propose a 
tentative explanation for its exceptionality. The second section is entirely dedicated to the 
discussion of Brazil, the country that has received most of the attention from the specialized 
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literature. I show that the impact of the CCT program Bolsa Família on the geographic 
distribution of the main parties’ electoral bases puts the 2006 election in a category apart in the 
Brazilian recent history.  
 
Universal CCT programs and the rearrangement of incumbents’ electoral bases 
I searched official websites for data on coverage of CCT programs and results of presidential 
elections for all cases classified in Table 2.2 as universal programs. For my purposes, these data 
should be disaggregated at the level of one of the country’s administrative subdivisions. When 
they were available at more than one level, I collected information corresponding to the lowest 
one. For example, if the government published data at the state and county levels, I gave 
preference to the latter. I found information for twelve out of fourteen cases (86%), and they are 
listed in Table 3.1. All of these datasets are composed of analogous variables. To calculate the 
coverage of CCT programs in each sub-national unit, I divided the number of beneficiary 
families at the time of the election by the total number of households according to the nearest 
census. Regarding electoral results, all datasets have information on the number of votes for the 
incumbent candidate in the current election, total votes for the president in the previous one, and 
total number of valid votes in both elections. To calculate vote shares, I divided the number of 
votes for the candidate by the number of valid votes, and to calculate vote swings I subtracted the 
president’s vote share in the previous election from the incumbent’s vote share in the current 
one. Although blank votes are considered valid in Colombia, they were not taken into account 
when I calculated vote shares and vote swings for Colombian candidates. Electoral information 
was extracted from the official website of each country’s electoral court, and sources and dates 
for CCT statistics are reported in the Appendix C. 
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Table 3.1 - Datasets with information for sub-national administrative divisions 
Election Incumbent CCT Program Units 
Brazil 2006 Lula Bolsa Família 5564 municipalities 
Brazil 2010 Dilma Rousseff Bolsa Família 5564 municipalities 
Chile 2005 Michele Bachellet Chile Solidario 346 communes 
Chile 2009 Eduardo Frei Chile Solidario 346 communes 
Colombia 2010 Juan Manoel Santos Familias en Acción 1123 municipalities 
Costa Rica 2010 Laura Chinchilla Avancemos 81 cantons 
Dom. Republic 2008 Leonel Fernández Solidaridad 32 provinces 
Ecuador 2006 Gilmar Gutiérrez BDH 22 provinces 
Ecuador 2009 Rafael Correa BDH 221 cantons 
Mexico 2006 Felipe Calderón Oportunidades 2442 municipalities 
Panama 2009 Balbina Herrera Red de Oportunidades 12 provinces 
Uruguay 2009 José Mujica Asignaciones Familiares 19 departments 
 
These datasets reveal that the geographic distribution of electoral support for incumbent 
candidates were affected in similar ways, independently of the original composition of their 
electoral bases. Some of them (or their predecessors) had been previously elected with higher 
support in impoverished rural areas (e.g. Gutiérrez in Ecuador 2002; Martín Torrijos in Panama 
2004; and Óscar Arias in Costa Rica 2006); others had been supported primarily by voters living 
in big cities and metropolitan areas (e.g., Fernández in the Dominican Republic 2004; Correa in 
Ecuador 2006; and Vázquez in Uruguay 2004); and still others had their electoral bases more 
evenly distributed across the country (e.g., Lula in Brazil 2002; Lagos in Chile 1999; and Uribe 
in Colombia 2006). One of the few characteristics these presidents had in common is that all of 
them invested in large universal CCT programs that benefitted primarily families living in less 
developed areas of the countryside. As a consequence, the geographic distribution of their 
electoral support was affected in similar ways, with more citizens voting for them in the 
countryside and fewer people voting for them in capitals and big cities. 
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 To illustrate the occurrence of these effects, I estimated bivariate regression models for 
all cases, but Brazil.
16
 These models use incumbents’ vote swings as the dependent variable and 
CCT coverage as the explanatory variable. If CCT programs increase incumbents’ electoral 
support in areas with high coverage and decrease their support in areas with low coverage, we 
should observe three patterns: 
1- The coefficient for CCT coverage should be positive: higher coverage leads to higher 
(less negative or more positive) vote swings.  
2- The intercept should be negative: incumbents are expected to lose votes in areas with 
low coverage, because non-beneficiaries comprise the vast majority of the population. 
3- The intersection between the regression line and the x-axis indicates the turning point, 
i.e., the level of coverage in which the number of beneficiaries becoming incumbent’s supporters 
is exactly the same as the number of non-beneficiaries defecting. I call it the turning point, 
because lower levels of coverage are expected to lead to negative vote swings, whereas higher 
levels of coverage are expected to lead to positive vote swings. Since the impact of CCT 
programs on the living conditions of beneficiaries is arguably stronger than the burden on the 
pockets of non-beneficiaries, the turning point should be located at a relatively low level of 
coverage. 
The results are presented in Table 3.2. Despite great social, economic, cultural, and 
political contrasts among Latin American countries, there is a pattern: with one exception (Costa 
Rica 2010), the association between CCT coverage and incumbents’ vote swings is always 
positive. The only model in which the coefficient is not statistically significant is the one for 
Ecuador 2006. The table also shows that eight models, out of nine with positive coefficients, 
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 Results for Brazil are discussed in the next section 
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have negative intercepts. They confirm our expectation that incumbent candidates actually lose 
support in areas with low coverage. The cases in which these losses were most dramatic are 
Chile 2009 and Colombia 2010. In these elections, incumbents lost between seventeen and 
eighteen percentage points of valid votes in sub-national units with nearly zero CCT coverage, 
relative to their predecessors. The models predict that vote swings only became positive in units 
where coverage was higher than 42% in Chile and 72% in Colombia. The Chile Solidario did not 
reach such a large coverage in any commune, and the OLS estimates presented in the table 
reflect the fact that the ruling coalition Concertación lost votes in almost the whole country 
between 2005 and 2009. Colombia has a larger CCT program, and coverage surpassed the 
estimated turning point in some municipalities.  
 
Table 3.2 - Bivariate OLS Estimates for Administrations that Invested in Universal CCT Programs 
Election Intercept Coefficient Turning Point p-value Adj. R
2
 N 
Chile 2005 -0.012 0.141 0.085 0.001 0.03 331 
Chile 2009 -0.173 0.410 0.422 0.000 0.11 342 
Colombia 2010 -0.181 0.250 0.724 0.000 0.18 1095 
Costa Rica 2010 0.071 -0.717 0.099 0.000 0.46 81 
Dominican Republic 2008 -0.072 0.376 0.191 0.000 0.47 32 
Ecuador 2006 -0.145 0.368 0.394 0.231 0.02 22 
Ecuador 2009 0.179 0.212 NA 0.000 0.13 219 
Mexico 2006 -0.051 0.127 0.402 0.000 0.10 2423 
Panama 2009 -0.096 0.153 0.627 0.026 0.35 12 
Uruguay 2009 -0.090 0.510 0.176 0.000 0.69 19 
Note. Shaded rows indicate elections with negative intercepts and positive coefficients for CCT coverage. 
 
In the model for Ecuador 2009, both the intercept and the coefficient are positive. 
Differently from other Latin American incumbent candidates, Rafael Correa improved his 
electoral performance all over the country from 2006 to 2009, although at higher rates in places 
with larger CCT coverage. The events that took place there resemble one of the two cases that I 
do not analyze in this chapter for lack of data: Bolivia 2009. The Bolivian incumbent candidate 
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Evo Morales also improved his performance all over the country relatively to the previous 
election. At least two factors contributed for the exceptional electoral performance of these two 
incumbent candidates. First, both of them were the acting president when they ran for reelection. 
Models reported in the previous chapter show that being already in power makes incumbent 
candidates considerably more successful, probably as a result of the higher recognition of their 
names. Second, out of fourteen presidents who invested in universal CCT programs, Correa and 
Morales are the only ones whose predecessors were impeached amid popular protests, and whose 
administrations drafted new constitutions. Hopes that their administrations would yield a new 
beginning for countries constantly affected by social and political instability may have 
contributed enormously for the increase of their popularity.  
Another pattern revealed by the models displayed in Table 3.2 is that the estimated 
turning points are relatively high in most cases. As a matter of fact, the national coverage of all 
CCT programs to which these models correspond is always below the turning points, as can be 
checked in Table 2.2 of the previous chapter. It means that incumbents are expected to have lost 
votes in sub-national units where coverage was at the same level as the program’s national 
coverage. This finding may indicate that, in general, the improvement of the incumbent’s 
electoral performance in areas with high CCT coverage has been, at best, only enough to offset 
massive losses in areas where non-beneficiaries constitute the majority. Only two incumbent 
candidates out of the ten included in the table fared better in the current election than in the 
previous one. They are exceptions to the general pattern and are listed in non-shaded rows 
(Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Laura Chinchilla in Costa Rica).  
An alternative way to visualize the rearrangement of incumbents’ bases of support 
triggered by investments in CCT programs is through electoral maps. Using Geographic 
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Information Systems (GIS) technology, I made maps showing incumbents’ vote shares, 
incumbents’ vote swings, and levels of CCT coverage in administrative subdivisions of all 
countries listed in Table 3.2.
17
 They consistently show that, in fact, incumbents’ electoral losses 
from one election to the other were concentrated in capitals and metropolitan agglomerations, 
where CCT coverage is usually lower. They also show that incumbents have improved their 
performances in impoverished areas of the countryside, where CCT coverage is higher. As a 
consequence, maps displaying incumbents’ vote swings tend to match maps displaying the 
proportion of the population covered by CCT programs. Below, I discuss in deeper details what 
happened in two representative cases, Panama 2009 and Uruguay 2009. All other cases followed 
the same pattern to a lesser or greater degree and will not be discussed here. Costa Rica 2010 is 
the only case that did not meet my expectations, and I finish the section proposing a tentative 
explanation for its exceptionality. 
 
Red de Oportunidades and the Panamanian 2009 Presidential Election 
The Panamanian CCT program Red de Oportunidades was implemented by President Martín 
Torrijos in March of 2006, one year and a half after he took office. He had won the 2004 election 
under the banner of the Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), a party launched in 1979 by 
his father and then dictator Omar Torrijos. Differently from other Latin American parties with 
roots in military dictatorships, the PRD has traditionally advocated left-leaning ideas. It was a 
member of the Foro de São Paulo until the mid 2000s and has been particularly strong among the 
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 For most countries, the shape files I used to make these maps were freely downloaded from the website 
www.diva-gis.org. For Mexico and Brazil, I downloaded shape files from the websites of their respective statistics 
agencies: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
(IBGE). Only maps for Panama, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Brazil are shown in this chapter. 
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poor and the lower classes in the countryside. Its atypical characteristics can be in part explained 
by the fact that the policies pursued by the Panamanian dictatorship in the 1970s and early 1980s 
were unusual in the region and strongly influenced by the presence of American troops in the 
Canal zone. At that time, most countries were being ruled by right-wing authoritarian regimes 
that cultivated good relations with the U.S. In Panama, dictator Omar Torrijos was rather a vocal 
critic of American imperialism, and its government was friendly towards the Cuban communist 
regime. Moreover, whereas other Latin American dictators invested in policies that benefitted 
business elites and promoted economic growth, Torrijos chose to invest in land reform and other 
redistributive policies that hurt the rich and favored peasants, indigenous people, and the urban 
poor.  
In 1989, when the country already followed a slow and controlled path towards 
redemocratization, an election was held to define who would be the next president. That election 
was blatantly rigged by the government and ended up being cancelled by the electoral court. A 
chain of events following the court’s decision led to a sharp decline in the popularity of dictator 
Manuel Noriega and to an American invasion that ousted him from power. Since then, elections 
have been carried out every five years, and alternations of power have been peaceful. The PRD 
and the right-centrist Partido Panameñista have been the main contestants, with the former 
winning two elections (1994 and 2004), and the latter also winning two (1999 and 2009).
18
 Maps 
displayed in Figure 3.1 show the proportion of votes received by President Torrijos when he was 
elected in 2004 and the proportion of votes received by incumbent candidate Balbina Herrera in 
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 In 2009, the Partido Panameñista was a member of the coalition that elected Ricardo Martinelli president. 
However, Martinelli is a member of the recently created Cambio Democrático, and not of the Partido Panameñista. 
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2009. These two elections delimit the period of the presidential administration during which the 
Panamanian CCT program Red de Oportunidades was implemented. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - Vote Shares of Torrijos and Herrera in the 2004 and 2009 Elections 
 
The maps displayed in the figure are divided into nine provinces and three indigenous 
comarcas, the country’s first level administrative subdivisions. Half of the population leaves in 
the province of Panama (indicated by the circle), which is the most developed and urbanized of 
all provinces. Poverty is disproportionally higher in the three indigenous comarcas and in the 
easternmost province of Darién. These are the administrative divisions where Balbina Herrera 
performed better in 2009, and they are marked in black and grey in the second map. Note that 
President Torrijos had already performed very well in two of the country’s comarcas five years 
before (Ngöbe-Buglé to the west and Emberá Wounaán to the east).
19
 A quick comparison 
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 The territory of Emberá Wounaán is not contiguous, as can be seen in the map. It corresponds to the two 
dark spots inside the province of Darién to the east. 
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between the two maps reveals that, at the end of Torrijos’ administration, the incumbent party 
PRD had lost support in nearly the whole country, but it remained strong in impoverished areas. 
One of the causes for the rearrangement of the party’s electoral bases certainly is the 
investments made by President Torrijos in the universal CCT program Red de Oportunidades. 
This program selects beneficiary families through proxy means tests, based on responses to a 
survey with seventy-five questions. Originally, it paid $35 to those fitting the eligibility criteria, 
but the stipend was increased to $50 in 2008, and there has not been any additional raise since 
then (as of June 2012). The program benefits families living in the whole territory, but coverage 
is disproportionally higher in the indigenous comarcas. Although Red the Oportunidades reached 
70,599 families, or 8.5% of the population, in December of 2008, all of the three indigenous 
comarcas had more than 60% of their households covered in the same month.  
The incumbent candidate Balbina Herrera was defeated by a landslide in the 2009 
election, and the presidency was transferred to right-leaning businessman Ricardo Martinelli. 
The first map of Figure 3.2 shows that the only places where the PRD gained votes relatively to 
the previous election were the impoverished comarca of Kuna Yala (northeastern coastal strip) 
and the province of Colón (northern coastal strip west of Kuna Yala). Some of the places where 
the incumbent party lost more than ten percentage points of valid votes correspond to places 
where CCT coverage was below 5%. The fact that losses endured by the PRD were relatively 
heavier in the capital and developed provinces turned its bases of support even more reliant on 
citizens living in the countryside and indigenous comarcas than they have been in the past.  
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Figure 3.2 - PRD Vote Swings from 2004 to 2009 and Red de Oportunidades Coverage 
  
 The maps displayed in the figure are telling of the effect that the Panamanian CCT 
program had on the incumbent’s electoral performance. The PRD lost votes in nearly the whole 
country, but losses were lower in the less developed western provinces and in the eastern 
province of Darién, where coverage is relatively higher. Even though the incumbent party also 
lost support in two of the three indigenous comarcas, it still conquered more than 60% of valid 
votes in both of them. The defection of citizens living in the most populous and developed 
provinces of the country cost PRD the presidency, and this is a risk faced by all presidents who 
invest in large CCT programs that benefit primarily families from outside of the capital. 
 
Asignaciones Familiares and the Uruguayan 2009 Presidential Election 
In 2002, Uruguay endured a major banking crisis that affected the whole population, but 
especially the lower classes. As levels of poverty and unemployment rose, the popularity of the 
two major Uruguayan parties, the Partido Colorado and Partido Nacional, sunk. These parties 
have dominated the country’s politics since independence in 1825, except for twelve years of 
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military dictatorship (1973-1985). Their hegemony came to an end in the presidential election of 
2004, when Tabaré Vázquez, the candidate of a coalition of leftist parties called Frente Amplio, 
beat all the other nominees and gained the presidency. The economic recession triggered by the 
banking crisis in 2002 explains in part the historical results of the 2004 election, and Vázquez’s 
success in handling the economy during his term contributed for the victory of incumbent 
candidate José Mujica in 2009. 
The Frente Amplio is a leftist political force and one of the most active members of the 
Foro de São Paulo. However, differently from Panama’s PRD, it has no links with the military 
dictatorship and has been traditionally stronger in the capital than in the less developed 
countryside. The maps displayed in Figure 3.3 are divided in nineteen departments, and they 
show that the vote of citizens living in the capital (indicated by the circle) was essential for the 
elections of Vázquez in 2004 and Mujica in 2009. While in the departments of Montevideo and 
Canelones the Frente Amplio received more than 50% of the votes in both elections, in many of 
the other departments its vote shares were lower than 40%. Having a strong base of support in 
the capital is particularly advantageous for the governmental coalition, as this is the home of 
more than one third of the country’s population. 
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Figure 3.3 - Vote Shares of Vázquez and Mujica in the 2004 and 2009 Elections 
 
The maps displayed in the figure seem to indicate that the geographic distribution of 
Frente Amplio’s bases of support did not change much from one election to the other. However, 
vote swings did occur, and results of the bivariate regression model displayed in Table 3.2 
suggest that they are closely associated with investments made by Vázquez in CCT programs. In 
the beginning of his term, he had implemented a package of short-term social programs called 
Plan de Asistencia Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES), with the objective of alleviating 
the adverse effects of the banking crisis on the most vulnerable families. The plan was designed 
to last from May 2005 to December 2007, and the CCT program Ingreso Ciudadano was one of 
its most important components. Beneficiary families received a monthly stipend of $U1,363 
(about $56 at 2005 exchange rate), independently of the number of children, and the program 
covered about 72,500 households, or 7% of the population, when it was discontinued in 2007. 
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In January of 2008, Vázquez implemented a new package of social programs called Plan 
de Equidad, now designed to last indefinitely. One of its provisions was to reform the 
sexagenarian welfare program Asignaciones Familiares and transform it into a conventional CCT 
program. The value of benefits became dependent on the number and age of children, and the 
program covered almost 150,000 households (14% of the population) in the first trimester of 
2009. Maps displayed in Figure 3.4 indicate that Vázquez’s investments in Asignaciones 
Familiares are correlated with voters’ decisions in 2009. Note that the incumbent lost votes in 
almost all departments where the program covered less than 15% of the population, including 
Montevideo. These losses were not trivial, because they prevented Mujica from winning the 
absolute majority of votes in the first round, and he was forced to dispute a runoff election. Note 
also that support for the incumbent grew in the relatively less developed northwestern 
departments, where coverage is larger.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 - Frente Amplio’s Vote Swings from 2004 to 2009 and Asignaciones Familiares 
Coverage 
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Uruguay, Panama, and most of the cases listed in Table 3.2 provide strong evidence that 
investments in CCT programs affect the electoral performance of incumbent candidates. Some of 
them got reelected, others did not, but all of them witnessed the defection of voters from capitals 
and big cities, and the increase of their support in the countryside. It is true that these vote swings 
have not been strong enough to significantly change the geographic distribution of their electoral 
bases. Those who were stronger in the capitals (e.g., Leonel Fernández in the Dominican 
Republic and Frente Amplio in Uruguay) remained stronger there, despite losses among their 
previous supporters and gains in areas where they have been traditionally weak. Analogously, 
those who were stronger in the countryside (e.g. Gutiérrez brothers in Ecuador and the PRD in 
Panama) became even stronger there, as their support grew or remained high in areas where they 
were already strong and decreased in areas where they had been traditionally weak. In only one 
case, investments in CCT programs produced a dramatic shift in the geographic distribution of 
the incumbent’s electoral bases, and it will be discussed in the next section. Before this is done, I 
turn to Costa Rica, the only case that did not follow the general pattern described above. 
 
Avancemos and the Costa Rican 2010 Presidential Election 
In 2006, Óscar Arias started his second non-consecutive term as president of Costa Rica. His 
party, the Partido Liberación Nacional, has been a prominent political force in the country since 
its foundation in 1951, and it has alternated in power with the Partido de Unidad Social 
Cristiana (PUSC) since the late 1970s. Both of these parties advocate policies and ideas that are 
clearly conservative or right-of-the-center, which makes Costa Rica’s political arena quite unique 
in comparison to other Latin American countries. Besides lacking a left-leaning party with 
chances to win elections, Costa Rica’s democracy is also one of the oldest in the continent. 
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During the decades in which most of the other Latin American countries were being ruled by 
military dictatorships, Costa Rica kept holding regular and competitive elections, and power was 
transferred from one party to another without any major incident. 
Óscar Arias was elected in 2006 with the vote of the countryside. The white spot in the 
first map of Figure 3.5 indicates that his vote shares were relatively lower in the cantons making 
up the metropolitan region of San José (indicated by the circle) than in the less developed 
cantons bordering Panama to the east and Nicaragua to the north. In 2010, incumbent candidate 
Laura Chinchila won with a higher vote share than his predecessor. Note in the figure that 
support for the incumbent appears to have increased in the capital and decreased in the 
countryside, which is unexpected in a country that invested in a large and universal CCT 
program.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 - Vote Shares of Arias and Chinchilla in the 2006 and 2010 Elections 
 
70 
 
 The program Avancemos was implemented by President Óscar Arias in May 19
th
 2006, 
less than two weeks after he took office. The government’s “National Plan of Development 
2006-2010” cites fighting poverty and inequality of access to education as the program’s 
objectives and establishes 130,000 beneficiary students as the program’s target. It has been 
funded primarily by the public budget and administered by the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social 
(IMAS). Differently from other Latin American CCT programs, Avancemos only benefits 
students attending secondary school, and the amount paid increases substantially as they advance 
from grade to grade. There is no explicit limit to the number of granted children per family, but 
the maximum amount each family can receive is 80,000 colones (about $160.00) a month. In 
2008, the target of 130,000 students was reached, but the program kept expanding to cover 
185,000 beneficiaries (43% of enrolled students) in 2010. That was also the year when the 
presidential election took place, and the incumbent candidate Laura Chinchilla became the first 
female president to rule the country. Figure 3.5 clearly shows that PLN’s electoral bases got 
rearranged at the end of Arias term in an unexpected way. The model for Costa Rica 2010 in 
Table 3.2 and the maps displayed in Figure 3.6 show that the association between coverage of 
Avancemos and PLN vote swings is negative, contradicting the pattern of all the other countries. 
It makes Costa Rica the great outlier of Latin America. 
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Figure 3.6 - Avancemos and PLN Vote Swings 
 
A larger proportion of the population receives Avancemos benefits in the countryside 
than in the capital, but the electoral support for the incumbent decreased in the former and 
increased in the latter. A more thorough analysis would be necessary to decipher Costa Rica’s 
exceptionality, but a unusual characteristic of its CCT program hints at a possible explanation. 
Avancemos is the only program in Latin America restricted to children attending secondary 
school. Consequently, they must have successfully completed six years of primary education, 
which many living in extreme poverty will never do, before becoming eligible for the benefits.
20
 
Failure to cover these extremely poor families limits considerably the program’s equalizing 
effects. Moreover, in contrast to all other countries that invested in universal CCT programs, the 
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 In all other countries, CCT coverage starts after the child is born, or even during pregnancy, when only 
health conditionalities are enforced. As children turn five or six years old, they begin attending primary school and 
health conditionalities are replaced by education conditionalities. 
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level of income inequality actually increased during Arias’ term. Figure 3.7 shows that Costa 
Rica’s Gini coefficient rose gradually from 2006 to 2009. The apparent ineffectiveness of 
Avancemos to improve the country’s income distribution may explain why PLN’s bases of 
support got rearranged in an unexpected way after Óscar Arias’ term ended. 
 
Figure 3.7 - Evolution of Costa Rica’s Gini Coefficient in the 2000s. Source: Standardized 
World Income Inequality Data (SWIID) 
 
The case I did not discuss in this section could also be considered an exception, but for a 
completely different reason. The Brazilian 2006 election follows the same pattern as the cases 
discussed before, but it takes this pattern to an extreme. In that country, vote swings observed 
between 2002 to 2006 were so dramatic that they completely shifted the composition and 
geographic distribution of incumbent Lula’s electoral bases. At the municipal level of analysis, 
the correlation between the incumbent’s 2002 and 2006 vote shares is zero, an event that is 
extremely rare both in consolidated and young democracies. For this and other reasons discussed 
in the next section, the Brazilian 2006 election could be labeled “critical” in the same way the 
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1896 and 1928 American elections have been by American scholars (see Key 1955; Pomper 
1967; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1990; Nardulli 1995). The main reason for the radical 
rearrangement of the Brazilian electorate in that election was not missed by leading scholars of 
Brazilian politics: huge investments in the CCT program Bolsa Família (Nicolau and Peixoto 
2007; Power and Hunter 2007; Zucco 2008; Soares and Terron 2008). 
 
Bolsa Família and the Realignment of the Brazilian Electorate 
In older democracies with consolidated party systems, electoral patterns tend to undergo only 
incremental changes from election to election. At the sub-national level of analysis, incumbents’ 
vote shares in one election tend to be highly correlated with their vote shares in the previous one. 
From time to time, however, major rearrangements of voters’ loyalties occur, changing previous 
electoral patterns and the geographic distribution of electoral support for each party. Numerous 
studies have proposed explanations for this phenomenon, most of them centered on American 
politics (e.g., Key 1955; Pomper 1967; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1990; Nardulli 1995). In 
general, these studies seek to identify and explain occurrences of critical elections and longer-
term processes of electoral realignment using datasets disaggregated at the level of states or 
counties. The interest of scholars in these events stems from the fact that changes in the 
composition of parties’ electoral bases may determine who win elections and what policies are 
implemented by the winner after he or she takes office. 
One of the earliest studies on American critical elections describes these events in the 
following way: 
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“A change in the parties’ bases of support would be evidenced in various changes 
in the election returns. The geographical distribution of each party’s vote would 
be different from the past: traditional strongholds would fall, while new areas of 
strength would become evident. Statistically, the vote in a critical election would 
not be closely associated with previous results. In individual states, each party’s 
vote would likewise tend to diverge measurably from traditional levels. Taking all 
states together, each party would experience both gains and losses. The 
Democratic percentage of the vote, for example, would increase in erstwhile rock-
ribbed Republican areas, but would decline in previously Democratic 
geographical bastions. (Pomper 1967, 539)” 
 
Applying the concept of critical elections to countries located south of the American 
border is challenging, due to their higher political instability and the younger age of their 
democratic regimes. Critical elections are characterized by changing previous voting patterns, 
but identifying such patterns requires the observation of several consecutive elections. Most 
Latin American countries transitioned to democracy only recently, and a sufficiently large 
number of elections have not been carried out yet in some of them for electoral patterns to 
become apparent. Consequently, one would have a hard time distinguishing “realigning” from 
“normal” presidential elections, as is common in the American literature. Adding to this 
difficulty, the first few elections following breakdowns of dictatorships tend to be volatile, 
because political parties and party systems are still in their earlier stages of formation. A second 
challenge stems from the fact that realigning elections are characterized by producing enduring 
changes in voters’ loyalties and parties’ electoral bases. Assuming, for example, that vote swings 
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triggered by CCT programs really generate permanent changes in the composition of incumbent 
parties’ electoral bases, this could only be confirmed after a few more presidential elections take 
place. Most CCT programs were implemented not long ago, making it impossible for us to 
determine how durable their electoral effects really are. 
Keeping these limitations in mind, the results presented in the last section still suggest the 
occurrence of rearrangements in incumbents’ electoral bases and voters’ loyalties. Relative to the 
election held immediately before, support for incumbents who invested in CCT programs grew 
in the impoverished countryside and decreased in the capital and metropolitan areas. If we apply 
to the datasets analyzed here the same method some Americanists have used to identify critical 
elections in the U.S., that is, the observation of Pearson’s correlations between sub-national vote 
shares in two consecutive elections (see Pomper 1967; and Knuckey 1999), we can have a better 
idea of how dramatic these rearrangements were. These statistics are presented in Table 3.3 and 
reveal great contrasts across cases. Their sign is positive for all elections but Brazil 2006, where 
it is close to zero. For the sake of comparison, the correlation of the state-level Democratic vote 
reported by Pomper (1967) for the critical American elections of 1896 and 1928 is 0.54 and 0.78, 
respectively. It was higher than 0.90 for most of the other elections. 
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Table 3.3 - Correlations of Incumbents' Vote Shares in the 
Current and Previous Elections 
Election Correlation N 
Brazil 2006 -0.01 5506 
Brazil 2010 0.84 5559 
Chile 2005 0.90 342 
Chile 2009 0.54 342 
Colombia 2010 0.75 1123 
Costa Rica 2010 0.70 82 
Dominican Republic 2008 0.55 32 
Ecuador 2006 0.78 22 
Ecuador 2009 0.53 219 
Mexico 2006 0.74 2423 
Panama 2009 0.77 12 
Uruguay 2009 0.93 19 
 
The values displayed in the table may seem high, but correlations of parties’ vote shares 
in two consecutive elections are supposed to be so. Using the old body of literature on American 
politics as a yardstick, the correlations displayed in the table are in fact low in most cases, except 
perhaps for Brazil 2010, Chile 2005, and Uruguay 2009. One case clearly stands out in the table: 
the Brazilian 2006 election. The municipal vote swings observed in that election were so extreme 
that it would be impossible to predict the distribution of Lula’s vote shares in 2006 based solely 
on his performance four years before. The incumbent became strong where he had been weak 
and weak where he had been strong. The magnitude of the changes in his electoral base is 
unprecedented in the Brazilian democratic history. Below, I briefly describe the political process 
that led to the implementation of the Brazilian CCT program Bolsa Família and the impact it had 
on the critical 2006 presidential election. The association between the program and the 
incumbent’s vote swings is the strongest of all cases, and it is not a coincidence that it has 
received most of the attention from scholars of CCT programs. 
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Bolsa Família and the Brazilian 2006 Presidential Election 
In 2001, almost the end of Cardoso’s term, two large CCT programs were created by the 
government. The first one, called Bolsa Escola, was implemented in April and managed by the 
Ministry of Education. The second one, called Bolsa Alimentação, was implemented in 
September under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health. In January 2002, Bolsa Escola 
beneficiaries started receiving a small bimonthly stipend from a new program administered by 
the Ministry of Mines and Energy called Auxílio Gás, which should be spent on cooking gas. 
Only families earning less than R$90.00 per capita a month (about $40.00 at 2002 average 
exchange rate) were officially classified as poor and eligible for these programs. A large family 
with six children could receive as much as R$97.50 if participating in all of them. The Bolsa 
Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, and Auxílio Gás were important components of the so-called 
Brazilian Social Safety Net, idealized by Cardoso at the beginning of his first term. More than 
five million poor families received CCT benefits when he left the presidency in the first day of 
2003. 
Soon after taking office, the newly elected president Lula consolidated the three  
programs created by Cardoso into the Bolsa Família. The new program operated under similar 
rules and was overseen by the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger. 
Families classified as poor (earning less than R$100.00 per capita) received a monthly stipend of 
R$15.00 per children younger than sixteen, and families classified as extremely poor (earning 
less than R$50.00 per capita) received an additional fixed amount of R$50.00. These values and 
age ranges were reviewed in the following years, and the program covered around 11 million 
families at the end of Lula’s first term. It expanded at a much lower rate during his second term 
78 
 
and reached 12.75 million families when the presidency was handed over to the candidate of the 
incumbent party Dilma Rousseff in January 2011. 
I did not find municipal data for the defunct program Bolsa Escola at the time of the 2002 
election, but information on coverage of Bolsa Família is available for all election years 
following its implementation. I also collected data on results of presidential elections held 
between 1989 and 2010, and on several socio-economic and political indicators commonly used 
by the literature in analyses of Brazilian presidential elections. In order to put the 2006 contest in 
historical perspective, Table 3.4 summarizes some of the characteristics of all elections held after 
the country’s redemocratization. 
 
Table 3.4 - Characteristics of the Most Recent Brazilian Presidential Elections  
          
Correlation of Vote Shares in 
Current and Previous Elections   
Election Incumbent Winner 
PSDB Vote 
Swing 
PT Vote 
Swing PSDB PT N 
1994 PRN PSDB +0.428 +0.099 0.08 0.58 4472 
1998 PSDB PSDB -0.012 +0.047 0.64 0.74 5015 
2002 PSDB PT -0.299 +0.147 0.52 0.63 5501 
2006 PT PT +0.184 +0.022 0.33 -0.01 5559 
2010 PT PT -0.090 -0.017 0.89 0.84 5559 
 
The first presidential election following the redemocratization was held in 1989. At that 
time, the strength and electoral viability of the country’s main political forces were still 
uncertain, and most parties chose to nominate their own candidates instead of negotiating 
alliances. Candidate Collor won the election under the banner of the recently created Partido da 
Reconstrução Nacional (PRN) and was impeached in late 1992. The nominee of the Partido da 
Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) Cardoso won the following election, held in 1994. Note in 
the table that his national vote share was more than forty percentage points higher than that of 
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the PSDB nominee five years before. The correlation between their vote shares is close to zero, 
but this is not surprising, given the fact that the party had been created one year before the 1989 
election. After 1994, the PSDB and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) established themselves as 
the two main political forces in the national arena, always holding the first and second places in 
first rounds of presidential elections. 
Despite sizable vote swings endured by these two parties every four years, the correlation 
of their performances in two consecutive elections had never been as low as in 2006 and as high 
as in 2010, except for Cardoso’s in 1994. The geographic distribution of their votes changed 
radically in 2006 relatively to previous elections, at a time when they were already consolidated 
as Brazil’s main political forces. The results of the 2010 presidential election suggests that the 
new arrangement was not temporary. The Brazilian 2006 election has all the characteristics 
commonly associated with realigning elections by American political scientists, and this very 
concept was employed by Singer (2010) in his analysis of that contest.  
The rearrangement of PT’s electoral bases is illustrated by maps displayed in Figure 3.8. 
A comparison between the first two maps at the top of the figure reveals that, in fact, Lula’s 
electoral performances in 2002 and 2006 are not associated at all. Whereas the 2002 map looks 
like a mosaic, with white, gray, and black spots randomly distributed all over the country, the 
pattern of the 2006 map is clear: Lula performed well in the Northeast and some Northern states, 
and poorly in the developed South and Southeast. The 2010 map in the top right of the figure is a 
matches the 2006 map, suggesting the consolidation of the pattern established in the previous 
election. Note the similarities between the bottom first and third maps, which indicate an 
enormous influence of Bolsa Família in Lula’s vote swings. This influence is in line with events 
elsewhere in Latin America. White spots in São Paulo, Brasília and other developed areas of 
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Brazil reflect their lower Bolsa Família coverage and huge electoral losses endured by Lula 
between 2002 and 2006. These losses were completely offset by gains in poor municipalities, 
and the incumbent ended up with a national vote share similar to the one he obtained four years 
before. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 - Bolsa Família and Brazilian Presidential Elections (Bigger Circles indicate São 
Paulo state and Smaller Circles indicate Brasília). Note: The map for Bolsa Família 
coverage in 2010 is similar to the one for 2006, and it is omitted in the Figure. 
 
The academic community agrees that shifts in the geographical distribution of Lula’s vote 
were triggered by investments in Bolsa Família (Nicolau and Peixoto 2007; Hunter and Power 
2007; Zucco 2008; Soares and Terron 2008; Licio et al. 2009; Marques et al. 2009). Most 
scholars studying the phenomenon contend that these investments led the poor to switch their 
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previous loyalties in favor of the incumbent. On the other hand, the same scholars rarely mention 
the huge losses endured by Lula in the developed states of Brazil, even though these losses were 
as large as his gains. The maps displayed above and evidence from other Latin American 
countries suggest that these losses are as much associated with investments in CCT programs as 
Lula’s electoral gains.  
Taking advantage of the availability of data on many characteristics of Brazilian 
municipalities, I estimated OLS models analogous to the ones I estimated for other countries, but 
with additional control variables. The dependent variable is Lula’s vote swings from 2002 to 
2006, and the main explanatory variable is coverage of Bolsa Família. The models control for 
log of the population in 2000, proportion of the population classified as black or brown (pardo) 
in 2000, proportion of Pentecostal Christians in 2000, per capita income in 2000, size of the 
public sector as percentage of the GDP in 2006, growth of the GDP in 2005, Lula’s vote share in 
2002, a dummy variable indicating that the mayor was from the Workers Party, and a dummy 
variable indicating that the state governor was from the Workers Party. All of these variables 
were collected from the website of the governmental research agency Instituto de Pesquisa 
Econômica Aplicada (IPEA).  
The reason for including these additional covariates in the model is rather pragmatic than 
theoretical. Authors who proposed models to explain Lula’s performance in 2006 controlled for 
them and provided their own justifications for doing so. Here, my objective is just to verify if 
these extra controls reduce or eliminate the Bolsa Família effect. On the other hand, the variable 
“Growth of GDP in 2005” is analogous to the variable “lagged growth of GDP” of the previous 
chapter and is the only one whose inclusion is theoretically justified. Remember that this is one 
of the economic vote indicators that significantly explains incumbents’ vote swings at the cross-
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national level of analysis. If the economic vote hypothesis also have explanatory power at the 
sub-national level of analysis, we should observe higher vote swings in municipalities with 
higher GDP growth. Brazil is the only country in Latin America that publishes yearly statistics of 
municipal GDP, and I could not make analogous analyses for other countries. Table 3.5 displays 
the results. 
 
Table 3.5 - OLS Models: Dep. Variable = Lula's Vote Swing from 2002 to 2006 (1st Round) 
 
Model 1   Model 2 
Variable β p   β p 
Coverage of Bolsa Família in 2006 0.892 0.000 
 
0.365 0.000 
Log of Population in 2000 
   
0.020 0.000 
Proportion of Blacks and Browns in 2000 
   
0.147 0.000 
Proportion of Pentecostal Christians in 2000 
   
-0.023 0.370 
Log of Per Capita Income in 2000 
   
-0.089 0.000 
Size of the Public Sector in 2006 (% of GDP) 
   
0.080 0.000 
GDP Growth in 2005 
   
0.0004 0.000 
Lula's vote share in 2002 
   
-0.622 0.000 
Workers Party Mayor 
   
-0.025 0.000 
Workers Party Governor 
   
-0.043 0.000 
Constant -0.217 0.000   0.402 0.000 
N 5506 
  
5468 
 Adj. R-squared 0.65     0.81   
 
In the first model, the only covariate is coverage of Bolsa Família in the election year. 
Compared to results for other countries reported in Table 3.2, the impact of the Brazilian CCT 
program on Lula’s performance is quite remarkable: it has the lowest intercept, the highest 
coefficient, and the second highest R-squared. According to the model, Lula lost more than 
twenty percentage points of valid votes in municipalities with nearly no coverage and improved 
his vote swing by 0.9 percentage point for each percent of the population covered. The turning 
point occurs when 24.3% of the population is covered, and the model predicts that Lula gained 
votes in about 60% of the country’s municipalities, where only 35% of the population resides. 
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Millions of votes were lost in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, and other big cities of Southern 
states. 
The second model controls for demographic, socio-economic, and political 
characteristics, all of them claimed to have affected Lula’s performances by some authors 
(Nicolau and Peixoto 2007; Zucco 2008; Soares and Terron 2008). Including these control 
variables reduces the magnitude of the coefficient for Bolsa Família coverage by more than half. 
Now, Lula is expected to have improved his performance by about one third of a percentage 
point for each percent of the population covered. It is still an enormous impact if compared to 
other Latin American countries. The model’s R-squared increases, and all variables but the 
proportion of Pentecostal Christians are statistically significant. Note that the coefficient for 
GDP growth in 2005 is small. An additional unit of GDP growth leads to an improvement of 
Lula’s vote swing by only 0.04 percentage point. In the cross-national analyses reported in the 
previous chapter, the incumbent was expected to improve it by more than one percentage point, 
an effect twenty-five times stronger. 
What happened in Brazil during the electoral cycle of 2002 - 2006 is in line with events 
elsewhere in Latin America, in the sense that the incumbent lost votes in metropolitan areas and 
developed states, while gaining votes in the impoverished countryside. The maps and statistical 
models reported above shows that the Brazilian CCT program influenced these vote swings in 
the same way as other Latin American CCT programs have influenced the performance of 
corresponding incumbent candidates. On the other hand, the events were apparently more 
dramatic in Brazil, leaving a profound and permanent impact on the electoral bases of the 
country’s main political forces. The 2006 presidential election could be labeled critical in the 
same way a few American elections have been by the literature.  
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Conclusion 
My objective in this chapter was to propose an explanation for the fact that CCT programs have 
not helped incumbent candidates to win elections. I collected data for 86% of all Latin American 
elections that followed investments in universal programs and demonstrated that incumbents’ 
vote swings are associated with CCT coverage in most of them. In 75% of the cases analyzed in 
this chapter, incumbents incurred electoral losses in areas with low coverage and electoral gains 
in areas with high coverage. So far, the literature has either completely neglected these losses or 
speculated different explanations for them, such as the greater awareness of the upper classes to 
corruption (Hunter and Power 2007). The reality, however, is that investments in CCT programs 
are associated with both negative and positive vote swings. Their electoral effect has been 
restricted to changes in the geographic distribution of incumbents’ electoral bases, rather than to 
improvements in their overall performances. 
 In the beginning of this chapter, I was brief when proposing reasons why CCT programs 
could lead to both electoral gains and losses at the sub-national level of analysis. Beneficiaries 
receive the cash and should reward incumbents at the polls; non-beneficiaries pay the costs of 
these programs through taxes and should be prone to punish incumbents. As a consequence, the 
electoral support for the incumbent should decrease in sub-national units where the population is 
comprised primarily of non-beneficiaries and increase in those units where the majority benefits 
from the program. The cases discussed in this chapter met these expectations. The trap of 
ecological fallacy, although always present, was minimized by the fact that most countries have 
administrative divisions with nearly zero and 100% CCT coverage. The negative intercepts of 
OLS binary models estimated above indicates that losses occurred in places with negligible 
proportion of beneficiaries, and these losses could only be caused by the defection of non-
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beneficiaries. Analogously, the fact that nearly all cases have a turning point indicates that vote 
swings were positive in units with nearly 100% of the population covered, and this pro-
incumbent effect could only be caused by the behavior of beneficiaries. 
 I recognize that these findings are not enough to completely eliminate the potential for 
ecological fallacy. Most sub-national units tend to have an intermediate level of CCT coverage, 
and the data do not indicate if electoral losses and gains in those units were caused by the 
behavior of beneficiaries or non-beneficiaries. The best way to deal with this challenge is to 
analyze individual-level data, and, luckily, plenty of them have been made available recently by 
the Latin American Public Opinion Project. These data are analyzed in the next chapter and show 
that my assumptions are correct for the most part. It is true that beneficiaries of CCT programs 
became more likely to vote for the incumbent from one election to the other, but not all non-
beneficiaries are critical of CCT programs. Incumbents who invested in them have been 
punished by a richer, better educated, and more conservative segment of the diverse group of 
non-beneficiaries.
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Chapter 4 
CCT Programs and Electoral Behavior 
 
In the previous chapter, I provided aggregate-level evidence that investments in CCT programs 
lead incumbents to gain votes in areas with high coverage and lose votes in areas with low 
coverage. In this chapter, my objective is to discuss the microfoundations of this phenomenon, 
and my analyses are made at the individual level. Arguments that CCT programs help 
incumbents to win elections are clearly based on theoretical assumptions about individuals’ 
behavior, and, for this reason, the empirical finding that beneficiaries are more likely to support 
incumbents than non-beneficiaries has had a strong, if not the strongest, influence in the 
literature on CCT programs. These programs are claimed to entice beneficiaries to join 
incumbents’ electoral bases, helping them to get reelected. Scholars have studied the 
phenomenon in different Latin American countries, but there is not much variation in their 
methodological approaches and claims. Without any intention to oversimplify the current state of 
the literature, it is accurate to say that scholars have been claiming the same thing, based on 
results found through similar methodologies, and that the only relevant source of variation in 
their inquiries is their datasets. Country studies are the predominant analytical approach, and the 
fact that similar results have been reached in analyses of different countries grants scholars’ 
claims an aura of generalizability. 
Remember from my discussion in previous chapters that the studies that set the stage for 
the debate were published in the aftermath of the Brazilian 2006 presidential election. A strong 
correlation between coverage of Bolsa Família and incumbent Lula’s vote shares at the level of 
municipalities and states quickly caught the attention of Brazilian analysts. The idea that Lula’s 
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investments in the program increased his support among the lower classes, helping him to get 
reelected, seemed too obvious. In the months following the 2006 elections, the only, short-lived 
scholarly controversy was not triggered by critiques of the view that extra votes among the poor 
helped Lula to get reelected, but by claims that it was the general economic performance, not the 
Bolsa Família program, that led the poor to vote for him. Carraro et al.’s (2007) critiques to 
studies by Nicolau and Peixoto (2007) and Hunter and Power (2007) were responsible for 
stirring this controversy, but the subsequent flood of studies demonstrating the existence of a 
Bolsa Família effect (Zucco 2008; Soares and Terron 2008; Licio et al. 2009; Marques et al. 
2009; Pinheiro 2009) made it clear which side the academic community had picked. 
At that point, the possibility of ecological fallacy was the only phantom haunting scholars 
investigating the effects of the program, but it seemed too weak to cause serious worries. After 
all, although it was not proven yet that the migration of Bolsa Família beneficiaries to Lula’s 
electoral base was the true mechanism behind the association found at the aggregate level, who 
would argue to the contrary? In order to chase that phantom away definitely, scholars turned 
their attention to the scarce sources of survey data that combined information on participation in 
CCT programs and electoral behavior. The first authors to pursue this strategy were Díaz-
Cayeros et al. (2009) and Licio et al. (2009). The former analyzed exit poll data to estimate the 
effect of the Mexican CCT program Oportunidades on citizens’ vote in 2006. They found that 
beneficiaries were 11% more likely to have voted for the incumbent Calderón than non-
beneficiaries. Licio et al. (2009) analyzed the Americas Barometer 2008 survey, estimated a 
multivariate probit model, and found that the average marginal effect of Bolsa Família on the 
probability of vote for Lula in 2006 was ten percentage points. 
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The 2010 Americas Barometer wave of surveys granted this research agenda renewed 
vigor, as surveys carried out in eleven countries distinguished CCT beneficiaries from non-
beneficiaries. Based on the Uruguayan survey, Queirolo (2011) demonstrated that beneficiaries 
of the short lived CCT program PANES were more likely to have voted for incumbent Mujica in 
2009 than non-beneficiaries. Soon afterward, Layton and Smith (2011) analyzed ten Americas 
Barometer surveys and concluded that CCT beneficiaries are more likely to vote for incumbents 
irrespective of country. According to the authors, their results confirm that findings from country 
studies were indeed generalizable to the whole continent and that CCT programs strongly 
influence vote decisions of beneficiaries in favor of incumbents. 
Despite the formation of this strong consensus, scholars failed to address the unsolved 
puzzle that still lingers in the literature. If CCT programs pay off electorally and entice 
beneficiaries to join incumbents’ electoral bases, why have not these extra votes been translated 
into an improvement of their overall performances? In Chapter 2, I showed that vote shares of 
incumbents who invested in CCT programs are neither larger than the vote shares of those who 
did not, nor larger than their own vote shares in previous elections. Most of these incumbent 
candidates lost votes from one election to the other, and this general trend is also reflected in the 
Americas Barometer 2010 surveys. Figure 4.1 shows that in nine out of ten countries with 
available information, the proportion of respondents who declared they would vote for the 
incumbent if the election took place in the following weekend is lower than, or the same as, the 
proportion of respondents who declared to have voted for the current president.
21
 Despite the 
existence of a “CCT effect” in most of these countries, as reported by Layton and Smith (2011), 
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 Although surveys applied in eleven countries have information on participation in CCT programs, 
Chileans were not asked who they would vote for if the elections took place in the following week. 
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the higher probability of pro-incumbent behavior among beneficiaries does not imply that 
incumbents would perform better than they did before, nor that they would even be reelected. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Proportion of Respondents who Voted for the Acting President and who 
Intended to Vote for the Incumbent if the Elections Were Upcoming (95% Confidence 
Intervals) 
 
Some authors have acknowledged that Lula lost support in the most developed areas of 
Brazil from 2002 to 2006 (e.g. Hunter and Power 2007; Soares and Terron 2008; Terron and 
Soares 2010), but this phenomenon has always been perceived as secondary to the pro-
incumbent effect of Bolsa Família in poor areas. By the same token, the fact that Calderón and 
Mujica performed worse than their predecessors does not seem to bother authors who found a 
pro-incumbent effect triggered by Oportunidades in Mexico and PANES in Uruguay. Hunter and 
Power (2007) have speculated that Lula’s vote losses in Southern states were due to the greater 
awareness of richer, better educated Brazilians to corruption scandals, but this argument is put in 
check if we note that Brazil is not exceptional: incumbents who invested massively in CCT 
programs incurred vote losses among richer and better educated voters everywhere. Moreover, I 
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demonstrate below that a strong association between citizens’ vote switches and their socio-
economic status is a distinctive characteristic only of countries with CCT programs. The low 
probability that these programs and corruption go hand in hand, such as to make Hunter and 
Power’s (2007) argument general, requires us to be more cautious and seek alternative 
explanations for the phenomenon. 
In the following sections, I claim and demonstrate that some voters defected from 
electoral bases of incumbents such as Lula, Calderón, and Mujica for the same reason that others 
have joined them: massive investments in targeted redistributive programs. It is true that CCT 
programs tend to be generally accepted by the majority of non-beneficiaries, which creates an 
illusion that they do not have any significant electoral cost at all. However, well-to-do 
individuals, especially the ideologically more conservative, are prone to criticize such programs 
and punish incumbents who invest in them. Many of those who have voted for the president in 
previous elections will leave his or her electoral base and invest their resources to convince 
others to do the same. The true effect of CCT programs is not merely to bring about extra votes 
for the incumbent among beneficiaries, but to trigger a rearrangement of voters’ loyalties, 
making class-based allegiances sharper than they were before. Whether this rearrangement hurts 
or helps the incumbent may depend on contextual factors, the study of which I leave for future 
work. My objective here is to demonstrate that electoral costs do exist, and that they tend to 
offset in great measure the electoral payoffs linked to the delivery of cash transfers. 
 
CCT programs and electoral behavior: current claims and their empirical foundations 
The most important challenge faced by scholars seeking to understand the influence of CCT 
programs on citizens’ vote choices is the scarcity of survey data that combine information about 
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participation in these programs and electoral behavior. The Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP) has helped to overcome this challenge after its researchers started carrying out 
the Americas Barometer surveys in the mid 2000s. In 2010, they were applied in twenty-six 
countries, eleven of which distinguished CCT beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries.
22
 Several 
questions about political attitudes and behavior have also been incorporated to these surveys, 
including whom respondents had voted for in the most recent presidential election (open-ended), 
and what they would do if the presidential elections took place that weekend. The latter question 
offered respondents four alternatives: 1- would not vote; 2- would vote for the incumbent 
candidate or party; 3- would vote for a candidate or party different from the current president; 4- 
would spoil the vote. Scholars who analyze Americas Barometer surveys to estimate the effect of 
CCT programs on respondents’ electoral behavior usually associate one of these two indicators 
(past vote or vote intention) with participation in the national CCT program, always controlling 
for variables they deem appropriate. 
The estimation method most commonly employed is the logit/probit regression, in which 
a dummy variable indicating vote for the incumbent is the dependent variable, and a dummy 
variable indicating participation in the CCT program is the main explanatory variable. To 
illustrate the usual approach, I estimated a logit model that explains vote for Lula in the first 
round of the 2006 Brazilian election, using the Americas Barometer survey carried out in 2007.
23
 
                                                          
22
 Out of the other fifteen countries, seven have CCT programs and eight do not. Most of those that do not 
have a CCT program are outside of the Iberian America: Belize, Canada, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua Suriname, the 
U.S., and Venezuela. 
23
 Americas Barometer surveys first ask respondents if they voted in the past election, and, to those who 
did, they ask for whom. Probably because these are two separate variables in the datasets, authors tend to code as 
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The main explanatory variable is an indicator of participation in Bolsa Família or in one of its 
predecessor programs (Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, and Vale Gás), and the model also 
accounts for respondents’ gender, race, age, education, living area, income, party identification, 
and perception of economy (see Appendix D for coding details of variables used throughout this 
chapter). The results are displayed in Table 4.1 and suggest the existence of a Bolsa Família 
effect. The probability of vote for Lula increases significantly and substantially if the respondent 
is a beneficiary of the program. The average marginal effect of the main explanatory variable is 
over twelve percentage points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
missing cases respondents who declare to not have voted. In this chapter, I do not do the same. Even if I followed 
the common practice, however, my results would be similar, and my conclusions would be identical. 
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Table 4.1. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted for Lula in 2006 
Variable β p 
Bolsa Família Beneficiary 0.57 0.009 
Female 0.13 0.367 
White -0.22 0.121 
Age (in years) 0.006 0.155 
Attends/Attended College -0.24 0.337 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.61 0.001 
Rich -0.31 0.218 
Identifies with PT 1.32 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.46 0.013 
Constant 0.30 0.240 
AME of Bolsa Família 0.123   
N 1016 
 LR test χ2 106.80 
 χ2 p-value 0.000   
Note. AME = Average Marginal Effect.
24
 Respondents whose family 
income belongs to the top three, out of nine categories set by the 
survey, were classified as Rich. PT is Lula's party.  
 
Two articles have estimated similar models for the same Brazilian presidential election. 
Licio et al. (2009) analyzed the 2008 Americas Barometer dataset, estimated a model with 
different control variables, and reached similar results. According to their model, Bolsa Família 
beneficiaries were ten percentage points more likely to have voted for Lula in the first round of 
the 2006 election. On the other hand, Bohn (2011) analyzed the 2007 Americas Barometer 
dataset and did not find any significant Bolsa Família effect in the same election. This surprising 
finding led her to conclude that beneficiaries had migrated to Lula’s electoral base before the 
program was implemented. Because her results contradict the evidence reported in Table 4.1 and 
                                                          
24
 Because logit models are non-linear, marginal effects depend on the values of all other covariates. To 
estimate the average marginal effect of Bolsa Família, I first computed its marginal effect for each of all possible 
combinations of values the other covariates can take, and then I averaged it. Some authors prefer to calculate 
marginal effects keeping all other covariates at their means, but both methods usually lead to similar results. 
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by Licio et al. (2009), I replicated her model using exactly the same variables as she did, or as I 
believe she did. My estimates were considerably different from hers and still suggested the 
existence of a Bolsa Família effect. The reasons for the divergence between our results are 
unclear. 
Before 2010, Americas Barometer surveys identified CCT beneficiaries only in Brazil 
(2007 and 2008), Chile (2006), and Colombia (2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009), but, in 2010, 
beneficiaries were also identified in surveys for other eight countries. I estimated models 
analogous to the one reported in Table 4.1 for all countries in which the CCT program was 
implemented before the most recent presidential election, but keep in mind that citizens may 
have become beneficiaries either before or after the election.
25
 My results are reported in Table 
4.2, and coefficients for control variables are presented in Appendix E (Tables E.1 to E.12). They 
suggest the existence of a CCT effect in many countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Guatemala is excluded by this criterion. The Argentine survey makes reference to two programs 
implemented before the 2007 election (Plan Familias and Jefes y Jefas) and one implemented after it (Asignación 
Universal por Hijo), but we also estimated a model for this country. 
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Table 4.2: Effect of CCT Program on Vote for Incumbent Candidate 
Survey Election Incumbent β AME p N 
Argentina 2007 Cristina Kirchner -0.13 -0.025 0.487 887 
Bolivia 2009 Evo Morales 0.28 0.052 0.013 1872 
Brazil 2006 Lula 0.47 0.096 0.000 1985 
Chile 2009 Eduardo Frei 0.28 0.054 0.228 926 
Chile (2006) 2005 Michelle Bachelet 0.35 0.072 0.160 1293 
Colombia 2006 Álvaro Uribe 0.30 0.064 0.040 1184 
Colombia (2006) 2006 Álvaro Uribe 0.38 0.089 0.185 1163 
Dom. Republic 2008 Leonel Fernández 0.13 0.024 0.366 1259 
Ecuador 2009 Rafael Correa 0.31 0.068 0.002 2627 
Mexico 2006 Felipe Calderón 0.40 0.080 0.017 1084 
Peru 2006 Alan Garcia 0.07 0.016 0.640 1176 
Uruguay 2009 José Mujica 0.22 0.026 0.272 1278 
Note. Surveys with significant estimates are shaded in the table. All of them were carried 
out in 2010, except when indicated otherwise. The table reports logit coefficients and 
average marginal effects of being a beneficiary of CCT programs on vote for the 
incumbent candidate in the most recent presidential election. All logit models have the 
same covariates as the ones reported in Table 4.1, and their coefficients are reported in the 
Appendix E (Tables E.1 to E.12). Dependent variables refer to the 1st round of elections, 
except for Peru, where information is only available for the 2nd round. Refer to Appendix 
D for coding details. 
 
As expected, all coefficients but one turned out to be positive, suggesting that cash 
transfers increase the probability of vote for incumbents. Estimates for five out of twelve surveys 
listed in the table reached statistical significance at the 0.05 level. Importantly, these five 
countries are the ones that had the largest CCT programs when the surveys were carried out. The 
smallest of the five were the Mexican Oportunidades and the Colombian Familias en Acción, 
which covered more than 20% of the population in 2010. On the other hand, except for the 
Dominican Republic, all countries in which the program did not affect citizens’ vote decisions 
had a level of coverage lower than 15%. This pattern might indicate that voters’ behavior is not 
affected only by the actual cash transfers, but also by the size and visibility of the CCT program.  
Scholars who have found a positive CCT effect in models similar to the ones I estimated 
(Licio et al. 2009; Queirolo 2011; Layton and Smith 2011) or through different methodological 
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approaches (Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2009) commonly conjecture that their results provide evidence 
that incumbents profit electorally from CCT programs. The usual interpretation is that 
improvements in living conditions caused by investments in these programs lead beneficiaries to 
migrate to incumbents’ electoral bases, increasing their levels of popular support. However, for 
this interpretation to be accurate two necessary conditions must hold. First, the CCT effect 
captured by these models must reflect changes in beneficiaries’ behavior. It is possible, for 
example, that poor voters, who are the only citizens eligible to receive CCT benefits, are always 
more likely to vote for incumbents than the non-poor, independently of the existence of the 
program.
26
 If the difference in the behavior of the poor (beneficiaries) and non-poor (non-
beneficiaries) is caused by factors exogenous to investments in CCT programs, mainstream 
interpretations may have been sustained on misleading empirical evidence. Second, for CCT 
programs to pay off electorally, they must lead some citizens to vote for the incumbent without 
leading others to vote for the opposition. If some citizens find reasons to oppose the 
implementation of CCT programs, they will punish the incumbent in the polls and perhaps also 
try to convince others to do the same. This loss of support could offset electoral gains among 
beneficiaries, leading to changes only in the composition, not the size, of the incumbent’s 
electoral base. 
These two necessary conditions are a sine qua non of mainstream interpretations, but they 
have never been tested. Although the best data sources currently available are not ideal, they 
have the potential to provide us with valuable information on the veracity of these two conditions 
                                                          
26
 Zucco (2008) argues that the Brazilian poor have a tendency to vote for incumbents in all elections, and 
that the Bolsa Família effect observed in 2006 reflects this historical pattern. An implication of his argument is that 
the poor would have supported Lula in 2006 even if Bolsa Família had not been implemented during his first term. 
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and help this research agenda to move forward. I begin by assessing if beneficiaries actually 
change their behavior as a consequence of cash transfers and then proceed to verifying if CCT 
programs lead some voters to punish incumbents, or not. 
 
The pro-incumbent effect of CCT programs 
The only way we can capture changes in voters’ behavior and estimate the influence of any 
factor in these changes is through longitudinal survey data or snapshot survey data with 
indicators of respondents’ behavior at two time points. While longitudinal data with the potential 
to answer questions posed by this research agenda are nonexistent, many Americas Barometer 
surveys do have indicators of respondents’ behavior at two time points. The first of these 
indicators is their vote in the most recent presidential election, and the second one is their 
intended behavior in a hypothetical upcoming election. These two pieces of information allow us 
to distinguish individuals who intended to change their vote in the period from those who did not 
and asses if changes favored the incumbent. One caveat is that most surveys with information on 
participation in CCT programs were carried out at a time when several presidents initially 
responsible for their implementation had already left office. However, I demonstrate below that 
cash transfers affected citizens’ decisions during administrations of both implementers and 
inheritors of these programs. 
Let us start by acknowledging that, on Election Day, citizens may behave in three 
different ways: 1- they may vote for the opposition; 2- they may spoil their vote or not turn out; 
and 3- they may vote for the incumbent. I call those who follow each of these courses of action 
oppositionists, apathetic, and supporters, respectively. In the models I estimate below, my 
dependent variable is categorical and accounts for these three possibilities of intended behavior. 
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It equals zero if the respondent declared an intention to vote for the opposition in a hypothetical 
upcoming election, one if he or she declared the intention to abstain or vote blank/null, and two 
if he or she declared the intention to vote for the incumbent. The main explanatory variable is 
still participation in the national CCT program, but now it is interacted with the way the 
respondent voted in the previous presidential election, so that we can assess if the program 
affects the behavior of previous supporters and non-supporters in different ways. My indicator of 
behavior in previous presidential elections is analogous to the dependent variable, but enters the 
right-hand side of the equation as two dummy variables, one indicating previous opposition, the 
other indicating previous apathy.  
Because I want to assess the effect of CCT programs on a trichotomous variable, I use a 
multinomial logit (MNL) model. It estimates two logit regressions, each of which is determined 
by the odds ratios of two of dependent variable’s categories. The model reported in Table 4.3 is 
based on the Americas Barometer 2010 survey of Brazil and allows for the possibility that the 
effect of Bolsa Família is conditional on electoral behavior in 2006. It predicts intended behavior 
in a hypothetical upcoming election, with intended vote for the opposition set as the reference 
category. More precisely, it estimates the effect of the covariates on the log odds that individuals 
will intend to follow any other course of action, rather than vote for the opposition. 
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Table 4.3. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 (Intended Oppositionist is 
Reference Category) 
 
Intended Apathetic Intended Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Bolsa Família Beneficiary -0.13 0.245 0.02 0.902 
Previous Oppositionist -1.11 0.000 -2.34 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 1.28 0.000 -0.50 0.028 
BF Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist 0.43 0.399 0.32 0.494 
BF Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic -0.63 0.161 -0.04 0.928 
Female 0.15 0.331 0.25 0.075 
White -0.45 0.006 -0.63 0.000 
Age (in years) 0.001 0.895 -0.006 0.199 
Attends/Attended College -0.35 0.162 -0.69 0.003 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.12 0.623 -0.38 0.057 
Rich -0.26 0.510 -0.12 0.721 
Identifies with PT 0.46 0.073 1.19 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.36 0.035 0.07 0.617 
Constant 0.14 0.699 1.92 0.000 
N 1725 
   
LR test χ2 491.89 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
The coefficients are trickier to interpret than those of models for binary dependent 
variables, and this difficulty is aggravated by the inclusion of interaction terms. Similarly to what 
I have done in the previous section, my strategy is to recover the average marginal effects of the 
program on the probability that one of the three outcomes presumed by the dependent variable 
will realize. As there are three categories of previous and intended behavior, the model makes 
nine substantive predictions: the effect of the program on the probability that a previous 
oppositionist, apathetic, and supporter declares an intention to vote for the opposition, for the 
incumbent, or become/remain apathetic. I calculated each of these nine average marginal effects 
with appropriate p-values that are based on standard errors for joint probabilities. The results are 
presented in the Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4. AME of Bolsa Família on the Probability of Intended Vote 
  
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Previous Behavior AME p-value AME p-value AME p-value 
Oppositionist -0.076 0.371 0.029 0.692 0.047 0.552 
Apathetic 0.054 0.270 -0.177 0.004 0.123 0.043 
Supporter 0.001 0.959 -0.020 0.406 0.019 0.541 
 
Most of the signs displayed in the table are in the expected direction, but only two of 
them are statistically significant. They show that voters who were apathetic in 2006 had their 
vote affected by the Bolsa Família. Among those voters, beneficiaries were almost eighteen 
percentage points less likely to declare the intention of remaining apathetic in 2010 and over 
twelve percentage points more likely to declare the intention to vote for the incumbent in a 
hypothetical upcoming election. These results suggest that the program mobilized apathetic 
voters to join the incumbent’s electoral base, rather than enticed oppositionists to switch sides. 
This is an important finding that has the potential to clarify the mechanism through which CCT 
programs bring about electoral payoffs for incumbents.  
The model I estimated explains electoral behavior and vote switches only during the 
second term of President Lula, which started when Bolsa Família already covered virtually all 
eligible families. The results may not be generalizable to his first term, when the program was 
first implemented and became universal. This is an important caveat, as the vote swings that took 
place between 2002 and 2006, and not those that occurred between 2006 and 2010, were the ones 
that caught the attention of analysts. Fortunately, the 2007 Americas Barometer survey of Brazil 
asked respondents whom they voted for in 2002 and 2006, thus allowing me to estimate a MNL 
model analogous to the one reported in Table 4.3 for the previous electoral cycle. Complete 
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results are reported in Appendix E (Table E.13), and Table 4.5 shows the average marginal 
effects of Bolsa Família. 
 
Table 4.5. AME of Bolsa Família on the Probability of Vote in 2006 
 
Oppositionist in 2006 Apathetic in 2006 Supporter in 2006 
Behavior in 2002 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.163 0.315 0.017 0.878 0.146 0.386 
Apathetic 0.059 0.431 0.018 0.857 -0.077 0.347 
Supporter -0.037 0.455 -0.032 0.265 0.069 0.213 
 
None of the average marginal effects turned out to be statistically significant, and it is in 
part due to the small number of respondents who remembered their vote in 2002. Almost half of 
the sample did not, and the model from which these marginal effects were recovered has a 
considerably low number of cases.  
Taking advantage of the fact that CCT beneficiaries could also be identified in the 
Americas Barometer surveys for other ten countries, I estimated analogous MNL models for all 
of them, except Chile.
27
 At the time when the 2010 surveys were carried out, three of these 
countries had presidents who implemented and/or universalized CCT programs: Colombia, 
Guatemala, and Argentina. The Colombian Familias en Acción was not implemented by Uribe, 
but he was the President who most invested in it, turning it into a universal program at the end of 
his second term (2006-2010). The Guatemalan Mi Familia Progresa was implemented during 
Colom’s term (2007-2011) and, when the Americas Barometer survey was carried out, covered 
the vast majority of municipalities and nearly 30% of the population. The Argentine Asignación 
Universal por Hijo was implemented by Cristina Kirchner in November of 2009 and expanded 
                                                          
27
 As I pointed out before, the Chilean survey did not ask respondents whom they intended to vote for in a 
hypothetical upcoming election. 
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fast. It was the youngest Latin American CCT program when Americas Barometer interviews 
took place in early 2010, but the program already covered more than 10% of the population at 
that time. The other six countries for which I estimated similar models were governed by 
presidents who inherited universal CCT programs from previous administrations.
28
 Table 4.6 
reports AMEs of CCT programs on the probability that voters intended to support the incumbent 
in a hypothetical upcoming election, with shaded country names indicating presidential 
administrations that universalized the CCT program, and shaded estimates indicating statistical 
significance at the 0.1 level (see Tables E.14 to E.31 in Appendix E for complete models). 
 
Table 4.6. AME of CCT on the Probability of Intended Vote for Incumbent 
Previous 
Behavior 
Argentina Bolivia Colombia Dom. Republic Ecuador 
AME p AME p AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.076 0.013 0.039 0.400 0.225 0.029 -0.015 0.806 0.016 0.700 
Apathetic 0.011 0.827 0.049 0.304 0.014 0.712 0.111 0.033 0.095 0.046 
Supporter 0.149 0.070 0.019 0.525 0.002 0.969 0.055 0.174 0.050 0.090 
N 748 
 
1615 
 
1020 
 
1142 
 
2308 
 
LR χ2 267.47 0.000 1165.22 0.000 522.74 0.000 808.58 0.000 1014.80 0.000  
           
Previous 
Behavior 
Guatemala Mexico Peru Uruguay 
  AME p AME p AME p AME p 
  Oppositionist 0.154 0.015 0.030 0.564 0.033 0.302 0.053 0.432 
  Apathetic 0.151 0.004 0.063 0.312 -0.008 0.746 0.171 0.031 
  Supporter 0.132 0.017 0.064 0.345 0.017 0.644 -0.026 0.455 
  N 936 
 
915 
 
1049 
 
1209 
   
LR χ2 293.25 0.000 255.17 0.000 247.08 0.000 1184.88 0.000  
  Note. Reported AMEs are based on MNL models analogous to the one reported in Table 
4.3 (refer to Appendix E for complete models). The Guatemalan survey does not have the 
ethnic category “white”, and the ethnicity variable in its model indicates “ladino” citizens 
instead. Shaded names of countries indicate presidential administrations that implemented 
or universalized a CCT program. Shaded estimates indicate that they are significant at the 
0.1 level. 
  
                                                          
28
 In the case of Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, the administrations from which the program was 
inherited were also led by the acting Presidents in 2010: Evo Morales and Leonel Fernández, respectively. 
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My results convey important information about the potential of CCT programs to affect 
the electoral performance of incumbent candidates. To begin with, note that most of the AMEs 
has positive signs, some of which are statistically significant. The only surprising exception was 
Argentina, where, among previous oppositionists, beneficiaries were actually less likely to 
support the incumbent than non-beneficiaries. In Colombia and Guatemala, the other two 
countries whose incumbent implemented/universalized the CCT program, it had a strong effect 
among previous oppositionists, inducing them to switch sides and support the incumbent. On the 
other hand, the behavior of previous oppositionists was not affected in countries governed by 
inheritors of CCT programs. In the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Uruguay, conditional 
cash transfers seem to have affected primarily previous apathetic voters’ decisions, in the same 
way that Bolsa Família did in Brazil during Lula’s second term. Finally, in three countries CCT 
programs affected the behavior of previous supporters, reinforcing the probability that they 
would vote for the incumbent. In these cases, the program acted as an inhibitor of change, luring 
beneficiaries to remain in the incumbent’s electoral base at the same time that non-beneficiaries 
were leaving it. This effect was particularly strong in Argentina and Guatemala, and less so in 
Ecuador. 
Table 4.6 reveals another pattern if examined in light of information presented in Figure 
4.1. CCT programs had a strong effect among previous supporters, or did not have any 
statistically significant effect, in countries where the incumbent was less popular. This is the case 
of Argentina, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. In the other six countries, the incumbent enjoyed a 
higher level of support, and the program had a strong effect among previous oppositionists or 
apathetic voters, except in Bolivia. It may indicate that CCT programs help popular and 
unpopular Presidents in different ways. The former ones expand their electoral support among 
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the poor, as apathetic and oppositionist beneficiaries are enticed to join their ranks; the latter 
ones lose fewer voters than they would have otherwise lost, as beneficiary supporters are induced 
to stay in their electoral bases. In both cases, investments in CCT programs potentially improve 
incumbents’ electoral prospects. 
By taking previous electoral behavior into account, my models confirm that these 
programs have an effect on citizens’ vote choices, impelling some of them to join the 
incumbent’s electoral base and others to not leave it. Which group of voters they affect, whether 
previous supporters, apathetic, or oppositionists, seems to depend primarily on the incumbent’s 
level of popularity, on who implemented/universalized the program (the incumbent or his/her 
predecessor), and probably also on the size of the program. I would need a larger number of 
cases to reach a definitive conclusion on how these contextual factors intermediate the effects of 
CCT programs, but my models indicate that cash transfers do have a pro-incumbent effect in the 
majority of countries, confirming previous claims made by the literature. 
Nonetheless, this is not the end of the story. If CCT programs were not controversial 
policies and generated only electoral payoffs, incumbents who invest in them would perform 
better than they actually do. The previous chapter provided evidence that these programs also 
hurt incumbents’ support in areas with low coverage, perhaps because some voters may have 
reasons to oppose them. If this is true, we need to review everything we know (or we think we 
know) about their impact on electoral results. In the next section, I demonstrate that, in fact, CCT 
programs also have an anti-incumbent effect. I also provide a profile of the voters who are 
wariest of targeted redistribution, that is, the voters incumbents who invest in CCT programs 
should fear the most on Election Day. 
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The Anti-Incumbent Effect of CCT Programs 
In all countries where a CCT program was implemented, non-beneficiaries are the majority, and 
their socio-economic status, levels of education, and political attitudes vary widely, especially if 
compared with those of beneficiaries. There are several reasons why non-beneficiaries might 
support CCT programs: some of their relatives or friends may be beneficiaries; they may endorse 
income redistribution on ideological grounds; or the program may boost the local economy. 
There are also several reasons why they might criticize these programs: they may pay the bulk of 
its costs through taxes; they may think it produces negative externalities (e.g. lower labor 
supply), or they may oppose income redistribution on ideological grounds as well. The electoral 
behavior of voters is bound to be affected by their opinions of governmental policy interventions, 
but the intensity of their reactions depends on how much they care about such interventions and 
on how strongly they favor or disapprove them. Accordingly, although CCT programs have 
become large and visible in many Latin American countries, not all citizens consider them a 
relevant political issue or let their vote decisions be affected by them. However, some do. If we 
identify citizens who oppose these programs and estimate the effect of their negative opinions on 
their vote choices, we can have a better understanding of the potential of CCT programs to harm 
incumbents’ electoral chances. 
Once again, the greatest challenge is the scarcity of data that would allow us to undertake 
such an enterprise. Surveys that identify CCT beneficiaries are rare, but those that identify 
opinions about CCT programs are rarer. In fact, I just found one, Brazil’s 2010 Americas 
Barometer, which asked respondents if they thought “the government should increase the 
number of families receiving the Bolsa Família, keep it the way it is, reduce, or discontinue the 
program”. I divided respondents into two categories based on their answers to that question: pro-
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BF are those who think the government should expand or keep the program the way it is, 
whereas anti-BF are those who believe Bolsa Família should be reduced or discontinued. This 
simple classification reveals that the program is widely accepted by the Brazilian society. Only 
about 8% of 2,396 respondents were classified as Anti-BF, a figure three times lower than the 
number of beneficiaries.
29
 Not surprisingly, the proportion of respondents who were at the same 
time beneficiaries and Anti-BF is negligible: 0.6% of the sample, and 2.4% of beneficiaries.  
Citizens who oppose CCT programs are likely to punish presidents who implement or 
invest in them, and this punishment should entail an exodus of voters from the incumbent’s 
electoral base. In the case of Brazil, such an event would be particularly consequential, as more 
than 50% of Anti-BF respondents declared to have voted for Lula in 2006. To assess the impact 
of opposition to Bolsa Família on citizens’ electoral behavior, I estimated a MNL model similar 
to the one reported in Table 4.3, but with the addition of the variable “Anti-BF” and interactions 
between it and indicators of previous behavior. Table 4.7 reports average marginal effects of 
being a Bolsa Família beneficiary and holding an Anti-BF opinion on the probability of intended 
vote for incumbent in a hypothetical upcoming election. The complete model and AME 
estimates can be found in the Appendix E (Table E.32 and E.33). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Only eighty-six respondents, or less than 5% of the sample, failed to answer this question and were 
treated as missing cases. 
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Table 4.7. AME of Bolsa Família and Anti-BF on the Probability of Intended Vote for the 
Incumbent 
Previous Behavior AME of Bolsa Família p-value AME of Anti-BF p-value 
Opposition 0.055 0.505 -0.124 0.100 
Apathetic 0.116 0.063 -0.049 0.654 
Supporter 0.005 0.862 -0.258 0.000 
N 1690 
   
LR χ2 500.52 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
Note. Reported AMEs are based on MNL models analogous to the one reported in Table 4.3, 
with three additional covariates: Anti-BF, Anti-BF × Previous Oppositionist, and Anti-BF × 
Previous Apathetic. For complete model, refer to Appendix E. Shaded rows are significant at the 
0.1 level. 
 
The formerly reported positive effect of Bolsa Família on the behavior of previous 
apathetic voters still holds, but its confidence level is now below 95%. On the other hand, 
opposition to the program has a strong and highly significant negative effect on the behavior of 
previous supporters. Among those who voted for Lula in 2006, Anti-BF citizens are twenty-six 
percentage points less likely to remain in his electoral base than the others. Intriguingly, the table 
shows that the negative effect of opposition to Bolsa Família among previous supporters is more 
than twice as large as the positive effect of the actual cash transfers among previous apathetic 
voters. The potential damage it implies for the incumbent’s electoral prospects is aggravated by 
the fact that the absolute majority of Anti-BF voters and beneficiaries declared to have already 
voted for Lula in 2006, while only less than 20% of both groups were apathetic in that year. 
Notwithstanding, since the number of Anti-BF respondents is three times smaller than the 
number of beneficiaries, vote gains and vote losses rather offset each others in the Brazilian 
context. 
Who are the anti-BF voters? They bear several characteristics in common, some of which 
lead them to oppose the program, while others are the result of the fact that they oppose the 
program. Distinguishing between causes and effects of opposition to CCT programs is important, 
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especially if we want to identify analogous voters in other countries. On the one hand, causes of 
this opposition may lead individuals to oppose other relatively aggressive approaches to income 
redistribution and governments more committed to pro-poor agendas. Individuals with higher 
propensity to oppose CCT programs will not only punish incumbents who invest in these 
programs, but also those who invest in other forms of income redistribution. On the other hand, 
effects of this opposition, such as lower support for, and higher distrust in, the president, as well 
as pessimistic opinions about the government and the country in general, are to be found among 
citizens who oppose any kind of policy pursued by the incumbent, not only redistributive ones. 
When delineating the profile of anti-BF citizens, I focus on the causes of their opposition to the 
program, so that we avoid confounding them with citizens who oppose and care more about 
governmental actions taken in other, non-related policy areas. 
There are four main reasons why citizens may oppose CCT programs and other effective 
redistributive policies: 1- they are rich and pay the program’s costs through taxes; 2- they attend 
college and believe that hard work and merit, not poverty, should be rewarded with higher 
income; 3- they are skeptical and believe the program is not an effective tool against poverty; 
and 4- they are ideologically conservative and favor the free market, rather than government’s 
intervention in the economy. Indicators for all of these characteristics can be found in Americas 
Barometer surveys, and I created four dummy variables based on them, two of which have 
already been used in models reported in previous pages: 
 
1- RICH: Income of individual’s family is at the top four, out of ten, categories 
established by LAPOP (See Appendix D for exceptions); 
2- COLLEGE: Individual is attending college or has college degree; 
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3- SKEPTICAL: Individual disagrees that the government is fighting poverty; and 
4- CONSERVATIVE: Individual strongly disagrees that the state, rather than the private 
sector, should own the most important companies and industries of the country. 
 
In fact, individuals with these characteristics are much more likely to be Anti-BF than 
other individuals. Table 4.8 shows estimates of three logit models in which Anti-BF is the 
dependent variable. The first of these models has only the four indicators described above as 
covariates, whereas the second one accounts for additional control variables. In the third model, I 
replaced those indicators by an index that varies from zero to four and equals their sum, as well 
as the same control variables of the second model. I call this index “propensity to oppose income 
redistribution”, because the expectation is that the higher it is, the more likely the respondent is 
to disapprove it. 
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Table 4.8. Logit Models: DV = Respondent is Anti-BF 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable β p β p β p 
RICH 0.58 0.054 0.43 0.175 
  COLLEGE 1.23 0.000 1.28 0.000 
  SKEPTICAL 0.30 0.185 0.33 0.171 
  CONSERVATIVE 0.52 0.006 0.46 0.021 
  INDEX 
    
0.68 0.000 
Female 
  
0.01 0.948 0.04 0.822 
White 
  
0.41 0.016 0.47 0.006 
Age (in years) 
  
0.022 0.000 0.020 0.000 
Lives in Urban Areas 
  
0.39 0.183 0.40 0.175 
Identifies with PT 
  
-0.23 0.332 -0.22 0.346 
Positive Perception of Economy 
 
0.23 0.202 0.30 0.092 
Constant -2.79 0.000 -4.23 0.000 -4.24 0.000 
Average Marginal Effects of Main Covariates         
RICH 0.043 
 
0.031 
   COLLEGE 0.091 
 
0.091 
   SKEPTICAL 0.022 
 
0.024 
   CONSERVATIVE 0.039 
 
0.033 
   INDEX 
    
0.049 
 All Zeroes to All Ones 0.404   0.353   0.400   
N 2059 
 
1962 
 
1962 
 
LR test χ2 61.79 
 
86.07 
 
75.42 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   0.000   0.000   
 
All of the four indicators increase the probability of opposition to the Bolsa Família 
program, but SKEPTICAL is statistically insignificant in both models, and RICH in the second 
one. Individuals without any of these four characteristics make up two thirds of the sample and 
are about forty percentage points less likely to be Anti-BF than individuals with all of them.  
In face of the lack of information about individuals’ opinions of CCT programs in other 
surveys, I build upon the fact that we can identify a typical opponent of these programs in Brazil 
to assess whether my findings can be extended to other countries. Individuals with high 
propensity to oppose income redistribution should punish incumbents in countries with CCT 
programs, but not in those where the head of government does not invest in redistributive 
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policies. I created an identical index using data from all Americas Barometer surveys carried out 
in 2010, some of them in countries with CCT programs, others in countries without them. I 
estimated MNL models analogous to the one reported in Table 4.3 for all of them, except 
Canada, Chile, and the U.S.
30
 In these models, I added the index of propensity to oppose income 
redistribution as a covariate, as well as interactions between it and the variables “Previous 
Oppositionist” and “Previous Apathetic”. The control variables “Attends/Attended College” and 
“Rich” were removed, because they are included in the index to oppose income redistribution. In 
surveys without information on participation in CCT programs, and for countries without these 
programs, the variable “Beneficiary of CCT program” and its interactions are, obviously, 
missing. Table 4.9 reports average marginal effects of CCT programs and the index of propensity 
to oppose income redistribution on the probability that previous supporters would vote for the 
incumbent in a hypothetical upcoming presidential/general election. Complete models and 
reports of AMEs are presented in the Appendix E (Tables E.34 to E.93). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 The question about intended behavior in a hypothetical upcoming election is missing for these countries. 
112 
 
Table 4.9. Average Marginal Effect of CCT Programs and Propensity to Oppose 
Redistribution on the Probability that a Previous Supporter will Remain a Supporter 
LAPOP 2010 (Surveys that Identify CCT Beneficiaries) 
Country 
AME for 
CCT p 
AME for 
Index p N LR test χ2 χ2 p-value 
Argentina 0.103 0.239 -0.082 0.077 699 252.03 0.000 
Bolivia 0.017 0.603 -0.033 0.125 1552 1136.50 0.000 
Brazil 0.007 0.838 -0.056 0.012 1591 433.35 0.000 
Colombia -0.001 0.981 -0.067 0.003 976 501.79 0.000 
Dom. Republic 0.070 0.090 -0.028 0.183 1102 796.90 0.000 
Ecuador 0.022 0.457 -0.089 0.000 2239 1036.17 0.000 
Guatemala 0.083 0.124 -0.053 0.084 877 268.30 0.000 
Mexico 0.048 0.489 -0.057 0.037 890 251.03 0.000 
Peru 0.020 0.584 0.002 0.892 1026 246.91 0.000 
Uruguay -0.038 0.304 0.004 0.840 1146 1134.78 0.000 
LAPOP 2010 (Surveys that Do Not Identify CCT Beneficiaries) 
Costa Rica 
  
0.047 0.080 898 538.64 0.000 
El Salvador 
  
-0.015 0.485 1110 584.58 0.000 
Honduras 
  
-0.015 0.644 1191 715.56 0.000 
Jamaica 
  
0.011 0.695 910 502.46 0.000 
Panama 
  
-0.046 0.052 1093 609.23 0.000 
Paraguay 
  
-0.019 0.463 859 230.73 0.000 
Trinidad & Tobago   -0.060 0.018 851 408.62 0.000 
LAPOP 2010 (Countries that Do Not Have CCT Programs) 
Belize 
  
-0.053 0.088 802 299.43 0.000 
Guyana 
  
0.030 0.438 850 282.18 0.000 
Haiti 
  
-0.006 0.246 1435 323.59 0.000 
Nicaragua 
  
-0.062 0.044 1083 879.75 0.000 
Suriname 
  
0.055 0.298 986 296.70 0.000 
Venezuela     -0.137 0.000 908 718.27 0.000 
LAPOP (Elections of Interest) 
Bolivia 2008 
  
-0.180 0.000 1647 1189.41 0.000 
Brazil 2007 0.084 0.153 -0.060 0.013 650 391.79 0.000 
Chile 2008 
  
-0.061 0.064 951 507.36 0.000 
Dom. Republic 2008 
 
-0.042 0.043 896 792.19 0.000 
Ecuador 2008 
  
-0.047 0.004 2086 809.91 0.000 
Panama 2008 
  
-0.015 0.601 1133 707.65 0.000 
Uruguay 2008     -0.092 0.000 1032 973.48 0.000 
Note. The last presidential elections to which the last group of surveys refer were held in 2005 
(Bolivia), 2002 (Brazil), 2005 (Chile), 2004 (Dom. Republic), 2006 (Ecuador), 2004 (Panama), 
and 2004 (Uruguay). Shaded rows cells are significant at the 0.1 level. 
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Let us start by discussing the results of the ten countries with information on 
beneficiaries, listed at the top of the table. CCT programs did not affect the behavior of previous 
supporters in any of them, except the Dominican Republic, where its effect is significant at the 
0.1 level. Accounting for the index of propensity to oppose income redistribution dissolved the 
previously reported statistical significance of the program in Argentina, Ecuador, and Guatemala 
(see Table 4.6). On the other hand, the same index was found to negatively affect the behavior of 
previous supporters in six countries, four of which at the 0.05 level. In those countries, richer, 
better educated, skeptical, and conservative citizens abandoned the incumbent’s electoral base at 
higher rates than other voters. The lack of effect in Peru is probably due to the small size and 
impact of Juntos, the only geographically-targeted program in that group. In Uruguay, it is due to 
the extraordinary popularity enjoyed by President Mujica at the beginning of his term. It is the 
only country investigated by Americas Barometer where more than 90% of previous supporters 
declared the intention to keep voting for the incumbent in 2010. 
In a few countries with CCT programs, most of them small and/or geographically 
targeted, Americas Barometer surveys did not identify beneficiaries. They comprise the second 
group in Table 4.9. Among them, the ones that had universal programs, although much smaller 
than those of other countries, are Costa Rica, Jamaica, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago. The 
index affected the behavior of previous supporters in the latter two to the disadvantage of the 
ruling head of government and in Costa Rica to his advantage. In the remaining countries, it did 
not play any relevant role. The result for Costa Rica is the only one in the table that goes against 
the general pattern, suggesting that its president actually pleased voters with high propensity to 
oppose income redistribution. This finding is in line with results reported in the previous chapter 
and confirms that Costa Rica is an outlier. Being the only program in the continent that targeted 
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only secondary school students, Avancemos did not reach the most vulnerable families whose 
children usually fail to achieve such a high level of education. Arias’ investments in this CCT 
program probably explain in part the increase of Costa Rica’s level of inequality in the 2000s and 
the support his successor Laura Chinchilla enjoyed among the upper classes in the 2010 
elections. 
Estimates reported for the third group of Table 4.9 reveal something interesting. As 
expected, the index of propensity to oppose income redistribution turned out to be insignificant 
in all countries without a CCT program, except for Belize, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The 
results for the latter two are far from surprising, however, as they were governed by two of the 
most radical leftist presidents of the region in 2010. Hugo Chávez and Daniel Ortega spent a 
considerable amount of public resources in redistributive policies, probably even more (in 
relative terms) than other Latin American leaders who invested in CCT programs. Their 
redistributive policies disappointed richer, better educated, and conservative citizens, leading 
these voters to abandon their electoral bases. On the other hand, the reason why the index 
influenced the behavior of Belizeans is unclear, as the governmental agenda of conservative 
Prime Minister Dean Barrow does not seen to have prioritized redistributive policies. 
 Finally, the surveys of the last group in the table were carried out before 2010 and match 
some of the electoral cycles analyzed in previous chapters. In two of these surveys (Chile and 
Ecuador), respondents’ previous electoral behavior corresponds to the year when inheritors of 
universal CCT programs were elected, whereas in the remaining five it corresponds to the years 
when implementers did. The table shows that, as expected, the index of propensity to oppose 
CCT programs negatively and significantly affected the behavior of previous supporters in six 
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countries. Panama is the only one where it did not have any significant effect, because the 
incumbent lost support among all segments of non-beneficiaries at similar rates.  
The models listed in Table 4.9 make predictions of intended behavior for every 
respondent, based on the values of their covariates. To illustrate the effect of the index on these 
probabilities, Figure 4.2 displays spline curves that pass across the median predicted probability 
of respondents belonging to each of the index’s five values in four countries, calculated in Stata 
through the command mspline. The four graphs displayed in the figure are representative of 
the general pattern in countries that invested in massive CCT programs. Rich, well-educated, 
skeptical, and conservative previous supporters migrated to the opposition’s electoral bases in 
countries led by conservative (Colombia, Mexico, and Panama), moderate leftist (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Uruguay), and radical leftist (Bolivia and 
Ecuador) presidents. The same pattern occurred in countries where the president inherited 
universal program from administrations led by oppositionist parties (Ecuador and Panama), or 
where the president implemented/universalized it (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay).  
 
 
116 
 
  
Figure 4.2: Effects of Index on Intended Behavior of Previous Supporters in Selected 
Countries 
 
The graphs show that previous supporters with high propensity to oppose income 
redistribution tend to switch sides and become oppositionists, elevating the electoral costs 
incurred by incumbents. Bolivia is an exception in this regard, as relatively more of Morales’ 
previous supporters became apathetic voters. The vast majority of countries in which the index 
significantly affected previous supporters’ behavior followed a pattern similar to Brazil, 
Colombia, and Ecuador. In order to compare the electoral phenomenon triggered by investments 
in CCT programs with other contexts, Figure 4.3 shows similar graphs for two countries where 
the index is not statistically significant. One of them has a small geographically targeted CCT 
program (Peru 2010), and the other does not have any (Guyana 2010).  
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Figure 4.3: Effects of Index on Intended Behavior of Previous Supporters in Peru and 
Guyana 
 
The figure shows that Alan García had lost most of his supporters after four years of 
government, and that his losses occurred among Peruvians of different socio-economic status 
and ideologies at similar rates. In Guyana, Bharrat Jagdeo managed to keep most of his followers 
in his electoral base after the 2006 election, but his level of support in 2010 seems to vary 
randomly across the five values of the index. The pattern observed in these and other countries 
that invested little or did not invest at all in CCT programs suggests that the dynamics of their 
electoral competition is different from that of countries that did. Although income inequality is 
endemic in Latin America, crossing boundaries of language, colonial history, and political 
traditions, electoral behavior became more correlated with social class and ideology only where 
heads of government invested massively in CCT programs or other redistributive policies. In the 
remaining countries, electoral decisions are still based on different issues, and citizens’ socio-
economic backgrounds do not affect their vote decisions in any significant way.  
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Conclusion 
To sum up, my findings reveal that CCT programs have a strong potential to harm incumbents’ 
electoral prospects, a risk that presidents who abstain from investing in them do not have to 
worry about. Although these programs are probably widely accepted in most countries, which 
explains in part why incumbents are lured to invest in them, they also disappoint an important 
segment of the population. Richer, better educated, skeptical, and conservative citizens who had 
voted for the incumbent in the past will abandon his or her electoral base and switch their loyalty 
to the opposition. The fact that they comprise a minority of the population should not make 
incumbents less concerned. After all, this minority is the elite, the citizens who have much to 
lose from income redistribution. Their capacity to influence electoral results goes beyond their 
own votes; they possess economic resources to invest in electoral campaigns of the opposition. 
Undecided voters and citizens who do not have well-shaped attitudes toward CCT programs are 
particularly prone to be swayed by these investments.  
Targeted redistributive programs do not necessarily help incumbents to get reelected, as 
has been believed so far. What they do is to trigger a rearrangement of voters’ loyalties and 
change the composition of candidates’ electoral bases. Most of the Latin American incumbents 
who invested in large, universal CCT programs attracted beneficiaries to their electoral bases at 
the same time that a segment of the upper classes abandoned them. If, in the end, these vote 
swings favored or not incumbents, it might have depended on a set of factors such as the 
president who implemented them and incumbents’ general level of popularity. It is arguably a 
secondary issue, however. The most important effect of CCT programs, as well as of other 
aggressive redistributive policies, is to impel voters to rethink their past decisions and migrate to 
the electoral bases of candidates more aligned with their interests. In the most inegalitarian 
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region of the world, it is natural that alliances and loyalties be based primarily on support or 
rejection of income redistribution. The stabilization of democratic regimes fosters such alliances 
and turn citizens’ electoral choices more class-based. For this reason, income redistribution in 
general, and CCT programs in particular, is and will remain a contentious political issue in Latin 
American young democracies. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
In the first decade of the 2000s, social safety nets of Latin American countries expanded 
primarily through investments in Conditional Cash Transfer programs. Millions of families left 
extreme poverty, and their children have better chances of improving their lives in the future. 
Although CCT programs are universalistic, well-targeted, and not dependent on beneficiaries’ 
political loyalties, some citizens doubt that they are the best way to tackle their countries’ social 
problems. Most scholars studying their effects on electoral results claim that CCT programs 
boost support for the incumbent among the poor, which supplies the media with appealing 
headlines and instigates citizens’ suspicions even more. The current consensus is that these 
programs help incumbents to win elections and no scholar has contested it up to this date. 
One of the major shortcomings of this literature is that it has relied primarily on country 
studies. To make matters worse, although twenty-nine Latin American presidential 
administrations invested in CCT programs between 1990 and 2010, only five cases were 
subjected to empirical research. This reduces considerably the external validity of the 
conclusions reached by this literature, as the effects found in one country do not necessarily 
apply to all the others. One of the objectives of this dissertation was to address this weakness. Do 
presidents who invest in CCT programs improve their electoral performances when they run for 
reelection?  
First, I collected data on all presidential elections that took place in Latin American 
democracies between 1990 and 2010. This original dataset has information on the performance 
of the incumbent candidate in each election and on the performance of his or her predecessor in 
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the previous one. These two pieces of information allowed me to identify incumbents who have 
improved their performances between elections and incumbents who have not. The dataset also 
contained information on a set of economic and political variables as well as on investments 
made in CCT programs. The first pattern revealed by the data is that incumbents actually lose 
votes between elections, which agrees with customary findings of the economic vote literature 
for developed and industrialized countries. As Paldam (1991, 19) asserted two decades ago, “it 
does cost votes to rule”. Notwithstanding, the data also revealed that presidents who invested in 
universal CCT programs were losing much less votes on average than other presidents, and this 
could be interpreted as a confirmation of the literature’s consensus. 
In order to assess if this interpretation was correct, I estimated regression models where 
the outcome variable was incumbents’ vote swings from one election to the other, and the 
explanatory variable was the national coverage of CCT programs. When controls for economic 
variables such as growth of GDP, inflation, and unemployment were included in these models, 
the effect of CCT programs completely faded away, whereas the effect of the economy remained 
strong and significant. Following insights of the economic vote literature, I also controlled for 
different political contexts, because it was possible that only presidents perceived as clearly 
responsible for the government’s policies and economic performance would be held accountable 
when the next election took place. As expected, the effect of the economy disappeared in 
contexts with less clarity of responsibility, but the effect of CCT programs remained insignificant 
in any political context. These analyses provide a negative answer for the original research 
question: presidents who invest in CCT programs do not improve their performances when they 
run for reelection. 
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These findings raise more questions than answer, however. Scholars consistently 
demonstrate that the electoral performance of presidents who invest in CCT programs improves 
in areas with large coverage, and that beneficiaries are always more likely to support incumbents 
than non-beneficiaries. Why have not these extra votes resulted in a better electoral performance 
at the national level is a puzzle that Chapters 3 and 4 aimed at solving. My first step was to 
collect data for as many cases of universal CCT programs as I could, and these data should be 
disaggregated at the level of one of the country’s administrative subdivisions. I was able to 
collect information for twelve out of fourteen cases (86%), most of them never studied by the 
academic community. For each of these elections, I gathered data on the performance of the 
incumbent candidate, on the performance of his or her predecessor, and on investments made in 
CCT programs. With this information in hand, I was able to verify if incumbents were indeed 
improving their electoral performances in areas with high coverage, as scholars consistently 
claim.  
The pattern revealed by the data provided a first clue for solving the puzzle entailed by 
findings of Chapter 2. Indeed, incumbents who invested in universal CCT programs do improve 
their electoral performances in areas where coverage is larger, but they also lose votes in areas 
with low coverage. The geographic distribution of  investments in these programs is similar in all 
countries, that is, coverage is higher in the countryside and lower in the capitals and big cities. 
As a consequence, the geographic distribution of incumbents’ bases of support were affected in 
similar ways: they lost support in the capitals and gained support in the countryside. This 
phenomenon was observed in all cases but one, independently of the initial distribution of 
incumbents’ electoral bases and their ideologies. I described the occurrence of this phenomenon 
in Chapter 3 with statistical analyses and a more in-depth discussion of two representative cases, 
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Panama and Uruguay. These analyses also allowed me to identify one outlier, Costa Rica, where 
the incumbent’s vote swings were negatively associated with coverage of the CCT program. A 
unique characteristic of the Costa Rican program Avancemos is that it covers only relatively old 
children attending secondary school, and I suggested that leaving thousands of extremely poor 
families out of the program could explain the unexpected pattern of the 2010 presidential 
election. 
Analyses of sub-national data also revealed a dramatic realignment of the incumbent’s 
electoral bases in Brazil from 2002 to 2006, when the largest CCT program in the world was 
implemented. President Lula is the incumbent who lost the largest proportion of votes in areas 
with low coverage, and the one whose performance was improved the most by each percentage 
of the population covered. Although he won the 2006 election with a national vote share similar 
to the one he had obtained in 2002, the composition of his electoral base had become completely 
different: the participation of citizens living in the impoverished North and Northeast increased 
considerably, whereas the participation of those living in the metropolitan areas of São Paulo, 
Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, and other developed cities in the South and Southeast decreased. The 
correlation between Lula’s municipal vote shares in 2002 and 2006 is zero, indicating an extreme 
case of electoral realignment, especially if compared to classic American critical elections of the 
past. The models I estimated for Brazil also revealed that growth of GDP had a quite slim 
explanatory power for Lula’s performance. While Chapter 2 showed that economic prosperity 
explains much of how incumbent candidates perform in national elections, at the sub-national 
level of analysis, investments in CCT programs seem to have been a much stronger determinant. 
Chapter 3 argues that CCT programs are associated with both electoral gains and losses. 
Scholars have underscored the former and ignored the latter, probably because the association 
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between helping the poor and political costs may not sound very intuitive. However, as I 
suggested throughout this dissertation, income redistribution does not lead to Pareto 
improvements in the allocation of societies’ resources. Someone has to lose for others to win. 
Taxpayers may oppose these policies and punish incumbents who pursue them, because they 
would rather pay less taxes or have their money invested for their own benefit. Analyses 
presented throughout Chapter 3 brings support to this hypothesis, but they did not allow me to 
make claims about individuals’ behavior. 
In order to avoid having my argument objected as an ecological fallacy, I turned my 
attention to survey data. Those that were made available by LAPOP in 2010 proved to be the 
ones with highest potential for clarifying the mechanisms through which CCT programs affect 
citizens’ votes, for three reasons. First, beneficiaries were identified in surveys carried out in ten 
countries. Second, these surveys have indicators of citizens’ behavior in two time points: their 
vote in the previous presidential election and their intended vote in a hypothetical upcoming 
election. These two indicators allowed me to identify changes in behavior and the association of 
these changes with CCT programs. Finally, the survey carried out in Brazil asked respondents to 
indicate their opinion about Bolsa Família. It made it possible for me to identify the 
characteristics of voters who have negative opinions about the program and assess how they 
changed their behavior between the two time points. I was also able to assess if voters with 
similar characteristics were behaving in the same way in other countries. 
Analyses of these datasets were presented throughout Chapter 4, and they are telling of 
the effects CCT programs have on the behavior of both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. I 
found that among voters who previously voted for the opposition, beneficiaries were more likely 
to switch their loyalties to the incumbent than non-beneficiaries in countries where the president 
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universalized the CCT program. A similar effect is observed among voters who did not vote or 
who spoiled their vote in the previous election in countries where the president inherited a 
universal program from previous administrations. It suggests that the potential of these programs 
to “steal” supporters from the opposition is restricted to the first administration that invested in 
them, and that in the following administrations their effect are limited to the mobilization of 
apathetic voters. Finally, in some countries where the president endured low levels of popularity, 
CCT programs helped them to lose fewer supporters than they would otherwise, which is an 
effect that also work to incumbents’ advantage. 
After demonstrating that CCT programs do have a pro-incumbent effect, I sought to 
verify if they could also engender electoral losses. I took advantage of the fact that the Brazilian 
survey asked respondents about their opinions of Bolsa Família and found that, among those who 
have voted for Lula in 2006, negative opinions reduced the chances that respondents would 
remain loyal to the incumbent by twenty-five percentage points. Then, I hypothesized that richer, 
better educated, skeptical, and conservative voters would be more likely to be critical of Bolsa 
Família, and, indeed, this was confirmed by the data. Voters with all of those characteristics are 
forty percentage points more likely to have a negative attitude towards Bolsa Família than voters 
without any of them. Other surveys did not ask  respondents’ opinions about CCT programs, but 
I found that richer, better educated, skeptical, and conservative voters were also more likely to 
leave the incumbent’s electoral base in countries where investments were made in those 
programs, but not in other countries. Again, Costa Rica turned out to be the only exception, 
confirming findings presented in Chapter 3.  
This dissertation makes a strong claim against the common view that CCT programs help 
incumbents to win elections. It does not mean that these programs do not have any electoral 
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effect at all; on the contrary, their effects seem to be quite strong. Every president who invested 
in universal CCT programs witnessed a rearrangement of their electoral bases, increasing the 
participation of beneficiaries and repelling a powerful segment of non-beneficiaries. In highly 
inegalitarian countries, such as the ones in Latin America, the upper classes fear income 
redistribution and react when the government invests in redistributive policies. In the past, they 
could resort to dictatorships to repress people’s demands, or to clientelism to buy their loyalty. 
As democracies consolidate, they need to play by the rules, and the only weapons currently 
available are their own votes and, perhaps, their economic resources if spent in campaigns of the 
opposition.  
Attending to the demands of the poor is a rational electoral strategy when income is not 
well distributed, because the poor comprise a sizable share of the population. In fact, incumbents 
may have been driven by electoral interests, instead of ideology or good intentions, when they 
decided to invest in CCT programs. However, these investments forced all voters, the poor and 
the rich, to review their past loyalties, as now they have real policy alternatives being proposed 
by candidates running for office. As a consequence, vote decisions became more class-based. 
This trend is likely to be observed in many elections to come in Latin America, for as many 
years as income remains grossly concentrated in the hands of a few. If attending to the demands 
of the poor does not increase incumbents’ chances of reelection, the existence of real policy 
alternatives in the electoral arena and the emergence of income redistribution as a relevant policy 
issue force politicians to make it clear what the interests they represent are. They will all have to 
deal with the fact that their choices have political consequences and that it becomes harder and 
harder to serve two masters at the same time.  
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Appendix A  
Sources and dates of variables used in Chapter 2. 
Information on CCT programs 
 
Argentina 
2003: Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 
10/2007: Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (Resumen Ejecutivo 2007). 
 
Bolivia 
2009:  Juancito Pinto: Ministerio de Educación 
 Juana Azurduy: Ministerio de Salud e Deportes (Logros 2009) 
Note. Only the number of granted women and children is published, and not the number of 
households. 
 
Brazil 
07/2002: Bolsa Escola: Sistema Bolsa Escola (SIBES) – Ministério da Educação 
     Bolsa Alimentação: Ministério da Saúde 
12/2006: Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome 
12/2010: Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome 
 
Chile 
2005: Secretaría Ejecutiva del Chile Solidario, Ministerio de Planificación 
05/2009: Ministerio de Planificación.  
 
Colombia 
12/2002: Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y para la Cooperación Internacional   
06/2006: Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y para la Cooperación Internacional   
06/30/2010: Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y para la Cooperación Internacional 
 
Costa Rica 
12/31/2009: Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social 
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Dominican Republic 
05/2008: Programa Solidaridad: Nómina de Beneficiários 05/2008 
 
Ecuador 
10/2006: Ministerio de Inclusion Económica y Social (Programa de Protección Social) 
04/2009: Ministerio de Inclusion Económica y Social (Programa de Protección Social) 
 
El Salvador 
03/2009: Fondo de Inversión Social para el Desarrollo Local 
 
Guatemala 
04/31/2011: Mi Familia Progresa, Consejo de Cohesión Social 
 
Honduras 
1993: Inter-American Development Bank (11/10/1998 Loan Proposal) 
1997: Inter-American Development Bank (11/10/1998 Loan Proposal) 
2001: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations 
2005: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations 
2009: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations 
 
Mexico 
05-06/2000: Secretaría de Desarrollo Social 
05-06/2006: Secretaría de Desarrollo Social 
 
Nicaragua 
2001: Inter-American Development Bank (Informe de Terminación de Proyecto – Red de 
Protección Social, Fase 1) 
2006: Moore (2009). “Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social: An Exemplary but Short-Lived 
Conditional Cash Transfer Programme”. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, 
United Nations. Country Study 17. 
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Panama 
2009: Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (Avance al Mes de Julio de 2010) 
 
Paraguay 
12/2007: Contraloría General de la Republica (Audit Report) 
 
Peru 
04/2006: Programa Juntos, Portal de Transparencia (Plan Operativo 2008) 
03-04/2011: Programa Juntos, Porta de Transparencia (Plan Operativo 2011 Reformulado) 
 
Uruguay 
01-03/2009: Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, Observatorio Social de Programas e Indicadores 
 
Information on presidential elections 
 
Argentina: Ministerio del Interior (all elections).  
 
Bolivia: Tribunal Supremo Electoral (all elections). 
 
Brazil: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010), Elections in the Americas: A 
Data Handbook (1989). 
 
Chile: Servicio Electoral (all elections). 
 
Colombia: Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010); Elections 
in the Americas: A Data Handbook (1982, 1986, 1990, 1994). 
 
Costa Rica: Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (all elections). 
 
Dominican Republic: Junta Central Electoral (all elections). 
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Ecuador: Consejo Nacional Electoral (2002, 2006, 2009); Elections in the Americas: A Data 
Handbook (1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1998). 
 
El Salvador: Tribunal Supremo Electoral (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009); Elections in the Americas: A 
Data Handbook (1984, 1989). 
 
Guatemala: Tribunal Supremo Electoral (1999, 2003, 2007); Elections in the Americas: A Data 
Handbook (1982, 1985, 1990, 1995). 
 
Honduras: Tribunal Supremo Electoral (all elections). 
 
Mexico: Instituto Federal Electoral (1994, 2000, 2006); Elections in the Americas: A Data 
Handbook (1982, 1988). 
 
Nicaragua: Consejo Supremo Electoral (2001, 2006); Elections in the Americas: A Data 
Handbook (1984, 1990, 1996). 
 
Panama: Tribunal Electoral (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009), Elections in the Americas: A Data 
Handbook (1989). 
 
Paraguay: Justicia Electoral (1998, 2003, 2008); Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook 
(1989, 1993). 
 
Peru: Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (all elections). 
 
Uruguay: Corte Electoral (all elections). 
 
Venezuela: Consejo Nacional Electoral (all elections). 
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Appendix B 
Models omitted in Chapter 2.  
Economic models mentioned on page 33. They use a dummy variable indicating any kind of 
CCT program as the main explanatory variable. 
 
Table B.1 - OLS Models: Dep. Variable = Vote Swing of Incumbent Candidate 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable β p β p β p 
Invested in CCT program 0.067 0.039 0.035 0.284 0.041 0.194 
GDP Growth 
  
-0.001 0.840 
  Log of Inflation 
  
-0.053 0.023 
  Unemployment 
  
-0.014 0.004 
  Lagged GDP Growth 
    
0.009 0.028 
Log of Lagged Inflation 
    
-0.038 0.121 
Lagged Unemployment 
    
-0.009 0.035 
Incumbent Candidate is the President 0.133 0.001 0.188 0.000 0.164 0.000 
President's vote share in previous election -0.425 0.001 -0.445 0.001 -0.379 0.003 
Constant 0.057 0.348 0.248 0.004 0.130 0.151 
N 76 
 
71 
 
71 
 Adj. R-squared 0.22 
 
0.32   0.36   
Notes. Inflation rates are logged to reduce the influence of hyperinflation in the early 1990s. Eight 
elections were excluded from all models, because incumbent candidates did not compete. Model 2 
also excludes four elections for which data on unemployment are missing (Dominican Republic 
1990, Guatemala 1990, 1999, and 2007), as well as the Argentine 1999 election, because it 
endured deflation and the log of negative numbers is undefined. Model 3 excludes five elections 
for which data on lagged unemployment are missing (Dominican Republic 1990, Guatemala 1990, 
1999, and 2007, and Honduras 2001). 
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Economic models mentioned on page 33. They use an indicator of universal CCT programs 
as the main explanatory variable. 
 
Table B.2 - OLS Models: Dep. Variable = Vote Swing of Incumbent Candidate 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable β p β p β p 
Invested in Universal CCT program 0.056 0.161 0.021 0.602 0.022 0.569 
GDP Growth 
  
-0.001 0.904 
  Log of Inflation 
  
-0.056 0.016 
  Unemployment 
  
-0.014 0.003 
  Lagged GDP Growth 
    
0.009 0.033 
Log of Lagged Inflation 
    
-0.042 0.100 
Lagged Unemployment 
    
-0.010 0.028 
Incumbent Candidate is the President 0.123 0.002 0.185 0.000 0.162 0.000 
President's vote share in previous election -0.396 0.003 -0.431 0.001 -0.369 0.004 
Constant 0.059 0.338 0.257 0.003 0.145 0.115 
N 76 
 
71 
 
71 
 Adj. R-squared 0.19 
 
0.31   0.35   
Notes. Inflation rates are logged to reduce the influence of hyperinflation in the early 1990s. Eight 
elections were excluded from all models, because incumbent candidates did not compete. Model 2 
also excludes four elections for which data on unemployment are missing (Dominican Republic 
1990, Guatemala 1990, 1999, and 2007), as well as the Argentine 1999 election, because it endured 
deflation and the log of negative numbers is undefined. Model 3 excludes five elections for which 
data on lagged unemployment are missing (Dominican Republic 1990, Guatemala 1990, 1999, and 
2007, and Honduras 2001). 
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Economic models mentioned on the footnote of page 33. They apply world average rates as 
baselines for economic growth and inflation. 
 
Table B.3 - OLS Models: Dep. Variable = Vote Swing of Incumbent Candidate 
 
Model 1   Model 2 
Variable β p   β p 
Coverage of CCT program 0.275 0.167 
 
0.263 0.174 
GDP Growth (world baseline) 0.000 0.999 
   Log of Inflation (world baseline) -0.061 0.019 
   Unemployment -0.013 0.009 
   Lagged GDP Growth (world baseline) 
   
0.009 0.047 
Log of Lagged Inflation (world baseline) 
   
-0.032 0.260 
Lagged Unemployment 
   
-0.008 0.061 
Incumbent Candidate is the President 0.178 0.000 
 
0.155 0.000 
President's vote share in previous election -0.434 0.001 
 
-0.376 0.004 
Constant 0.188 0.017   0.116 0.130 
N 71 
  
71 
 Adj. R-squared 0.31 
  
0.34   
Notes. Inflation rates are logged to reduce the influence of hyperinflation in the early 
1990s. Eight elections were excluded from all models, because incumbent candidates did 
not compete. Model 2 also excludes four elections for which data on unemployment are 
missing (Dominican Republic 1990, Guatemala 1990, 1999, and 2007), as well as the 
Argentine 1999 election, because it endured deflation and the log of negative numbers is 
undefined. Model 3 excludes five elections for which data on lagged unemployment are 
missing (Dominican Republic 1990, Guatemala 1990, 1999, and 2007, and Honduras 
2001). 
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Economic models mentioned on the footnote of page 33. They apply Latin America average 
rates as baselines for economic growth and inflation. 
 
Table B.4 - OLS Models: Dep. Variable = Vote Swing of Incumbent Candidate 
 
Model 1   Model 2 
Variable β p   β p 
Coverage CCT program 0.317 0.120 
 
0.312 0.122 
GDP Growth (Latin America baseline) 0.005 0.417 
   Log of Inflation (Latin America baseline) -0.039 0.110 
   Unemployment -0.011 0.019 
   Lagged GDP Growth (Latin America baseline) 
   
0.009 0.065 
Log of Lagged Inflation (Latin America baseline) 
   
-0.031 0.208 
Lagged Unemployment 
   
-0.009 0.038 
Incumbent Candidate is the President 0.170 0.000 
 
0.156 0.000 
President's vote share in previous election -0.438 0.001 
 
-0.404 0.002 
Constant 0.154 0.049   0.120 0.104 
N 71 
  
71 
 Adj. R-squared 0.29 
  
0.32   
Notes. Inflation rates are logged to reduce the influence of hyperinflation in the early 1990s. 
Eight elections were excluded from all models, because incumbent candidates did not compete. 
Model 2 also excludes four elections for which data on unemployment are missing (Dominican 
Republic 1990, Guatemala 1990, 1999, and 2007), as well as the Argentine 1999 election, 
because it endured deflation and the log of negative numbers is undefined. Model 3 excludes 
five elections for which data on lagged unemployment are missing (Dominican Republic 1990, 
Guatemala 1990, 1999, and 2007, and Honduras 2001). 
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Models mentioned on page 37. They use weighted averages of effective number of parties 
during the presidential administration instead of its value at the time of the election. 
 
Table B.5 - OLS Models: DV = Incumbent's Vote Swing 
  
(1) Coverage (2) Any Kind (3) Coverage 
  Variable β p β p β p 
β1 Invested in CCT program 0.514 0.140 0.059 0.326 0.224 0.333 
β2 Lagged GDP growth 0.011 0.004 0.012 0.004 0.014 0.016 
β3 Coalition government -0.014 0.772 -0.009 0.860 -0.014 0.819 
β4 Minority government 0.014 0.743 -0.020 0.669 0.054 0.420 
β13 CCT program × Coalition -0.420 0.462 -0.088 0.299 
  β14 CCT program × Minority -0.545 0.285 0.018 0.827 
  β34 Coalition × Minority -0.126 0.080 -0.089 0.237 -0.171 0.061 
β134 CCT program × Coalition × Minority 0.934 0.266 0.039 0.778 
  β23 Lagged GDP growth × Coalition 
   
-0.005 0.604 
β24 Lagged GDP growth × Minority 
   
-0.013 0.278 
β234 Lagged GDP growth × Coalition × Minority 
  
0.021 0.209 
β5 Effective number of parties (weighted average) 0.009 0.461 0.010 0.346 0.007 0.556 
β6 President is leftist 0.006 0.899 0.041 0.388 0.029 0.551 
β7 President is the incumbent candidate 0.092 0.027 0.097 0.017 0.091 0.025 
β8 President's vote share in the previous election -0.327 0.025 -0.321 0.019 -0.332 0.013 
β0 Constant -0.028 0.770 -0.038 0.669 -0.017 0.832 
 
N 76   76   76   
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 
 
0.34 
 
0.33 
 Recovered Effects of CCT Programs and Lagged GDP Growth 
Model Effect Coefficients Effect p N 
1 Coverage in Single Party Majority β1 0.514 0.135 20 
1 Coverage in Single Party Minority β1+β14 -0.030 0.932 26 
1 Coverage in Coalition Majority β1+β13 0.094 0.847 21 
1 Coverage in Coalition Minority β1+β13+β14+β134 0.483 0.461 9 
2 CCT program in Single Party Majority β1 0.059 0.323 20 
2 CCT program in Single Party Minority β1+β14 0.076 0.128 26 
2 CCT program in Coalition Majority β1+β13 -0.029 0.650 21 
2 CCT program in Coalition Minority β1+β13+β14+β134 0.027 0.799 9 
3 Lagged GDP growth in Single Party Majority β2 0.014 0.013 20 
3 Lagged GDP growth in Single Party Minority β2+β24 0.000 0.966 26 
3 Lagged GDP growth in Coalition Majority β2+β23 0.009 0.249 21 
3 Lagged GDP growth in Coalition Minority β2+β23+β24+β234 0.016 0.051 9 
Note. The p-values of main models were calculated through t-tests, whereas p-values of recovered effects 
were calculated through z-tests. That is the default procedure of the software I used to make my analyses 
(Stata), which explains why the p-value of recovered effects in Single Party Minority governments is slightly 
different from the p-value of the correspondent coefficient in the model. Shaded rows indicate statistically 
significant recovered effects. 
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Models mentioned on page 44. The economic variable lagged GDP is replaced by inflation 
and unemployment, reducing the number of cases. Both of these alternative variables refer 
to the election year. 
 
Table B.6 - OLS Models: DV = Incumbent's Vote Swing 
  
(1) Inflation   (2) Unemployment 
  Variable β p   β p 
β1 Coverage of CCT program 0.176 0.454 
 
0.214 0.403 
β2 Economy -0.071 0.040 
 
-0.009 0.502 
β3 Coalition government -0.188 0.057 
 
-0.041 0.783 
β4 Minority government -0.008 0.911 
 
0.032 0.789 
β13 Economy × Coalition 0.166 0.051 
 
0.003 0.842 
β14 Economy × Minority -0.018 0.778 
 
-0.001 0.961 
β34 Coalition × Minority -0.010 0.935 
 
-0.207 0.367 
β134 Economy × Coalition × Minority -0.092 0.408 
 
0.006 0.769 
β5 Effective number of parties 0.002 0.839 
 
0.001 0.940 
β6 President is leftist 0.040 0.398 
 
0.033 0.503 
β7 President is the incumbent candidate 0.115 0.004 
 
0.138 0.006 
β8 President's vote share in the previous election -0.421 0.003 
 
-0.475 0.001 
β0 Constant 0.169 0.053 
 
0.176 0.174 
 
N 75     72   
  Adjusted R-squared 0.31     0.25   
Recovering the Effect of CCT Programs and Lagged GDP Growth 
Model Effect Coefficients   Effect p 
1 Log of Inflation in Single Party Majority β1   -0.071 0.036 
1 Log of Inflation in Single Party Minority β1+β14 
 
-0.090 0.108 
1 Log of Inflation in Coalition Majority β1+β13 
 
0.095 0.210 
1 Log of Inflation in Coalition Minority β1+β13+β14+β134 
 
-0.016 0.707 
2 Unemployment in Single Party Majority β1 
 
-0.009 0.499 
2 Unemployment in Single Party Minority β1+β14 
 
-0.010 0.185 
2 Unemployment in Coalition Majority β1+β13 
 
-0.005 0.621 
2 Unemployment in Coalition Minority β1+β13+β14+β134 
 
0.000 0.982 
Notes. The variable economy is log of inflation in Model 1 and unemployment in Model 2. The p-values of 
main models were calculated through t-tests, whereas p-values of recovered effects were calculated through 
z-tests. That is the default procedure of the software I used to make my analyses (Stata), and it explains why 
the p-value of recovered effects in Single Party Minority governments is slightly different from the p-value of 
the correspondent coefficient in the model. Shaded rows indicate statistically significant recovered effects. 
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Appendix C 
Sources and dates of statistics on CCT programs 
 
To estimate the coverage of CCT programs, I divided the number of beneficiary families by the 
total number of households in the administrative division, according to the nearest census. A 
household may be composed of more than one family, but country censuses tend to publish 
information only on the number of households. I searched for information on CCT statistics as 
close to Election Day as possible. Below, I indicate the exact date of these statistics, their source, 
and the year in which the national census was carried out. 
 
 
Election Date of CCT Statistics 
Source of CCT 
Statistics 
Census Year 
Brazil 2006 December 2006 
Ministry of Social 
Development 
2000 
Brazil 2010 December 2010 
Ministry of Social 
Development 
2000 
Chile 2005 December 2005 
Ministry of Social 
Development 
2002 
Chile 2009 May 2009 
Ministry of Social 
Development 
2002 
Colombia 2010 July 2010 SISBEN 2005 
Costa Rica 2010 December 2009 
Mixed Institute of 
Social Assistance 
2011 
Dom. Republic 2008 March 2008 
Office of Social 
Policy 
2010 
Ecuador 2006 2006 
Social Protection 
Program 
2010 
Ecuador 2009 2009 
Social Protection 
Program 
2010 
Mexico 2006 Early 2007 
Social Development 
Secretariat 
2005 
Panama 2009 2008 
Ministry of Social 
Development 
2010 
Uruguay 2009 Jan-Mar 2009 
Ministry of Social 
Development 
2004 
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Appendix D 
Coding and Definition of Variables Used in Chapter 4 
 
Dependent Variable in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
Independent Variable “Previous Supporter” in Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.9  
 
Survey Voted for: 
Question 
Code Definition 
Argentina 
2010 
Cristina Kirchner 
in 2007 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Cristina 
Kirchner in 2007 (VB3=1701) 
Belize 2010 UDP in 2008 VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for the UDP in 
2008 (VB3 = 2601) 
Bolivia 2008 Evo Morales in 
2005 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Evo 
Morales in 2005 (VB3 = 1002) 
Bolivia 2010 Evo Morales in 
2009 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Evo 
Morales in 2009 (VB3=1002) 
Brazil 2007 Lula in 2006* BRAVB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Lula in 
2006 (BRAVB3 = 1) 
Brazil 2007 Lula in 2002** VOL2A = 1 if respondent voted for Lula in 
2002 (VOL2A = 1) 
Brazil 2010 Lula in 2006 VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Lula in 
2006 (VB3=1501) 
Chile 2006 Michelle Bachelet 
in 2005 
CHIVB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Michelle 
Bachelet in 2005 (CHIVB3 = 1) 
Chile 2008 Michelle Bachelet 
in 2005 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Michelle 
Bachelet in 2005 (VB3 = 1301) 
Chile 2010 Eduardo Frei in 
2009 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Eduardo 
Frei in 2009 (VB3 = 1301) 
Colombia 2006 Álvaro Uribe in 
2006 
COLVB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Álvaro 
Uribe in 2006 (COLVB3 = 3) 
Colombia 2010 Álvaro Uribe in 
2006 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Álvaro 
Uribe in 2006 (VB3 = 803) 
Costa Rica 
2010 
Óscar Arias in 
2006 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Óscar 
Arias in 2006 (VB3 = 602) 
Dom. Republic 
2008 
Leonel Fernández 
in 2004 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Leonel 
Fernández in 2004 (VB3 = 2101) 
Dom. Republic 
2010 
Leonel Fernández 
in 2008 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Leonel 
Fernández in 2008 (VB3 = 2101) 
Ecuador 2008 Rafael Correa in 
2006 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Rafael 
Correa in 2006 (VB3 = 901) 
Ecuador 2010 Rafael Correa in 
2009 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Rafael 
Correa in 2009 (VB3 = 901) 
El Salvador 
2010 
Mauricio Funes in 
2009 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Mauricio 
Funes in 2009 (VB3 = 302) 
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(Cont.) 
Survey Voted for: 
Question 
Code Definition 
Guatemala 
2010 
Álvaro Colom in 
2007 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Álvaro 
Colom in 2007 (VB3 = 201) 
Guyana 2010 PPP in 2006 VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for the PPP in 
2006 (VB3 = 2401) 
Haiti 2010 René Préval in 
2006 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for René 
Préval in 2006 (VB3 = 2201) 
Honduras 2010 Porfirio Lobo in 
2009 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Porfirio 
Lobo in 2009 (VB3 = 404) 
Jamaica 2010 JLP in 2007 VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for the JLP in 
2007 (VB3 = 2302) 
Mexico 2010 Felipe Calderón in 
2006 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Felipe 
Calderón in 2006 (VB3 = 101) 
Nicaragua 
2010 
Daniel Ortega in 
2006 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Daniel 
Ortega in 2006 (VB3 = 502) 
Panama 2008 Martín Torrijos in 
2004 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Martín 
Torrijos in 2004 (VB3 = 703) 
Panama 2010 Ricardo Martinelli 
in 2009 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Ricardo 
Martinelli in 2009 (VB3 = 702) 
Paraguay 2010 Fernando Lugo in 
2008 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Fernando 
Lugo in 2008 (VB3 = 1201) 
Peru 2010 Alan Garcia in 
2006 (2
nd
 round) 
PERVB3B = 1 if respondent voted for Alan 
Garcia in 2006 (PERVB3B = 1102) 
Suriname 2010 NPS in 2005 VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for the NPS in 
2005 (VB3 = 2709) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 2010 
PNM in 2007 VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for the PNM 
in 2007 (VB3 = 2501) 
Uruguay 2008 Tabaré Vázquez 
in 2004 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Tabaré 
Vázquez in 2004 (VB3 = 1401) 
Uruguay 2010 José Mujica in 
2010 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for José 
Mujica in 2009 (VB3 = 1401) 
Venezuela 
2010 
Hugo Chávez in 
2006 
VB3 = 1 if respondent voted for Hugo 
Chávez in 2006 (VB3 = 1601) 
* Dependent Variable in Table 4.1. 
** Independent Variable in Tables 4.5 and 4.9. 
Important Note. All of these variables equal zero if the respondent did not vote, voted 
blank, or voted for another candidate. I only coded as missing cases those in which the 
respondent did not answer/remember if he or she voted in the election (variable VB2 or 
analogous is missing), or if she voted, but does not remember for whom (variable VB2 or 
analogous = 1, but variable VB3 or analogous is missing). All variables refer to the 1
st
 
round, except for Peru 2010. 
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Explanatory Variable “CCT Beneficiary” in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.9. 
 
Survey Beneficiary of 
Question 
Code Definition 
Argentina 2010 Asignación Universal 
por Hijo, Plan Jefes y 
Jefas de Hogar, or 
Plan Familias 
CCT1 = 1 if respondent, or someone in 
her household, receives monthly 
cash or in-kind aid from the 
government, like Asignación 
Universal por Hijo, Plan Jefes y 
Jefas de Hogar, or Plan Familias 
(CCT1=1) 
Bolivia 2010 Renta Dignidad, Bono 
Juancito Pinto, or 
Bono Juana Azurduy 
CCT1 = 1 if respondent, or someone in 
her household, receives monthly 
cash or in-kind aid from the 
government, like Renta Dignidad, 
Bono Juancito Pinto, or Bono 
Juana Azurduy (CCT1=1) 
Brazil 2010 Bolsa Família CCT1 = 1 if respondent, or someone in 
her household, receives monthly 
cash or in-kind aid from the 
government, like the program 
Bolsa Família (CCT1=1) 
Brazil 2007 Bolsa Família, Bolsa 
Escola, Bolsa 
Alimentação, or Vale 
Gás 
BF1A, BF1B, 
BF1C, BF1D 
= 1 if respondent participates in the 
program Bolsa Família, Bolsa 
Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, or Vale 
Gás of the Federal Government 
(BF1A=1, or BF1B=1, or BF1C=1, 
or BF1D=1) 
Chile 2010 Chile Solidario, 
PASIS, or Chile Crece 
Contigo 
CCT1 = 1 if respondent, or someone in 
her household, receives monthly 
cash or in-kind aid from the 
government, like Chile Solidario, 
PASIS, or Chile Crece Contigo 
(CCT1=1) 
Chile 2006 Chile Solidario CHI17A = 1 if respondent was beneficiary 
of Chile Solidario in the last three 
years (CHI17A=1) 
Colombia 2010 Familias en Acción CCT1 = 1 if respondent, or someone in 
her household, receives monthly 
cash or in-kind aid from the 
government, like Familias en 
Acción (CCT1=1) 
Colombia 2006 Familias en Acción COLFAMACC = 1 if respondent is registered in 
the program Familias en Acción 
(COLFAMACC=1) 
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(Cont.) 
Survey Beneficiary of 
Question 
Code Definition 
Dominican 
Republic 2010 
Solidaridad 
(excluding Para 
Envejeciente) 
DOMTS1, 
DOMTS2A, 
DOMTS2B, 
DOMTS2C 
= 1 if respondent, or someone in 
her household receives cash from 
the government through the 
programs Comer es Primero, 
Incentivo Escolar, or Bono Gas. 
(DOMTS2A=1, or DOMTS2B=1, 
or DOMTS2C=1) 
Ecuador 2010 Bono Solidario, or 
Bono de la Vivienda 
CCT1 = 1 if respondent, or someone in 
her household, receives monthly 
cash or in-kind aid from the 
government, like Bono Solidario, 
or Bono de la Vivienda (CCT1=1) 
Guatemala 
2010 
Bolsa Solidaria, Mi 
Familia Progresa, 
Fertilizante Barato, 
Comedores 
Solidarios, or similar 
programs 
GUAN20 = 1 if respondent is beneficiary of 
Bolsa Solidaria, Mi Familia 
Progresa, Fertilizante Barato, 
Comedores Solidarios, or similar 
programs (GUAN20 = 1) 
Mexico 2010 Oportunidades, or 
Procampo 
CCT1 = 1 if respondent, or someone in 
her household, receives monthly 
cash or in-kind aid from the 
government, like Oportunidades, 
or Procampo (CCT1=1) 
Peru 2010 Vaso de Leche, 
Juntos, or Seguro 
Integral de Salud 
CCT1 = 1 if respondent, or someone in 
her household, receives monthly 
cash or in-kind aid from the 
government, like Vaso de Leche, 
Juntos, or Seguro Integral de Salud 
(CCT1=1) 
Uruguay 2010 Asignaciones 
Familiares, or Plan 
de Emergencia 
CCT1, 
CCT2A, 
CCT2B 
= 1 if respondent, or someone in 
her household, receives monthly 
cash or in-kind aid from the 
government, like Asignaciones 
Familiares, or Plan de Emergencia 
(CCT2A=1, or CCT2B=1) 
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Control Variables in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9. 
 
Variable Survey 
Question 
Code Definition 
Female All Surveys Q1 = 1 if respondent is female (Q1=2) 
White All Surveys, except 
Guatemala 2010 
ETID = 1 if respondent classifies herself as 
white (ETID=1). Note: This category is 
missing in the Guatemalan 2010 survey. 
Ladino Guatemala 2010 ETID = 1 if respondent classifies herself as 
“ladina” (ETID=2) 
Age (in years) All Surveys Q2 = respondent’s age (Q2) 
Attends College All Surveys ED = 1 if respondent is attending college, 
or has college degree (ED > x; x varies 
across surveys) 
Lives in Urban 
Areas 
All Surveys UR = 1 if respondent lives in urban area 
(UR=1) 
Rich All Surveys, except 
Brazil 2007, and 
Dominican Republic 
2008 
Q10 = 1 if total income of respondent’s 
household belongs to the top four, out 
of ten, categories (Q10 > 6) 
Rich Brazil 2007 VS12 = 1 if total income of respondent’s 
household belongs to the top three, out 
of nine, categories (Q10 > 6) 
Rich Dominican Republic 
2008 
Q10 = 1 if total income of respondent’s 
household belongs to the top four, out 
of eleven, categories (Q10 > 7) 
Positive 
Perception of 
Economy 
All Surveys SOCT1 = 1 if respondent believes that the 
country’s economic situation is good or 
very good (SOCT1 < 3) 
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Control Variable “Identification with Incumbent’s Party” in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 
4.6, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9. 
 
Survey 
Identification 
with: 
Question 
Code Definition 
Argentina 2010 FPV VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the FPV 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 1701) 
Belize 2010 UDP VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the UDP 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 2601) 
Bolivia 2008 
and 2010 
MAS VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the MAS 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 1002) 
Brazil 2007 PT SEP4, SEP5 = 1 if respondent identifies with the PT 
(SEP4 = 1 & SEP5 = 13) 
Brazil 2010 PT VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the PT 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 1501) 
Chile 2008 PS VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the PS 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 1301) 
Colombia 2010 Partido de la U VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the Partido 
de la U (VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 804) 
Costa Rica 
2010 
PLN VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the PLN 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 602) 
Dom. Republic 
2008 and 2010 
PLD VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the PLD 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 2102) 
Ecuador 2008 
and 2010 
Alianza PAIS VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the Alianza 
PAIS (VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 913) 
El Salvador 
2010 
FMLN VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the FMLN 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 302) 
Guatemala 
2010 
UNE VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the UNE 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 201) 
Guyana 2010 PPP VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the PPP 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 2401) 
Haiti 2010 Fwon Lespwa VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the Fwon 
Lespwa (VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 2201) 
Honduras 2010 PNH VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the PNH 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 401) 
Jamaica 2010 JLP VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the JLP 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 2302) 
Mexico 2010 PAN VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the PAN 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 101) 
Nicaragua 
2010 
FSLN VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the FSLN 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 502) 
Panama 2008 PRD VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the PRD 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 702) 
Panama 2010 Cambio 
Democrático 
VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the Cambio 
Democratico (VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 702) 
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(Cont.) 
Survey 
Identification 
with: 
Question 
Code Definition 
Paraguay 2010 PLRA VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with a member 
of the PLRA (VB10 = 1 & VB11 =1202) 
Peru 2010 APRA VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the APRA 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 1102) 
Suriname 2010 NPS VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the NPS 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 2709) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 2010 
PNM VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the PNM 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 2501) 
Uruguay 2008 
and 2010 
Frente Amplio VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the Frente 
Amplio (VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 1401) 
Venezuela 2010 PSUV VB10, VB11 = 1 if respondent identifies with the PSUV 
(VB10 = 1 & VB11 = 1611) 
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Independent Variable “Previous Apathetic” in Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.9.  
 
Survey Question 
Code 
Definition 
All Surveys, 
except Brazil 
2007, and Peru 
2010 
VB2, VB3, 
or 
analogous 
= 1 if respondent did not vote, or 
spoiled her vote in the previous 
presidential/general election (VB2 = 2, 
or VB3 = 00) 
Brazil 2007 VOL1, 
VOL2 
= 1 if respondent did not vote, or 
spoiled her vote in the 2002 
presidential election (VOL1 = 2, 
VOL2 = 3, VOL2 = 4) 
Peru 2010 PERVB2B, 
PERVB3B 
= 1 if respondent did not vote, or 
spoiled her vote in the second round 
of the 2006 presidential election 
(PERVB2B = 2, or PERVB3B = 
1103) 
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Dependent Variable in Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.9. 
 
Variable Survey 
Question 
Code Definition 
Intended Behavior 
if the general or 
presidential 
elections were held 
this 
week/weekend* 
All Surveys, 
except Brazil 
2007, Colombia 
2010, and Haiti 
2010 
VB20 = 0 if respondent would vote for a 
party, or candidate different from the 
current government (VB20=3) 
= 1 if respondent would not vote, or 
would go to vote but would leave the 
ballot blank or would purposely cancel 
her vote (VB20=1, or VB20=4) 
= 2 if respondent would vote for 
incumbent candidate or party 
(VB20=2) 
Behavior in the 
2006 presidential 
election** 
Brazil 2007 BRAVB3 = 0 if respondent voted for a candidate 
other than Lula in 2006 (BRAVB3 > 
1) 
= 1 if respondent did not vote, or 
voted blank/null in 2006 (VB2 = 2, or 
BRAVB3 = 0) 
= 2 if respondent voted for Lula in 
2006 (BRAVB3 = 1) 
Intended Behavior 
if the presidential 
elections were held 
this week 
Colombia 2010 COLVB20 = 0 if respondent would vote for a 
candidate other than Juan Manuel 
Santos (COLVB20 > 5 & COLVB20 
≠ 7) 
= 1 if respondent would not vote, or 
would go to vote but would leave the 
ballot blank or would purposely cancel 
her vote (COLVB20=1, or 
COLVB20=4) 
= 2 if respondent would vote for Juan 
Manuel Santos (COLVB20=7) 
Intended Behavior 
if the 2010 
presidential 
election was held 
today*** 
Haiti 2010 HAIVB12 = 0 if respondent would vote for a 
party other than Fwon Lespwa 
(HAIVB12 > 2201) 
= 1 if respondent did not know / did 
not answer (HAIVB12 is missing) 
= 2 if respondent would vote for the 
Fwon Lespwa (HAIVB12=2201) 
* The survey Trinidad & Tobago 2010 is the only one whose question coded as VB20 has the 
fifth alternative “It would depend on who the candidates are”. If that was the respondent’s 
choice in this case, I coded the variable as one (Apathetic). 
** Dependent Variable in Tables 4.5 and 4.9. 
*** Differently from other surveys, intended behavior for Haiti 2010 is based on an open-ended 
question. 
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Dependent Variable in Table 4.7. 
Explanatory Variable INDEX and components in Tables 4.8, and 4.9  
 
Variable Survey 
Question 
Code Definition 
Anti-BF Brazil 2010 CCT4BRA = 1 if respondent thinks that the 
government should reduce or discontinue 
the Bolsa Família (CCT4BRA=3, or 
CCT4BRA=4) 
SKEPTICAL All Surveys N1 = 1 if respondent disagrees that the 
government is fighting poverty (N1 < 4) 
CONSERVATIVE All Surveys, 
except Brazil 
2007 
ROS1 = 1 if respondent strongly disagrees that 
the state, instead of the private sector, 
should own the most important companies 
and industries of the country (ROS1=1) 
CONSERVATIVE Brazil 2007 PR2 = 1 if respondent strongly agrees that the 
privatization of state-owned companies 
was good for the country (PR2=4) 
INDEX All Surveys  = RICH + COLLEGE + SKEPTICAL + 
CONSERVATIVE 
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Appendix E 
Complete Models of Chapter 4  
 
Models of Table 4.2 
 
Table E.1 - Argentina. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted 
for Cristina Kirchner in 2007 (Americas Barometer 2010) 
Variable β p 
CCT Beneficiary -0.13 0.487 
Female 0.38 0.014 
White 0.23 0.196 
Age (in years) 0.019 0.000 
Attends/Attended College -0.10 0.606 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.35 0.234 
Rich -0.43 0.174 
Identifies with FPV 1.84 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.71 0.001 
Constant -2.37 0.000 
AME of CCT -0.025   
N 887 
 
LR test χ2 72.27 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
Note. CCT beneficiaries are recipients of Plan Familias, Jefes y 
Jefas, and Asignación Universal por Hijo. 
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Table E.2 - Bolivia. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted for 
Evo Morales in 2009 (Americas Barometer 2010) 
Variable β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.28 0.013 
Female -0.02 0.819 
White -1.07 0.000 
Age (in years) 0.018 0.000 
Attends/Attended College -0.40 0.002 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.29 0.012 
Rich -0.31 0.113 
Identifies with MAS 2.26 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.68 0.000 
Constant -0.79 0.000 
AME of CCT 0.052   
N 1872 
 
LR test χ2 498.42 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
Note. CCT beneficiaries are recipients of Renta Dignidad, Bono 
Juancito Pinto, and Bono Juana Azurduy. 
 
 
 
Table E.3 - Brazil. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted for 
Lula in 2006 (Americas Barometer 2010) 
Variable β p 
Bolsa Família Beneficiary 0.47 0.000 
Female 0.01 0.921 
White -0.37 0.000 
Age (in years) 0.025 0.000 
Attends/Attended College -0.13 0.427 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.03 0.823 
Rich -0.34 0.185 
Identifies with PT 1.33 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.18 0.089 
Constant -0.53 0.011 
AME of Bolsa Família 0.096   
N 1985 
 
LR test χ2 180.79 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
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Table E.4 - Chile. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted for 
Eduardo Frei in 2009 (Americas Barometer 2010) 
Variable β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.28 0.228 
Female -0.14 0.371 
White -0.04 0.782 
Age (in years) 0.002 0.702 
Attends/Attended College -0.48 0.034 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.23 0.291 
Rich 0.06 0.790 
Identifies with PDC 2.31 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.47 0.011 
Constant -0.58 0.103 
AME of CCT 0.054   
N 926 
 
LR test χ2 36.93 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
Note. CCT beneficiaries are recipients of Chile Solidario, PASIS, 
and Chile Crece Contigo 
 
 
 
Table E.5 - Chile 2006. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted 
for Michelle Bachelet in 2005 (Americas Barometer 2006) 
Variable β p 
Beneficiary of Chile Solidario 0.35 0.160 
Female 0.31 0.016 
White -0.09 0.473 
Age (in years) 0.04 0.000 
Attends/Attended College -0.53 0.004 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.07 0.697 
Rich 0.04 0.813 
Identifies with PS 1.43 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.61 0.000 
Constant -2.50 0.000 
AME of Chile Solidario 0.072   
N 1293 
 
LR test χ2 196.07 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
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Table E.6 - Colombia. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted 
for Álvaro Uribe in 2006 (Americas Barometer 2010) 
Variable β p 
Familias en Acción Beneficiary 0.30 0.040 
Female 0.26 0.039 
White 0.24 0.073 
Age (in years) 0.048 0.000 
Attends/Attended College -0.05 0.743 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.23 0.121 
Rich -0.18 0.360 
Identifies with the Partido de la U 0.81 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.15 0.440 
Constant -2.20 0.000 
AME of Familias en Acción 0.064   
N 1184 
 
LR test χ2 164.76 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
 
 
 
Table E.7 - Colombia 2006. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted 
for Álvaro Uribe in 2006 (Americas Barometer 2006) 
Variable β p 
Familias en Acción Beneficiary 0.38 0.185 
Female 0.02 0.842 
White 0.32 0.011 
Age (in years) 0.017 0.000 
Attends/Attended College -0.07 0.684 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.19 0.187 
Rich 0.22 0.395 
Identifies with the Partido Conservador 0.82 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.45 0.019 
Constant -1.05 0.000 
AME of Familias en Acción 0.089   
N 1163 
 
LR test χ2 57.71 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
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Table E.8 - Dominican Republic. Logit Model: DV = Respondent 
Voted for Leonel Fernández in 2008 (Americas Barometer 2010) 
Variable β p 
Solidaridad Beneficiary 0.13 0.366 
Female 0.23 0.082 
White -0.52 0.022 
Age (in years) 0.023 0.000 
Attends/Attended College 0.54 0.005 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.37 0.014 
Rich -0.09 0.652 
Identifies with PLD 2.28 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.76 0.001 
Constant -1.53 0.000 
AME of Solidaridad 0.024   
N 1259 
 
LR test χ2 364.94 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
 
 
 
Table E.9 - Ecuador. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted for 
Rafael Correa in 2009 (Americas Barometer 2010) 
Variable β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.31 0.002 
Female 0.07 0.434 
White -0.12 0.390 
Age (in years) 0.004 0.156 
Attends/Attended College -0.04 0.732 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.32 0.000 
Rich 0.23 0.134 
Identifies with Alianza PAIS 2.00 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.63 0.000 
Constant 0.14 0.328 
AME of CCT 0.068   
N 2627 
 
LR test χ2 220.01 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
Note. CCT beneficiaries are recipients of Bono Solidario and Bono 
de la Vivienda 
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Table E.10 - Mexico. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted for 
Felipe Calderón in 2006 (Americas Barometer 2010) 
Variable β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.40 0.017 
Female 0.30 0.030 
White -0.11 0.572 
Age (in years) 0.026 0.000 
Attends/Attended College 0.48 0.014 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.14 0.421 
Rich 0.26 0.117 
Identifies with PAN 1.75 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.10 0.689 
Constant -2.33 0.000 
AME of CCT 0.080   
N 1084 
 
LR test χ2 118.73 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
Note. CCT beneficiaries are recipients of Oportunidades and 
Procampo 
 
 
 
Table E.11 - Peru. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted for 
Alan García in 2006 (Americas Barometer 2010) 
Variable β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.07 0.640 
Female 0.07 0.600 
White 0.24 0.214 
Age (in years) 0.021 0.000 
Attends/Attended College 0.34 0.016 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.61 0.000 
Rich 0.15 0.349 
Identifies with APRA 3.28 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.56 0.004 
Constant -2.12 0.000 
AME of CCT 0.016   
N 1176 
 
LR test χ2 138.93 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
Note. CCT beneficiaries are recipients of Vaso de Leche, Juntos, 
and Seguro Integral de Salud. 
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Table E.12 - Uruguay. Logit Model: DV = Respondent Voted 
for José Mujica in 2009 (Americas Barometer 2010) 
Variable β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.22 0.272 
Female 0.09 0.590 
White -0.37 0.040 
Age (in years) -0.005 0.287 
Attends/Attended College -0.16 0.465 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.02 0.950 
Rich 0.07 0.701 
Identifies with Frente Amplio 3.62 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.66 0.000 
Constant -1.06 0.005 
AME of CCT 0.026   
N 1278 
 
LR test χ2 738.71 
 
χ2 p-value 0.000   
Note. CCT beneficiaries are recipients of Asignaciones Familiares 
and Plan de Emergencia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
Model of Table 4.5 
 
Table E.13 - MNL Model: DV = Behavior in 2006 (Voted for Opposition is 
Reference Category) 
 
Apathetic in 2006 Supporter in 2006 
Variable β p β p 
Bolsa Família Beneficiary -0.26 0.786 0.48 0.463 
Oppositionist in 2002 -1.46 0.002 -2.99 0.000 
Apathetic in 2002 2.33 0.000 -1.00 0.003 
BF Beneficiary × Oppositionist in 2002 0.81 0.599 0.36 0.730 
BF Beneficiary × Apathetic in 2002 -0.17 0.884 -1.26 0.182 
Female -0.37 0.200 0.02 0.941 
White -0.47 0.108 -0.22 0.384 
Age (in years) 0.025 0.010 -0.003 0.733 
Attends/Attended College -1.40 0.012 -1.30 0.000 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.06 0.877 -0.65 0.058 
Rich -0.61 0.224 -0.39 0.299 
Identifies with PT 0.79 0.053 1.49 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.13 0.749 0.50 0.149 
Constant -1.04 0.113 2.54 0.000 
N 698 
   
LR test χ2 422.27 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
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Models of Table 4.6 
 
 
Table E.14 - Argentina. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior (Voted for 
Opposition is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary 1.08 0.032 1.12 0.013 
Previous Oppositionist -0.50 0.086 -1.91 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 1.13 0.000 -1.00 0.002 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -0.72 0.246 -2.62 0.022 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic -0.72 0.218 -0.81 0.225 
Female -0.36 0.049 -0.16 0.484 
White -0.06 0.767 0.21 0.419 
Age (in years) -0.014 0.047 0.008 0.332 
Attends/Attended College -0.19 0.395 0.00 0.997 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.08 0.829 0.19 0.658 
Rich -0.41 0.312 0.45 0.265 
Identifies with FPV 0.60 0.256 1.35 0.002 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.13 0.656 1.28 0.000 
Constant -0.17 0.741 -1.05 0.078 
N 748 
   
LR test χ2 267.47 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.15 - Argentina. AME of CCT on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2007 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.002 0.983 0.078 0.244 -0.076 0.013 
Apathetic -0.076 0.238 0.065 0.339 0.011 0.827 
Supporter -0.229 0.002 0.080 0.279 0.149 0.070 
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Table E.16 - Bolivia. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior (Voted for 
Opposition is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.57 0.128 0.37 0.156 
Previous Oppositionist -0.70 0.061 -3.45 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.90 0.015 -2.01 0.000 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -0.36 0.437 -0.03 0.943 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic 0.32 0.506 0.52 0.244 
Female 0.07 0.700 0.15 0.363 
White -0.26 0.379 -0.67 0.051 
Age (in years) 0.011 0.072 0.011 0.056 
Attends/Attended College -0.15 0.423 -0.12 0.539 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.10 0.615 -0.88 0.000 
Rich -0.32 0.268 0.24 0.412 
Identifies with MAS -0.40 0.358 2.29 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.04 0.863 0.62 0.003 
Constant -0.91 0.029 1.38 0.000 
N 1615 
   
LR test χ2 1165.22 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.17 - Bolivia. AME of CCT on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2009 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.058 0.248 0.018 0.590 0.039 0.400 
Apathetic -0.137 0.002 0.087 0.084 0.049 0.304 
Supporter -0.039 0.133 0.020 0.355 0.019 0.525 
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Table E.18 - Colombia. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior (Voted for 
Opposition is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Beneficiary of Familias en Acción -0.22 0.537 -0.05 0.854 
Previous Oppositionist -2.48 0.001 -2.89 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 1.28 0.000 -0.64 0.006 
Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist 1.86 0.097 2.08 0.010 
Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic 0.30 0.487 0.20 0.624 
Female -0.21 0.234 -0.21 0.227 
White 0.10 0.594 0.13 0.483 
Age (in years) 0.004 0.600 -0.002 0.770 
Attends/Attended College -0.69 0.001 -0.72 0.000 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.15 0.486 -0.01 0.966 
Rich -1.13 0.000 -0.34 0.204 
Identifies with Partido de la U 0.20 0.644 3.13 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.07 0.807 0.48 0.069 
Constant -0.61 0.159 0.42 0.316 
N 1020 
   
LR test χ2 522.74 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.19 - Colombia. AME of CCT on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.289 0.009 0.064 0.333 0.225 0.029 
Apathetic -0.018 0.676 0.004 0.930 0.014 0.712 
Supporter 0.020 0.702 -0.022 0.541 0.002 0.969 
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Table E.20 - Dominican Republic. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior 
(Voted for Opposition is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Beneficiary of Solidaridad -0.13 0.699 0.25 0.417 
Previous Oppositionist -1.72 0.000 -2.39 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.37 0.172 -0.57 0.058 
Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -0.75 0.163 -0.50 0.373 
Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic -0.12 0.811 0.30 0.556 
Female 0.54 0.004 0.68 0.001 
White -0.28 0.410 -0.05 0.880 
Age (in years) 0.004 0.551 0.010 0.104 
Attends/Attended College -0.11 0.666 -0.41 0.151 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.10 0.643 -0.21 0.357 
Rich 0.25 0.324 -0.03 0.927 
Identifies with PLD -0.06 0.847 2.86 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.23 0.544 0.66 0.057 
Constant -0.04 0.909 -0.36 0.341 
N 1142 
   
LR test χ2 808.58 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.21 - Dominican Republic. AME of CCT on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2008 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.092 0.147 -0.077 0.026 -0.015 0.806 
Apathetic -0.010 0.832 -0.102 0.059 0.111 0.033 
Supporter -0.010 0.798 -0.045 0.268 0.055 0.174 
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Table E.22 - Ecuador. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior (Voted for 
Opposition is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.06 0.773 0.26 0.138 
Previous Oppositionist -0.66 0.000 -2.93 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 1.06 0.000 -1.53 0.000 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -0.01 0.972 -0.08 0.869 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic 0.00 0.999 0.46 0.282 
Female 0.08 0.489 -0.01 0.904 
White 0.25 0.221 0.31 0.152 
Age (in years) 0.000 0.997 0.003 0.422 
Attends/Attended College -0.38 0.010 -0.25 0.099 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.11 0.373 -0.25 0.046 
Rich -0.03 0.899 0.07 0.752 
Identifies with Alianza PAIS -0.31 0.444 2.15 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.20 0.228 0.73 0.000 
Constant 0.10 0.626 0.79 0.000 
N 2308 
   
LR test χ2 1014.80 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.23 - Ecuador. AME of CCT on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2009 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.020 0.731 0.004 0.942 0.016 0.700 
Apathetic -0.033 0.467 -0.062 0.264 0.095 0.046 
Supporter -0.030 0.216 -0.020 0.415 0.050 0.090 
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Table E.24 - Guatemala. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior (Voted for 
Opposition is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.23 0.528 0.89 0.009 
Previous Oppositionist -0.33 0.214 -2.54 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 1.58 0.000 0.04 0.904 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -0.26 0.688 1.65 0.036 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic -0.75 0.118 0.02 0.960 
Female 0.55 0.001 0.46 0.043 
Ladino 0.20 0.267 -0.10 0.681 
Age (in years) 0.012 0.025 0.006 0.450 
Attends/Attended College -0.31 0.336 0.65 0.141 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.03 0.874 -0.28 0.259 
Rich -0.22 0.501 -0.38 0.525 
Identifies with UNE 1.13 0.107 3.32 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.14 0.712 0.56 0.164 
Constant -2.17 0.000 -1.89 0.000 
N 936 
   
LR test χ2 293.25 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.25 - Guatemala. AME of CCT on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2007 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.122 0.121 -0.032 0.592 0.154 0.015 
Apathetic 0.026 0.680 -0.178 0.004 0.151 0.004 
Supporter -0.131 0.041 -0.001 0.989 0.132 0.017 
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Table E.26 - Mexico. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior (Voted for Opposition 
is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.13 0.756 0.35 0.315 
Previous Oppositionist -0.50 0.044 -1.38 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.97 0.000 -0.60 0.021 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -0.36 0.532 -0.16 0.773 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic -0.44 0.418 -0.07 0.893 
Female 0.24 0.151 0.71 0.000 
White 0.25 0.275 0.40 0.109 
Age (in years) 0.000 0.994 -0.001 0.828 
Attends/Attended College -0.54 0.032 -0.32 0.243 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.41 0.057 -0.20 0.372 
Rich 0.07 0.714 -0.16 0.487 
Identifies with PAN -0.24 0.618 2.23 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.30 0.301 0.39 0.231 
Constant -1.18 0.001 -0.59 0.128 
N 915 
   
LR test χ2 255.17 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.27 - Mexico. AME of CCT on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.007 0.915 -0.037 0.474 0.030 0.564 
Apathetic 0.030 0.687 -0.092 0.205 0.063 0.312 
Supporter -0.060 0.398 -0.004 0.946 0.064 0.345 
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Table E.28 - Peru. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior (Voted for Opposition is 
Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary -0.94 0.016 0.02 0.959 
Previous Oppositionist -0.81 0.001 -2.38 0.002 
Previous Apathetic 0.70 0.000 -0.92 0.025 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist 1.32 0.013 1.25 0.254 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic 1.19 0.010 -0.16 0.866 
Female 0.21 0.156 -0.42 0.151 
White -0.15 0.518 0.31 0.424 
Age (in years) 0.007 0.131 -0.002 0.873 
Attends/Attended College -0.27 0.101 -0.13 0.680 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.29 0.108 0.00 0.991 
Rich -0.02 0.911 0.15 0.673 
Identifies with APRA 0.23 0.678 3.32 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.60 0.019 0.33 0.368 
Constant -1.42 0.000 -1.93 0.001 
N 1049 
   
LR test χ2 247.08 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.29 - Peru. AME of CCT on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.079 0.172 0.045 0.380 0.033 0.302 
Apathetic -0.054 0.383 0.063 0.313 -0.008 0.746 
Supporter 0.111 0.036 -0.128 0.002 0.017 0.644 
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Table E.30 - Uruguay. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior (Voted for 
Opposition is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary -0.34 0.651 -0.52 0.362 
Previous Oppositionist -3.04 0.000 -4.92 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.97 0.100 -2.87 0.000 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist 1.08 0.202 0.89 0.188 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic 0.25 0.810 1.55 0.102 
Female 0.08 0.776 -0.48 0.061 
White 0.48 0.139 0.48 0.109 
Age (in years) 0.000 0.965 -0.016 0.037 
Attends/Attended College 0.34 0.356 -0.03 0.919 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.04 0.926 -0.07 0.864 
Rich -0.60 0.063 -0.08 0.779 
Identifies with Frente Amplio -0.63 0.242 2.19 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.20 0.530 0.44 0.098 
Constant 0.31 0.703 3.31 0.000 
N 1209 
   
LR test χ2 1184.88 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.31 - Uruguay. AME of CCT on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2009 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.089 0.192 0.037 0.175 0.053 0.432 
Apathetic -0.037 0.522 -0.135 0.089 0.171 0.031 
Supporter 0.019 0.414 0.007 0.813 -0.026 0.455 
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Model  of Table 4.7 
 
 
Table E.32 - MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 (Intended 
Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Bolsa Família Beneficiary -0.11 0.643 -0.03 0.876 
Anti-BF -0.16 0.629 -1.22 0.000 
Previous Oppositionist -1.01 0.000 -2.33 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 1.34 0.000 -0.49 0.045 
BF Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist 0.50 0.335 0.45 0.351 
BF Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic -0.73 0.111 -0.08 0.858 
Anti-BF × Previous Oppositionist -0.28 0.636 0.29 0.658 
Anti-BF × Previous Apathetic -0.21 0.771 0.73 0.337 
Female 0.20 0.219 0.27 0.063 
White -0.44 0.008 -0.59 0.000 
Age (in years) 0.000 0.935 -0.005 0.287 
Attends/Attended College -0.33 0.202 -0.61 0.010 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.14 0.567 -0.40 0.053 
Rich -0.34 0.409 -0.03 0.931 
Identifies with PT 0.49 0.058 1.20 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.35 0.043 0.07 0.642 
Constant 0.08 0.821 1.96 0.000 
N 1690 
   
LR test χ2 500.52 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.33 - AME of being a Bolsa Família beneficiary and holding Anti-BF opinions 
on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
Bolsa Família Beneficiary 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.094 0.278 0.040 0.611 0.055 0.505 
Apathetic 0.064 0.203 -0.180 0.003 0.116 0.063 
Supporter 0.007 0.798 -0.012 0.626 0.005 0.862 
Anti-BF Opinions 
Oppositionist 0.154 0.081 -0.029 0.698 -0.124 0.100 
Apathetic 0.058 0.525 -0.009 0.933 -0.049 0.654 
Supporter 0.148 0.007 0.110 0.042 -0.258 0.000 
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Models of Table 4.9 
 
 
Table E.34 - Argentina. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 (Intended 
Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary 1.21 0.027 1.02 0.037 
Index 0.42 0.198 -0.25 0.337 
Previous Oppositionist 0.20 0.697 -1.68 0.001 
Previous Apathetic 1.80 0.000 -0.94 0.056 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -0.81 0.222 -2.63 0.025 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic -0.79 0.214 -0.87 0.235 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.67 0.075 -0.04 0.926 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.77 0.041 -0.08 0.845 
Female -0.35 0.062 -0.20 0.406 
White -0.08 0.704 0.19 0.466 
Age (in years) -0.014 0.052 0.009 0.253 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.06 0.884 0.09 0.843 
Identifies with FPV 0.51 0.360 1.40 0.002 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.15 0.624 1.25 0.000 
Constant -0.61 0.332 -0.78 0.232 
N 699 
   
LR test χ2 252.03 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.35 - Argentina. AME of Being a CCT Beneficiary and of the Index of 
Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
CCT Beneficiary 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2007 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.004 0.958 0.090 0.200 -0.086 0.009 
Apathetic -0.083 0.227 0.092 0.197 -0.010 0.840 
Supporter -0.230 0.004 0.127 0.151 0.103 0.239 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT programs 
Oppositionist 0.054 0.127 -0.037 0.254 -0.018 0.439 
Apathetic 0.079 0.052 -0.065 0.120 -0.013 0.646 
Supporter -0.006 0.916 0.088 0.075 -0.082 0.077 
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Table E.36 - Bolivia. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 (Intended 
Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.57 0.141 0.33 0.213 
Index -0.38 0.139 -0.38 0.030 
Previous Oppositionist -0.41 0.371 -2.82 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.93 0.040 -1.76 0.000 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -0.49 0.300 -0.11 0.806 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic 0.18 0.718 0.29 0.525 
Index × Previous Oppositionist 0.00 0.991 -0.42 0.165 
Index × Previous Apathetic 0.11 0.722 -0.17 0.570 
Female -0.01 0.951 0.08 0.636 
White -0.19 0.543 -0.63 0.084 
Age (in years) 0.011 0.090 0.013 0.039 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.02 0.911 -0.72 0.000 
Identifies with MAS -0.32 0.459 2.25 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.12 0.617 0.47 0.022 
Constant -0.82 0.076 1.49 0.000 
N 1552 
   
LR test χ2 1136.50 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.37 - Bolivia. AME of Being a CCT Beneficiary and of the Index of 
Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
CCT Beneficiary 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2009 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.029 0.565 0.003 0.934 0.026 0.603 
Apathetic -0.110 0.019 0.088 0.099 0.022 0.662 
Supporter -0.038 0.174 0.022 0.314 0.017 0.603 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT programs 
Oppositionist 0.118 0.000 -0.023 0.292 -0.095 0.004 
Apathetic 0.055 0.026 0.002 0.960 -0.057 0.080 
Supporter 0.039 0.034 -0.006 0.681 -0.033 0.125 
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Table E.38 - Brazil. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 (Intended 
Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Bolsa Família Beneficiary -0.16 0.542 -0.05 0.818 
Index -0.28 0.084 -0.41 0.002 
Previous Oppositionist -1.12 0.000 -2.36 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.85 0.003 -0.48 0.087 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist 0.53 0.314 0.50 0.313 
CCT Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic -0.54 0.251 -0.10 0.819 
Index × Previous Oppositionist 0.02 0.942 0.13 0.634 
Index × Previous Apathetic 0.53 0.071 -0.10 0.742 
Female 0.13 0.411 0.27 0.069 
White -0.40 0.019 -0.60 0.000 
Age (in years) -0.002 0.683 -0.006 0.205 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.16 0.517 -0.25 0.241 
Identifies with PT 0.51 0.055 1.25 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.30 0.084 0.03 0.823 
Constant 0.29 0.447 1.90 0.000 
N 1591 
   
LR test χ2 433.35 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.39 - Brazil. AME of Being a Bolsa Família Beneficiary and of the Index of 
Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
Bolsa Família Beneficiary 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.097 0.269 0.036 0.646 0.061 0.462 
Apathetic 0.059 0.260 -0.134 0.035 0.075 0.238 
Supporter 0.010 0.724 -0.017 0.530 0.007 0.838 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT programs 
Oppositionist 0.061 0.149 -0.026 0.499 -0.035 0.424 
Apathetic 0.012 0.680 0.139 0.000 -0.151 0.000 
Supporter 0.050 0.002 0.006 0.750 -0.056 0.012 
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Table E.40 - Colombia. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Beneficiary of Familias en Acción -0.15 0.693 -0.05 0.870 
Index -0.33 0.060 -0.43 0.001 
Previous Oppositionist -1.24 0.219 -2.63 0.005 
Previous Apathetic 1.49 0.000 -0.45 0.240 
Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist 1.34 0.258 1.77 0.060 
Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic 0.15 0.736 0.10 0.810 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.86 0.176 -0.19 0.666 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.15 0.476 -0.09 0.667 
Female -0.32 0.079 -0.28 0.121 
White 0.10 0.615 0.19 0.338 
Age (in years) 0.003 0.634 -0.002 0.787 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.20 0.370 0.03 0.905 
Identifies with Partido de la U 0.19 0.660 3.11 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.06 0.834 0.43 0.105 
Constant -0.67 0.178 0.50 0.261 
N 976 
   
LR test χ2 501.79 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.41 - Colombia. AME of Being a Beneficiary of Familias en Acción and of the 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
Beneficiary of Familias en Acción 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.219 0.056 0.046 0.503 0.173 0.107 
Apathetic -0.004 0.937 -0.004 0.938 0.007 0.851 
Supporter 0.015 0.772 -0.014 0.710 -0.001 0.981 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT programs 
Oppositionist 0.102 0.031 -0.054 0.187 -0.048 0.273 
Apathetic 0.092 0.000 -0.058 0.008 -0.034 0.070 
Supporter 0.081 0.000 -0.014 0.441 -0.067 0.003 
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Table E.42 - Dominican Republic. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 
2010 (Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Solidaridad Beneficiary -0.14 0.695 0.35 0.279 
Index 0.08 0.644 -0.13 0.453 
Previous Oppositionist -1.21 0.003 -1.66 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.04 0.911 -0.38 0.348 
Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -1.00 0.081 -0.82 0.161 
Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic 0.06 0.913 0.12 0.818 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.36 0.173 -0.59 0.075 
Index × Previous Apathetic 0.29 0.246 -0.25 0.384 
Female 0.54 0.005 0.72 0.000 
White -0.29 0.402 -0.04 0.915 
Age (in years) 0.004 0.539 0.009 0.148 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.15 0.501 -0.20 0.379 
Identifies with PLD -0.01 0.980 2.82 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.38 0.338 0.58 0.099 
Constant -0.17 0.690 -0.33 0.432 
N 1102 
   
LR test χ2 796.90 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.43 - Dominican Republic. AME of Being a Solidaridad Beneficiary and of the 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
Solidaridad Beneficiary 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2008 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.128 0.037 -0.093 0.008 -0.036 0.557 
Apathetic -0.018 0.698 -0.058 0.296 0.076 0.142 
Supporter -0.016 0.675 -0.054 0.195 0.070 0.090 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT programs 
Oppositionist 0.097 0.003 -0.011 0.584 -0.086 0.012 
Apathetic -0.012 0.593 0.100 0.000 -0.088 0.001 
Supporter 0.003 0.864 0.025 0.256 -0.028 0.183 
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Table E.44 - Ecuador. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.01 0.965 0.11 0.550 
Index -0.40 0.000 -0.62 0.000 
Previous Oppositionist -0.90 0.000 -3.25 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.92 0.000 -1.76 0.000 
Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist 0.08 0.820 0.12 0.803 
Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic 0.02 0.966 0.51 0.251 
Index × Previous Oppositionist 0.30 0.043 0.40 0.065 
Index × Previous Apathetic 0.20 0.245 0.35 0.110 
Female 0.06 0.635 -0.09 0.468 
White 0.25 0.237 0.24 0.280 
Age (in years) 0.000 0.944 0.004 0.397 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.06 0.656 -0.13 0.341 
Identifies with Alianza PAIS -0.32 0.419 2.11 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.16 0.344 0.69 0.000 
Constant 0.33 0.156 1.24 0.000 
N 2239 
   
LR test χ2 1036.17 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.45 - Ecuador. AME of Being a CCT Beneficiary and of the Index of 
Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
CCT Beneficiary 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2009 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.030 0.617 0.010 0.852 0.020 0.654 
Apathetic -0.025 0.592 -0.060 0.297 0.084 0.084 
Supporter -0.012 0.652 -0.010 0.681 0.022 0.457 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT programs 
Oppositionist 0.032 0.181 -0.014 0.530 -0.018 0.338 
Apathetic 0.033 0.112 -0.018 0.514 -0.015 0.501 
Supporter 0.084 0.000 0.005 0.705 -0.089 0.000 
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Table E.46 - Guatemala. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.37 0.341 0.66 0.066 
Index 0.22 0.318 -0.35 0.159 
Previous Oppositionist -0.20 0.633 -2.22 0.003 
Previous Apathetic 1.85 0.000 0.01 0.980 
Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -0.18 0.790 1.40 0.101 
Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic -0.82 0.110 0.14 0.789 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.20 0.471 -0.23 0.693 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.37 0.161 0.01 0.983 
Female 0.57 0.001 0.39 0.100 
Ladino 0.26 0.180 -0.02 0.930 
Age (in years) 0.012 0.032 0.004 0.593 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.02 0.918 -0.016 0.528 
Identifies with UNE 1.20 0.090 3.24 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.24 0.571 0.52 0.213 
Constant -2.46 0.000 -1.52 0.001 
N 877 
   
LR test χ2 268.30 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.47 - Guatemala. AME of Being a CCT Beneficiary and of the Index of 
Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
CCT Beneficiary 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2007 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.114 0.164 0.002 0.973 0.112 0.054 
Apathetic 0.024 0.720 -0.152 0.024 0.127 0.017 
Supporter -0.115 0.090 0.032 0.581 0.083 0.124 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT programs 
Oppositionist 0.017 0.553 0.007 0.746 -0.024 0.305 
Apathetic 0.045 0.177 -0.017 0.604 -0.027 0.276 
Supporter 0.011 0.790 0.043 0.176 -0.053 0.084 
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Table E.48 - Mexico. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary 0.17 0.680 0.29 0.420 
Index 0.00 0.997 -0.29 0.054 
Previous Oppositionist -0.53 0.154 -1.01 0.005 
Previous Apathetic 1.02 0.003 -0.25 0.482 
Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -0.36 0.535 -0.20 0.720 
Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic -0.56 0.313 -0.17 0.771 
Index × Previous Oppositionist 0.04 0.857 -0.47 0.112 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.03 0.879 -0.37 0.168 
Female 0.22 0.200 0.66 0.001 
White 0.25 0.286 0.32 0.217 
Age (in years) 0.002 0.766 -0.004 0.603 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.33 0.129 -0.17 0.445 
Identifies with PAN -0.26 0.582 2.26 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.29 0.324 0.42 0.212 
Constant -1.24 0.003 -0.31 0.457 
N 890 
   
LR test χ2 251.03 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.49 - Mexico. AME of Being a CCT Beneficiary and of the Index of 
Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
CCT Beneficiary 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.014 0.836 -0.028 0.594 0.015 0.765 
Apathetic 0.054 0.479 -0.099 0.192 0.045 0.452 
Supporter -0.055 0.447 0.008 0.899 0.048 0.489 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT programs 
Oppositionist 0.061 0.058 0.024 0.318 -0.086 0.002 
Apathetic 0.046 0.138 0.038 0.230 -0.084 0.002 
Supporter 0.039 0.173 0.019 0.423 -0.057 0.037 
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Table E.50 - Peru. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 (Intended 
Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary -0.91 0.020 0.07 0.866 
Index -0.07 0.607 0.008 0.964 
Previous Oppositionist -0.67 0.099 -2.04 0.045 
Previous Apathetic 0.97 0.003 0.33 0.590 
Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist 1.31 0.014 1.24 0.263 
Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic 1.10 0.020 -0.51 0.582 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.05 0.831 -0.23 0.716 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.16 0.387 -1.05 0.023 
Female 0.22 0.159 -0.45 0.137 
White -0.14 0.528 0.28 0.466 
Age (in years) 0.009 0.075 -0.001 0.950 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.29 0.114 0.12 0.737 
Identifies with APRA 0.21 0.708 3.35 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.63 0.014 0.36 0.316 
Constant -1.53 0.000 -2.14 0.001 
N 1026 
   
LR test χ2 246.91 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.51 - Peru. AME of Being a CCT Beneficiary and of the Index of Propensity 
to Oppose CCT Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
CCT Beneficiary 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.084 0.159 0.049 0.362 0.035 0.292 
Apathetic -0.035 0.584 0.052 0.418 -0.017 0.473 
Supporter 0.103 0.054 -0.12 0.004 0.020 0.584 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT programs 
Oppositionist 0.019 0.491 -0.015 0.568 -0.005 0.741 
Apathetic 0.069 0.012 -0.036 0.195 -0.033 0.029 
Supporter 0.009 0.699 -0.011 0.597 0.002 0.892 
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Table E.52 - Uruguay. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
CCT Beneficiary -0.05 0.947 -0.51 0.387 
Index 0.17 0.743 0.16 0.691 
Previous Oppositionist -2.36 0.001 -4.63 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 1.53 0.070 -1.81 0.018 
Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist 0.68 0.454 0.79 0.263 
Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic 0.19 0.872 1.58 0.143 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.74 0.190 -0.29 0.498 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.42 0.488 -1.00 0.073 
Female 0.23 0.453 -0.43 0.105 
White 0.50 0.150 0.51 0.097 
Age (in years) 0.001 0.953 -0.015 0.046 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.11 0.817 0.04 0.934 
Identifies with Frente Amplio -0.58 0.287 2.06 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.35 0.305 0.45 0.097 
Constant -0.19 0.830 2.98 0.000 
N 1146 
   
LR test χ2 1134.78 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.53 - Uruguay. AME of Being a CCT Beneficiary and of the Index of 
Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
CCT Beneficiary 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2009 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.070 0.341 0.029 0.278 0.041 0.569 
Apathetic -0.044 0.469 -0.107 0.216 0.151 0.083 
Supporter 0.017 0.479 0.022 0.507 -0.038 0.304 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT programs 
Oppositionist 0.042 0.147 -0.026 0.041 -0.016 0.570 
Apathetic 0.045 0.145 0.056 0.210 -0.101 0.028 
Supporter -0.005 0.680 0.001 0.945 0.004 0.840 
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Table E.54 - Costa Rica. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index 0.02 0.934 0.32 0.131 
Previous Oppositionist 0.37 0.336 -0.07 0.865 
Previous Apathetic -1.11 0.001 0.34 0.380 
Index × Previous Oppositionist 0.29 0.324 -0.58 0.061 
Index × Previous Apathetic 0.01 0.962 -0.47 0.115 
Female -0.26 0.147 -0.15 0.487 
White 0.15 0.402 -0.08 0.730 
Age (in years) 0.000 0.924 0.000 0.920 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.05 0.792 -0.06 0.799 
Identifies with PLN 0.00 0.995 3.60 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.39 0.074 0.04 0.894 
Constant -0.37 0.260 -0.95 0.010 
N 898 
   
LR test χ2 538.64 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.55 - Costa Rica. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs 
on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.056 0.071 -0.035 0.194 -0.020 0.450 
Apathetic 0.009 0.682 0.006 0.822 -0.015 0.480 
Supporter -0.024 0.507 -0.023 0.509 0.047 0.080 
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Table E.56 - El Salvador. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index -0.07 0.675 -0.13 0.422 
Previous Oppositionist -1.47 0.000 -2.51 0.000 
Previous Apathetic -0.29 0.355 -1.22 0.000 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.14 0.554 -0.49 0.094 
Index × Previous Apathetic 0.18 0.483 -0.34 0.226 
Female 0.29 0.123 0.30 0.125 
White 0.02 0.926 -0.08 0.715 
Age (in years) 0.002 0.781 -0.003 0.574 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.34 0.080 -0.40 0.053 
Identifies with FMLN 0.23 0.583 2.74 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.42 0.176 -0.17 0.563 
Constant 0.82 0.021 1.70 0.000 
N 1110 
   
LR test χ2 584.58 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.57 - El Salvador. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT 
Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2009 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.084 0.007 -0.005 0.846 -0.079 0.021 
Apathetic 0.019 0.482 0.073 0.025 -0.092 0.006 
Supporter 0.010 0.475 0.005 0.816 -0.015 0.485 
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Table E.58 - Honduras. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index -0.78 0.002 -0.52 0.006 
Previous Oppositionist -1.39 0.000 -2.71 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.67 0.033 -1.47 0.000 
Index × Previous Oppositionist 0.73 0.022 0.45 0.183 
Index × Previous Apathetic 1.16 0.000 0.52 0.121 
Female -0.25 0.166 0.04 0.846 
White -0.66 0.001 -0.28 0.168 
Age (in years) -0.007 0.264 -0.014 0.044 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.58 0.001 -0.08 0.691 
Identifies with PNH -0.53 0.086 1.49 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.06 0.814 -0.14 0.581 
Constant 1.11 0.002 1.98 0.000 
N 1191 
   
LR test χ2 715.56 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.59 - Honduras. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs 
on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2009 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.014 0.753 -0.006 0.866 -0.008 0.841 
Apathetic -0.032 0.209 0.074 0.021 -0.042 0.169 
Supporter 0.074 0.001 -0.059 0.059 -0.015 0.644 
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Table E.60 - Jamaica. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index -0.02 0.946 0.052 0.838 
Previous Oppositionist -1.46 0.001 -2.54 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.76 0.094 0.11 0.833 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.23 0.467 -0.26 0.602 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.17 0.573 -0.91 0.019 
Female 0.30 0.086 -0.11 0.666 
White NA NA NA NA 
Age (in years) -0.011 0.059 0.004 0.603 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.01 0.965 -0.23 0.376 
Identifies with JLP 0.49 0.200 2.36 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 1.47 0.037 2.50 0.001 
Constant 1.32 0.005 -0.20 0.730 
N 910 
   
LR test χ2 502.46 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
Note. Only one respondent was classified as white. 
 
 
 
Table E.61 - Jamaica. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs 
on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2007 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.053 0.198 -0.046 0.259 -0.007 0.805 
Apathetic 0.031 0.089 0.036 0.207 -0.067 0.007 
Supporter -0.001 0.984 -0.011 0.779 0.011 0.695 
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Table E.62 - Panama. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index 0.047 0.818 -0.21 0.203 
Previous Oppositionist -1.24 0.000 -3.54 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.90 0.007 -1.31 0.000 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.05 0.865 0.13 0.652 
Index × Previous Apathetic 0.27 0.370 -0.46 0.213 
Female 0.00 0.996 -0.25 0.177 
White -0.12 0.555 -0.21 0.287 
Age (in years) 0.005 0.508 0.016 0.020 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.30 0.124 0.54 0.006 
Identifies with Cambio Democratico -0.67 0.166 0.99 0.005 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.61 0.003 -0.08 0.703 
Constant 0.11 0.778 1.12 0.003 
N 1093 
   
LR test χ2 609.23 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.63 - Panama. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on 
the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2009 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.007 0.841 0.003 0.930 -0.010 0.714 
Apathetic -0.004 0.883 0.149 0.000 -0.145 0.000 
Supporter 0.017 0.324 0.028 0.139 -0.046 0.052 
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Table E.64 - Paraguay. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index -0.15 0.312 -0.14 0.262 
Previous Oppositionist -0.52 0.245 -1.31 0.008 
Previous Apathetic 1.54 0.000 -0.15 0.684 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.06 0.813 -0.21 0.470 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.12 0.568 -0.34 0.161 
Female 0.40 0.022 0.24 0.205 
White -0.40 0.029 -0.50 0.012 
Age (in years) 0.012 0.094 0.004 0.570 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.04 0.838 -0.43 0.031 
Identifies with PLRA -0.17 0.569 0.69 0.008 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.12 0.578 0.48 0.028 
Constant -0.66 0.100 0.31 0.447 
N 859 
   
LR test χ2 230.73 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.65 - Paraguay. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs 
on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2008 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.061 0.127 -0.022 0.515 -0.038 0.271 
Apathetic 0.053 0.030 -0.016 0.592 -0.037 0.096 
Supporter 0.032 0.206 -0.012 0.590 -0.019 0.463 
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Table E.66 - Trinidad and Tobago. MNL Model: DV = Intended 
Behavior in 2010 (Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index 0.14 0.547 -0.31 0.247 
Previous Oppositionist -1.06 0.005 -1.99 0.001 
Previous Apathetic 0.82 0.071 -0.92 0.127 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.35 0.208 -0.64 0.254 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.25 0.452 -0.15 0.761 
Female -0.14 0.466 0.08 0.763 
White 0.64 0.601 -12.30 0.976 
Age (in years) -0.002 0.732 0.002 0.838 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.01 0.951 0.04 0.898 
Identifies with PNM 0.20 0.613 2.61 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.19 0.387 0.47 0.134 
Constant 1.49 0.001 0.03 0.951 
N 851 
   
LR test χ2 408.62 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.67 - Trinidad and Tobago. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT 
Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2007 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.072 0.041 -0.015 0.681 -0.057 0.077 
Apathetic 0.013 0.556 0.013 0.685 -0.026 0.296 
Supporter -0.004 0.869 0.064 0.048 -0.060 0.018 
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Table E.68 - Belize. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index 0.22 0.296 -0.16 0.460 
Previous Oppositionist -0.83 0.093 -1.57 0.011 
Previous Apathetic 0.82 0.097 -0.74 0.209 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.20 0.458 -0.35 0.363 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.22 0.436 0.03 0.925 
Female 0.44 0.012 0.07 0.745 
White 0.94 0.254 0.11 0.920 
Age (in years) -0.014 0.027 0.003 0.722 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.26 0.143 -0.58 0.012 
Identifies with UDP -0.20 0.557 1.83 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.07 0.848 0.41 0.321 
Constant 0.70 0.142 0.20 0.715 
N 802 
   
LR test χ2 299.43 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.69 - Belize. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on 
the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2008 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.027 0.501 0.018 0.620 -0.045 0.099 
Apathetic 0.004 0.899 0.011 0.751 -0.015 0.588 
Supporter -0.013 0.687 0.066 0.071 -0.053 0.088 
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Table E.70 - Guyana. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index 0.22 0.364 0.22 0.280 
Previous Oppositionist 0.00 0.993 -0.61 0.078 
Previous Apathetic 1.35 0.000 0.26 0.466 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.69 0.028 -0.64 0.025 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.31 0.286 -0.89 0.004 
Female 0.20 0.267 0.29 0.121 
White NA NA NA NA 
Age (in years) 0.002 0.808 -0.007 0.307 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.28 0.160 0.13 0.572 
Identifies with PPP 0.00 0.996 1.33 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.61 0.008 1.22 0.000 
Constant -1.28 0.002 -0.53 0.193 
N 850 
   
LR test χ2 282.18 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
Note. None of the respondents was classified as white. 
 
 
 
Table E.71 - Guyana. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on 
the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.092 0.003 -0.046 0.080 -0.046 0.128 
Apathetic 0.052 0.090 0.040 0.250 -0.093 0.003 
Supporter -0.048 0.229 0.018 0.600 0.030 0.438 
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Table E.72 - Haiti. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 (Intended 
Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended Apathetic Intended Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index -0.30 0.110 -1.12 0.193 
Previous Oppositionist -0.70 0.014 -17.18 0.986 
Previous Apathetic -0.09 0.759 -2.81 0.072 
Index × Previous Oppositionist 0.12 0.658 3.04 0.996 
Index × Previous Apathetic 0.43 0.125 1.05 0.546 
Female 0.22 0.074 -0.37 0.646 
White 0.38 0.727 -10.54 0.998 
Age (in years) 0.02 0.000 0.001 0.975 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.04 0.749 -1.08 0.229 
Identifies with Lespwa -3.27 0.000 6.48 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.47 0.123 0.46 0.785 
Constant 0.51 0.091 -3.63 0.049 
N 1435 
   
LR test χ2 323.59 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
Note. The Survey for Haiti is the only one where intended behavior is 
indicated by an open-ended question. Only 2% of the respondents declared 
they would vote for the Fwon Lespwa and were classified as Intended 
Supporters. It explains the unusual results displayed under the column 
"Intended Supporter". For this reason, these estimates should be read with 
great cautious. 
 
 
 
Table E.73 - Haiti. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on 
the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.041 0.338 -0.041 0.337 0.000 0.998 
Apathetic -0.020 0.569 0.020 0.539 -0.001 0.955 
Supporter 0.059 0.084 -0.052 0.124 -0.006 0.246 
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Table E.74 - Nicaragua. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index -0.36 0.156 -0.54 0.020 
Previous Oppositionist -1.49 0.000 -3.24 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 0.00 0.991 -1.07 0.005 
Index × Previous Oppositionist 0.05 0.875 -0.20 0.654 
Index × Previous Apathetic 0.29 0.316 -0.38 0.239 
Female 0.41 0.016 0.23 0.302 
White 0.55 0.014 0.35 0.224 
Age (in years) 0.001 0.936 -0.002 0.781 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.25 0.161 0.12 0.609 
Identifies with FSLN 0.45 0.212 3.23 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.47 0.254 0.37 0.452 
Constant 0.01 0.974 0.60 0.186 
N 1083 
   
LR test χ2 879.75 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.75 - Nicaragua. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs 
on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.086 0.006 -0.026 0.311 -0.060 0.072 
Apathetic 0.048 0.039 0.057 0.033 -0.105 0.000 
Supporter 0.069 0.034 -0.008 0.809 -0.062 0.044 
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Table E.76 - Suriname. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index 0.21 0.644 0.27 0.281 
Previous Oppositionist 0.17 0.836 -0.29 0.499 
Previous Apathetic 1.98 0.014 -0.51 0.309 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.83 0.120 -0.41 0.136 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.21 0.672 -0.58 0.078 
Female 0.44 0.066 0.02 0.882 
White 17.06 0.996 0.95 1.000 
Age (in years) 0.04 0.000 0.019 0.004 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.02 0.928 -0.55 0.003 
Identifies with NPS 1.17 0.114 2.87 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.08 0.811 0.91 0.000 
Constant -4.32 0.000 -1.22 0.015 
N 986 
   
LR test χ2 296.70 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
Note. Only one respondent was classified as white. 
 
 
 
Table E.77 - Suriname. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs 
on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2005 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.037 0.076 -0.019 0.052 -0.018 0.370 
Apathetic 0.020 0.530 0.017 0.621 -0.037 0.127 
Supporter -0.059 0.272 0.004 0.856 0.055 0.298 
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Table E.78 - Venezuela. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2010 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index -0.29 0.187 -0.93 0.000 
Previous Oppositionist -1.40 0.003 -4.60 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 1.17 0.003 -1.36 0.001 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.13 0.679 0.57 0.308 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.15 0.589 0.42 0.174 
Female 0.06 0.767 -0.15 0.511 
White 0.51 0.014 0.41 0.103 
Age (in years) 0.008 0.280 -0.002 0.834 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.09 0.840 -0.09 0.869 
Identifies with PSUV 0.95 0.027 2.59 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.85 0.013 1.70 0.000 
Constant -0.39 0.527 1.15 0.106 
N 908 
   
LR test χ2 718.27 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.79 - Venezuela. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs 
on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.064 0.067 -0.051 0.154 -0.013 0.721 
Apathetic 0.070 0.003 -0.045 0.157 -0.025 0.328 
Supporter 0.103 0.000 0.035 0.185 -0.137 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194 
 
Table E.80 - Bolivia 2008. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2008 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index -0.11 0.574 -1.28 0.000 
Previous Oppositionist -1.62 0.000 -4.07 0.000 
Previous Apathetic -0.08 0.800 -2.20 0.000 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.02 0.934 0.62 0.064 
Index × Previous Apathetic 0.01 0.981 0.36 0.209 
Female 0.07 0.643 -0.18 0.301 
White -0.11 0.666 -0.37 0.268 
Age (in years) 0.004 0.403 -0.017 0.007 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.15 0.366 -0.37 0.047 
Identifies with MAS 0.12 0.836 3.30 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.94 0.005 2.03 0.000 
Constant 0.55 0.142 3.41 0.000 
N 1647 
   
LR test χ2 1189.41 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.81 - Bolivia 2008. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT 
Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2005 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.061 0.013 0.001 0.946 -0.063 0.016 
Apathetic 0.051 0.006 0.065 0.004 -0.116 0.000 
Supporter 0.064 0.000 0.116 0.000 -0.180 0.000 
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Table E.82 - Brazil 2007. MNL Model: DV = Behavior in 2006 (Oppositionist is 
Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Bolsa Família Beneficiary 0.02 0.984 0.70 0.362 
Index -0.55 0.095 -0.63 0.002 
Previous Oppositionist -1.47 0.028 -3.13 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 2.31 0.000 -0.90 0.072 
BF Beneficiary × Previous Oppositionist -11.76 0.982 -0.27 0.826 
BF Beneficiary × Previous Apathetic -0.61 0.621 -1.34 0.201 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.27 0.692 0.28 0.458 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.17 0.699 -0.20 0.601 
Female -0.49 0.096 -0.10 0.682 
White -0.61 0.046 -0.26 0.309 
Age (in years) 0.025 0.013 -0.002 0.839 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.16 0.727 -0.55 0.147 
Identifies with PT 0.72 0.085 1.40 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.29 0.502 0.26 0.456 
Constant -0.77 0.309 2.83 0.000 
N 650 
   
LR test χ2 391.79 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.83 - Brazil 2007. AME of Being a Bolsa Família Beneficiary and of the Index 
of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs on the Probability of Behavior in 2006 
Bolsa Família Beneficiary 
 
Oppositionist in 
2006 
Apathetic in 
2006 
Supporter in 
2006 
Behavior in 2002 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist -0.030 0.878 -0.094 0.003 0.124 0.522 
Apathetic 0.071 0.393 -0.041 0.706 -0.030 0.748 
Supporter -0.053 0.303 -0.031 0.346 0.084 0.153 
Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT programs 
Oppositionist 0.095 0.108 -0.049 0.269 -0.046 0.435 
Apathetic 0.078 0.006 -0.032 0.492 -0.046 0.287 
Supporter 0.060 0.001 -0.001 0.972 -0.060 0.013 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
Table E.84 - Chile 2008. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 2008 
(Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index -0.33 0.134 -0.47 0.016 
Previous Oppositionist -1.68 0.000 -2.81 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 1.61 0.000 -1.02 0.013 
Index × Previous Oppositionist 0.25 0.360 -0.25 0.466 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.25 0.348 -0.56 0.073 
Female 0.22 0.246 0.51 0.017 
White -0.24 0.209 -0.15 0.468 
Age (in years) 0.011 0.108 -0.001 0.947 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.12 0.669 0.01 0.970 
Identifies with PS -0.49 0.369 1.27 0.005 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.16 0.501 0.49 0.052 
Constant 0.19 0.703 1.39 0.009 
N 951 
   
LR test χ2 507.36 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.85 - Chile 2008. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT Programs 
on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2005 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.073 0.054 0.010 0.733 -0.083 0.022 
Apathetic 0.070 0.000 -0.015 0.580 -0.055 0.014 
Supporter 0.055 0.025 0.006 0.831 -0.061 0.064 
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Table E.86 - Dominican Republic 2008. MNL Model: DV = Intended 
Behavior in 2008 (Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index 0.17 0.483 -0.31 0.193 
Previous Oppositionist -2.69 0.000 -2.03 0.000 
Previous Apathetic -0.10 0.856 -0.92 0.069 
Index × Previous Oppositionist 0.24 0.528 0.02 0.961 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.09 0.790 -0.50 0.213 
Female 0.41 0.161 0.05 0.862 
White 0.07 0.876 0.39 0.318 
Age (in years) 0.014 0.131 -0.008 0.384 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.34 0.289 -0.07 0.802 
Identifies with PLD 1.35 0.068 5.45 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.93 0.102 0.84 0.092 
Constant -1.22 0.060 0.72 0.217 
N 896 
   
LR test χ2 792.19 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.87 - Dominican Republic 2008. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose 
CCT Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2004 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.008 0.594 0.013 0.092 -0.021 0.171 
Apathetic 0.029 0.259 0.038 0.167 -0.067 0.009 
Supporter 0.013 0.547 0.029 0.101 -0.042 0.043 
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Table E.88 - Ecuador 2008. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 
2008 (Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index 0.04 0.774 -0.21 0.068 
Previous Oppositionist -0.93 0.000 -2.28 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 1.17 0.000 -0.48 0.137 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.13 0.488 -0.16 0.413 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.07 0.757 -0.47 0.087 
Female 0.08 0.542 0.05 0.689 
White -0.31 0.210 -0.33 0.170 
Age (in years) -0.001 0.802 -0.013 0.003 
Lives in Urban Areas -0.11 0.459 -0.02 0.910 
Identifies with Alianza PAIS -0.80 0.032 1.69 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.05 0.807 0.70 0.000 
Constant 0.63 0.014 2.05 0.000 
N 2086 
   
LR test χ2 809.91 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.89 - Ecuador 2008. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT 
Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2006 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.051 0.054 0.005 0.824 -0.057 0.028 
Apathetic 0.023 0.212 0.088 0.005 -0.111 0.000 
Supporter 0.015 0.218 0.033 0.025 -0.047 0.004 
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Table E.90 - Panama 2008. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 
2008 (Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index 0.21 0.272 0.01 0.968 
Previous Oppositionist -0.62 0.049 -2.73 0.000 
Previous Apathetic 1.41 0.000 -1.09 0.001 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.42 0.102 0.00 0.994 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.41 0.083 -0.26 0.402 
Female 0.04 0.775 -0.19 0.327 
White 0.06 0.704 0.10 0.625 
Age (in years) 0.014 0.007 -0.008 0.267 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.09 0.598 -0.80 0.000 
Identifies with PRD -0.63 0.070 2.45 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy 0.02 0.952 0.13 0.659 
Constant -1.13 0.002 0.83 0.034 
N 1133 
   
LR test χ2 707.65 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.91 - Panama 2008. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT 
Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2004 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.027 0.417 -0.031 0.235 0.004 0.889 
Apathetic 0.042 0.141 -0.029 0.362 -0.014 0.611 
Supporter -0.017 0.565 0.032 0.219 -0.015 0.601 
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Table E.92 - Uruguay 2008. MNL Model: DV = Intended Behavior in 
2008 (Intended Oppositionist is Reference Category) 
 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Variable β p β p 
Index 0.14 0.454 -0.63 0.001 
Previous Oppositionist -1.44 0.000 -2.79 0.000 
Previous Apathetic -0.31 0.502 -0.86 0.074 
Index × Previous Oppositionist -0.08 0.739 -0.60 0.224 
Index × Previous Apathetic -0.32 0.322 -0.21 0.611 
Female 0.17 0.398 0.28 0.260 
White -0.45 0.060 -0.21 0.475 
Age (in years) -0.023 0.000 -0.018 0.022 
Lives in Urban Areas 0.01 0.981 -0.26 0.533 
Identifies with Frente Amplio -0.63 0.270 3.74 0.000 
Positive Perception of Economy -0.67 0.054 0.70 0.029 
Constant 1.41 0.009 1.64 0.008 
N 1032 
   
LR test χ2 973.48 
   
χ2 p-value 0.000       
 
 
 
Table E.93 - Uruguay 2008. AME of the Index of Propensity to Oppose CCT 
Programs on the Probability of Intended Behavior 
 
Intended 
Oppositionist 
Intended 
Apathetic 
Intended 
Supporter 
Behavior in 2004 AME p AME p AME p 
Oppositionist 0.093 0.009 0.023 0.145 -0.116 0.002 
Apathetic 0.075 0.053 0.011 0.723 -0.086 0.019 
Supporter 0.030 0.126 0.062 0.002 -0.092 0.000 
 
 
